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SURVEY
Clarifying North Carolina's Ethnic Intimidation Statute and
Penalty Enhancement for Bias Crimes
"Government officials, advocacy groups, and citizens themselves
must keep the pressure on legislatures and courts to prevent a
withdrawal from the goal of protecting all victims of hate crimes
everywhere."'
Almost every state, including North Carolina, has enacted
criminal laws to counteract violent conduct based on characteristics
such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability,
and age.2 These "hate crime" or "bias crime" laws vary widely in
1. JACK LEVIN & JACK MCDEVITr, HATE CRIMES: THE RISING TIDE OF BIGOTRY

AND BLOODSHED 203 (1993); see also Thomas Ferry, Community Involvement and
Interagency Cooperationin the Prevention of Hate Crimes, in BIAS CRIME: AMERICAN
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LEGAL RESPONSES 132, 141 (Robert J.Kelly ed., 2d ed. 1993)
(noting that a "state legislature ... becomes part of [the] ...criminal justice system when

it considers and debates any proposed law that might affect, even remotely, any area of
criminal justice activities").
2. See Anti-Defamation League, Hate Crimes Laws: Chart and Graphs: State Hate

Crimes Statutory Provisions (visited Sept. 1, 2000) <http:lwww.adl.orglframes/
front_99hatecrime.html> [hereinafter ADL State Provisions] (charting the various hate
crime laws enacted by the states); see also J. David Coldren, Bias Crimes: State Policy
AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LEGAL
Considerations, in BIAS CRIME:
RESPONSES, supra note 1, at 163, 168 (noting the growth in state hate crimes laws in the

1980s and 1990s); Robert V. Ward, Jr., Hate Crimes, 32 GONz. L. REv. 511, 513-14 (1997)
(stating that more than forty states have adopted criminal bias crime laws).
In addition to criminal provisions, many states have enacted non-penal bias crime
laws. See generally LU-IN WANG, HATE CRIMES LAW app. B (1999) (providing an
annually-updated comparison of all states' bias crimes statutes); Staff Project, Crimes
Motivated by Hatred. The Constitutionality and Impact of Hate Crime Legislation in the
United States, 1 SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL'Y 29 app. A at 68-84 (1995) (compiling all
state bias crime legislation). Some of these statutes provide civil remedies against
perpetrators. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-106.5 (West 1999) (allowing
either the victim or the victim's family to recover damages); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.

12, § 11H (West 1999) (granting a civil cause of action to the state attorney general); see
also Michael A. Sandberg, Bias Crime: The Problems and the Remedies, in BIAS CRIME:
AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LEGAL RESPONSES, supra note 1, at 193, 196-97
(explaining the civil actions available in Illinois); Morris Dees & Ellen Bowden, Taking
Hate Groups to Court, TRIAL, Feb. 1995, at 22, 24 (1995) (describing the process of
bringing civil suits for bias crimes). Other civil statutes require state and local agencies to

compile statistics of bias crimes or to report incidents of bias-motivated conduct to central
repositories. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 877.19 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000) (requiring

police departments to report monthly); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.550 (1997) (mandating
annual reports).

A few state statutes require bias crime training programs for law
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detail, but each of them falls into one of several general categories. 3

The oldest category of statutes was enacted during the 1950s or
earlier to curb the violent and intimidating conduct of the Ku Klux

Klan.4 These statutes, many of which are still in effect today, punish
specific activities such as cross-burning, vandalism, wearing masks
and hoods, and organizing secret societies. 5 While these "Klan laws"
target conduct associated with racial, ethnic, or religious hostility,
they have only been labeled "bias crime" laws in light of the newer

generation of bias crime legislation.6
Compelled by the public's perception of a rise in hate violence,
many states passed new types of laws during the 1980s and 1990s that
criminalize bias-motivated conduct.' In contrast to the "Klan laws,"
which focus on particular acts, these statutes focus on the offender's
motive and enumerate protected victim groups.8 The first new type of
enforcement officials. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 8.34 (West 1999) (requiring hate
crime training for prosecutors); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.642 (1997) (requiring training for
police officers). This Note, however, focuses only on certain statutes providing a criminal
penalty for unlawful acts motivated by bias.
3. See VALERIE JENNESS & KENDAL BROAD, HATE CRIMES: NEW SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS AND THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE 39-40 (1997) (describing the types of
statutes); BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A
POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE TO HATE CRIMES 27 (1997) [hereinafter POLICYMAKER'S
GUIDE] (same).
4. See JENNESS & BROAD, supra note 3, at 40 (noting that some of these laws date
back to the latter part of the nineteenth century); see also DONALD ALTSCHILLER, HATE
CRIMES: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 22 (1999) (noting the connection between these
laws and Klan violence); WANG, supranote 2, § 11.01, at 11-2 (same).
5. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-37(b) (1999) (criminalizing burnings intended to
intimidate others); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.35(4) (McKinney 2000) (prohibiting certain
masked gatherings in public places). See generally WANG, supra note 2, at §§ 11.01-13.03
(describing these and similar laws in more detail). North Carolina's "Klan laws," enacted
in 1953, are described infranotes 26-29 and accompanying text.
6. See JENNESS & BROAD, supra note 3, at 39-40 (explaining that these laws
originated in "a previous generation," "were not introduced under the rubric of hate
crimes legislation," and are only "in retrospect" considered bias crime laws).
7. As Professor Frederick Lawrence explains, "During the 1980s, public concern
over the level of racially-motivated violence in the United States rose dramatically. This
decade saw the most significant legislative response to the problem of bias crimes since
Reconstruction." Frederick M. Lawrence, The Case for a Federal Bias Crime Law, 16
NAT'L BLACK L.J. 144, 145 (1999); see also Terry A. Maroney, Note, The Struggle Against
Hate Crime: Movement at a Crossroads,73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 564, 564-92 (1998) (analyzing
the "unprecedented public attention focused on hate crime" in the 1980s and 1990s and
the consequent legislative response).
8. See JENNESS & BROAD, supra note 3, at 40. These types of bias crime laws were
challenged repeatedly in the 1980s and early 1990s on grounds that they unconstitutionally
burdened the perpetrators' First Amendment right to free speech. See, e.g., People v.
Grupe, 532 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (1988) (holding that a law prohibiting bias-motivated
violence did not prohibit free speech). Two United States Supreme Court cases, however,
have largely dispelled any uncertainty surrounding the issue. In 1992, the Court, in R.A.V.
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law-the sentence-enhancement statute-permits a judge, during the

sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution, to impose a higher
sentence for any crime motivated by the race, religion, or other

protected status of the victim.9 The second type, which commonly
includes "ethnic intimidation" or "malicious harassment" statutes,
generally targets physical injury, property damage, and threats proven
to be motivated by bias. 10 Such statutes create new substantive crimes

by taking the elements of an existing crime, adding the requirement
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), struck down a statute criminalizing "fighting
words" based on race, color, creed, religion, or gender. See id. at 394-96. The Court held
that because the statute did not criminalize all "fighting words," it isolated for special
punishment only a certain type of speech and therefore violated the First Amendment.
See id. The next year, however, in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993), the Court
unanimously upheld a Wisconsin statute penalizing perpetrators who selected their victims
on the basis of race, religion, disability, or other protected characteristic. See id. at 488-90.
The Court reasoned that because the statute punished action based on ideas rather than
punishing the ideas themselves, it did not violate the First Amendment. See id. at 487; see
also Hans F. Bader, Recent Development, Penalty Enhancement for Bias-Based Crimes:
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993), 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 253, 254-60
(1994) (summarizing the Mitchell opinion). Mitchell has not entirely prevented further
academic debate on whether bias crime statutes violate the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
Steven G. Gey, What if Wisconsin v. Mitchell Had Involved Martin Luther King, Jr.? The
ConstitutionalFlaws of Hate Crime Enhancement Statutes, 65 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1014,
1014 (1997) (calling the Mitchell rationale "deeply and irrevocably flawed"); Scott T.
Noth, Comment, A Penny for Your Thoughts: Post-Mitchell Hate Crime Laws Confirm a
Mutating Effect Upon Our FirstAmendment and the Government's Role in Our Lives, 10
REGENT U. L. REV. 167, 191 (1998) (stating that "[w]hen ... government [regulates] not
only actions and intentions, but motivational notions, it has trespassed into a new
jurisdiction, grasping at reins not meant for human hands"). The decision has, however,
established that almost all current statutory criminal penalties based on bias are no longer
vulnerable to First Amendment litigation. See Anti-Defamation League, Hate Crimes
Laws: Constitutionality: ConstitutionalChallenges to Hate Crimes Statutes (visited Sept. 1,
2000) <http://www.adl.org/frames/front_99hatecrime.html>.
9. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-13(c) (1999) (mandating higher minimum sentences
for crimes shown to have been motivated by bias); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 44-3 (West 1995
& Supp. 1999) (requiring an "an extended term" for a crime motivated by bias); see also
Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, Strengthening Hate Crime Laws in Kentucky, 88 KY. L.J. 63, 75-76
(2000) (describing Kentucky's sentence-enhancement provision).
10. See WANG, supra note 2, § 10.03, at 10-7. The following actual event, which took
place in North Carolina, illustrates the type of conduct ethnic intimidation statutes are
designed to punish:
In March 1988, an African-American woman was injured as she and her two
children fled the path of a pickup truck in Taylorsville, North Carolina. Three
white males in the truck yelled racial slurs and swerved the truck toward the
family. On the third pass, the truck cut off the woman's path ... then left the
scene when another vehicle approached. The woman fell twice, sustaining
injuries ... that required surgery.
LEViN & MCDEvrrr, supra note 1, at 188 (citing an account from CENTER FOR
DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL, THEY DON'T ALL WEAR SHEETS:

RACIST AND FAR RIGHT VIOLENCE-1980-1986 (1987)).

A CHRONOLOGY OF
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of bias, and making the penalty more severe than it would be for the
same crime without bias.
The third type of modem law
criminalizing bias-motivated conduct is the penalty-enhancement
statute, which provides an automatic increase in the offender's
penalty if the prosecution proves the crime was motivated by bias
toward the victim's protected status. 2 As with ethnic intimidation
and malicious harassment statutes, offenders must be charged under
penalty-enhancement statutes in order for the increased punishment
to apply; unlike sentence-enhancement statutes, penaltyenhancement statutes require police and prosecutors, rather than
judges, to determine initially whether the offender should be
punished for bias. 3
Most states use similar causation language in each of the newer
types of bias crime statutes-they require that the offense was
perpetrated "because of," "on account of," or "by reason of" the
victim's protected characteristic.' 4 Despite the prevalence of this
language, confusion has arisen concerning the required connection
between the offender's bias and the crime committed. 5 This Note
examines ways to improve the causation language of North Carolina's
ethnic intimidation statute and penalty-enhancement statute in light
of the North Carolina General Assembly's recent, unsuccessful
attempt to amend them. 6 Presently, both statutes require proof that
11. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 470A(b)(3)-(4) (1999) (penalizing biasmotivated property damage); see also James B. Jacobs, The Emergenceand Implications of
American Hate Crime Jurisprudence, in HATE CRIME: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF
POLARIZATION 150, 159-62 (Robert J. Kelly & Jess Maghan eds., 1998) (noting that these
statutes are substantively independent of other crimes); Kenneth A. Wittenberg, Taking A
Bite Out of Hate Crimes, 57 OR. ST. B. BULL. 9, 9-10 (1996) (describing Oregon's ethnic
intimidation law). North Carolina's ethnic intimidation statute is described infra notes 3437 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1304(a)(2) (1998) (reclassifying high
misdemeanors as felonies); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.749 (West 2000) (same). North
Carolina's penalty-enhancement statute is described infra notes 38-42 and accompanying
text. According to the Anti-Defamation League, only ten states, as of 1999, had not
enacted penalty-enhancement hate crime laws. These states are Arkansas, Georgia,
Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, New Mexico, New York, South Carolina, and
Wyoming. See ADL State Provisions, supra note 2, at <http://www.adl.orglframesl
front_99hatecrime.html>.
13. See infra note 42 and accompanying text (describing the charging procedure for
North Carolina's penalty-enhancement statute).
14. See FREDERICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER
AMERICAN LAW 35-36 (1999); Jacobs, supra note 11, at 162; Lu-in Wang, The
Transforming Power of "Hate": Social Cognition Theory and the Harms of Bias-Related
Crime,71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47,67 (1997).
15. See discussion infra notes 61-87 and accompanying text.
16. See An Act to Honor the Memory of Matthew Shepard by Expanding the Scope
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the specified offenses were committed "because of the victim's race,

color, religion, nationality, or country of origin.'

7

This Note suggests

that clarifying the "because of" language to convey more clearly the

required level of causation and the type of bias that must be proven
will improve the two statutes' enforceability and effectiveness.
This Note first discusses North Carolina's bias crime laws,
focusing on the ethnic intimidation statute and penalty-enhancement
statute.'" Next, the Note discusses the General Assembly's recent

proposed changes to these two laws, 9 and explains an alternative that
could both reflect the spirit of the amendments and better

communicate the statutes' causation and motivation requirements. 20
The Note then suggests that revised causation language will
encourage investigation of bias-motivation 2 1 help improve the

collection of data on bias crimes in North Carolina,z2 and facilitate
further amendments to North Carolina's bias crime laws.23

The North Carolina General Statutes codify a family of laws that
impose criminal penalties on certain acts motivated by bias.2 4 The
General Assembly has enacted each major type of hate crime law
discussed above?5 North Carolina was among the several states in the
1950s to enact laws criminalizing activities traditionally associated

with the Ku Klux Klan,' such as destruction of religious strnctures.27
of the Hate Crime Laws and Increasing the Criminal Penalty for Committing a Hate
Crime, H.R. 884, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1999).
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-3(c) (1999) (emphasis added); id. § 14-401.14.
18. See infra notes 24-42 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 43-60 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 61-87 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 98-112 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
24. See CITIZENS' RIGHTS SECTION, NORTH CAROLINA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
OFFICE, HATE CRIME STATUTES IN NORTH CAROLINA 1-9 (2000) [hereinafter
STATUTES IN NORTH CAROLINA].
25. See id. Many of these crimes are punished as misdemeanors and several others as
felonies. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-12.3 (1999) (punishing certain secret meetings as
misdemeanors); id. § 14-62.2 (1999) (punishing setting fire to religious structures as a
felony). In North Carolina, if the maximum punishment for a crime is more than six
months imprisonment, it is a Class 1 misdemeanor. If the maximum punishment is
between 30 days and 6 months imprisonment, the crime is a Class 2 misdemeanor. If the
punishment is 30 or fewer days imprisonment or a monetary fine, the crime is a Class 3
misdemeanor. See id. § 14-3(a)(1)-(3) (1999). The presumptive ranges of sentences
permitted for felonies are set out in section 15A-1340.17(c)(2) of the North Carolina
General Statutes. See id. § 15A-1340.17(c)(2) (1999).
26. See A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1953: Criminal Law:
Secret Societies, 31 N.C. L. REv. 375, 401-03 (1953) (noting the connection between the
1953 legislation and Ku Klux Klan activities). Each of these statutes is separately
enumerated within Article 4A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes of North Carolina.
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placement of exhibits to intimidate
others,8 and participation in
29
activities.
subversive
certain
The General Assembly also adopted, during the early 1990s,
each of the modem types of criminal statutes targeting bias-related
acts. First, the General Statutes provide a sentence-enhancement
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-12.2 to 14-12.15 (1999). Exemptions from Article 4A are listed
in section 14-12.11. While these statutes aim to deter bias-related activities, not all of them
require the State to prove bias. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-62.2 (1999) (punishing
church burning as a felony regardless of the perpetrator's motive). Where bias is not an
element of the crime, but is nevertheless proven and the activity is punishable as a felony,
the sentence can be increased under the sentence-enhancement statute described infra
notes 30-33 and accompanying text. See id. § 15A-1340.16(d)(17) (1999).
27. Most prominent among the statutes aiming to prevent damage to religious
structures are the prohibitions on cross-burning and church burning. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 14-12.12, 14-49(b)(1), 14-62.2 (1999). Placing a burning or flaming cross on another
person's property without that person's permission is prohibited, see id. § 14-12.12(a), as is
placing a burning cross on a public street or highway if intended to intimidate or influence
another person or group, see id. § 14-12.12(b). Willfully setting or helping set fire to a
church, chapel, or meetinghouse is punishable as a felony, even when the State fails to
prove the offender's racial or ethnic bias. See id. § 14-62.2. Finally, it is a felony to
damage maliciously a place of worship with an explosive or incendiary device. See id. § 1449(b)(1).
28. North Carolina has two laws that punish individuals who construct exhibits with
the intent to intimidate or provoke other persons. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-12.13, 1412.14. While the use of intimidating exhibits is traditionally associated with acts of racial
or religious intolerance, actual bias is not an element of either of these statutes. See
STATUTES INNORTH CAROLINA, supra note 24, at 6. The first statute makes it a Class I
felony to set up any exhibit with the intention of intimidating another person, causing that
person to do something unlawful, or preventing that person from doing something lawful.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-12.13. The second statute prohibits displaying such exhibits
while wearing a mask or other obscuring device. See id. §14-12.14. The North Carolina
Attorney General's Office claims that the first of these two statutes "applies to many more
situations, and may be the most constitutionally defensible." STATUTES IN NORTH
CAROLINA,

supra note 24, at 6.

29. There are numerous prohibitions on secret meetings and other covert activities.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-12.3 to 14-12.5, 14-12.7 to 14-12.9. Each is punishable as a
Class 1 misdemeanor. See id. § 14-12.15. For example, it is unlawful to join, aid, or in any
way organize a secret political or military society or a society that meets to violate or
circumvent North Carolina's laws. See id. § 14-12.3. In general, to be prohibited, a society
must promote or conduct illegal or dangerously subversive activities. See id. § 14-12.2 (1)(3) (defining "secret society," "secret political society," and "secret military society").
Societies not violating the law may meet, but must identify with signs the locations of their
meetings and maintain lists of members and organizers. See id. § 14-12.6. Also,
individuals may not permit unlawful secret societies to organize or meet on their property.
See id. § 14-12.5. North Carolina also prohibits taking oaths or pledges, or using signs,
grips, passwords, or disguises to advance a secret military, political, or unlawful purpose.
See id. § 14-12.4. In addition, no one may wear a mask, hood, or other face- or voicedisguising device on a street or other public way, on any public property in the state, or on
private property without the owner's consent. See id. §§ 14-12.7-14-12.9; see also id. § 1412.11 (exempting certain types of disguises, such as holiday and theater costumes and
trade safety gear).
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In determining a convicted felon's
provision for felonies. °
punishment, courts may impose a greater sentence after considering
any of several enumerated aggravating factors. 3 ' One aggravating
factor the court may consider is whether the "offense for which the
defendant stands convicted was committed against a victim because of

the victim's race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin."'32 If
the state proves such causation by a preponderance of the evidence

into
and the sentencing judge chooses to take the aggravating factor
3
punishment?
defendant's
the
increase
may
judge
account, the
The second type of modem bias crime law, the ethnic
intimidation statute, creates a new crime that requires the prosecution
to prove that specified acts were committed "because of' a protected

characteristic. 4 Any adult who assaults another person, damages or
defaces the property of another person, or threatens to do either of
these acts, "because of race, color, religion, nationality, or country of
origin" is guilty of a Class I misdemeanor. 3 Therefore, if a police
investigation of an assault or property damage reveals evidence of

racial, religious, or ethnic bias, the state may charge the perpetrator
under the ethnic intimidation statute rather than the statute

penalizing the same assault or vandalism committed without bias.36
The statute also punishes anyone who teaches the techniques used to

perpetrate such bias-motivated assault or property damage.37

30. See id. § 15A-1340.16(d)(17).
31. See id. § 15A-1340.16(b).
32. Id. § 15A-1340.16(d)(17) (emphasis added). In a recent case, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals noted that the United States Supreme Court has held that using bias as
an aggravating factor when determining the sentence to be imposed for a crime does not
violate the First Amendment. See In re McDonald, 133 N.C. App. 433, 435, 515 S.E.2d
719,721 (1999) (citing Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476,485 (1993)).
33. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(a)-(b). The sentencing judge may increase
the sentence only within the range permitted by Section 15A-1340.17(c)(4). See id. § 15A1340.16(b). The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that such bias existed at the time of the crime before it may be considered an aggravating
factor. See id. § 15A-1340.16(a). The bias factor cannot be used when the sentence is
death and it cannot be the basis for increasing a sentence from incarceration to death. See
STATUTES IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 24, at 4. According to the North Carolina
Attorney General's office, some of the felonies most commonly involving bias, and
therefore most vulnerable to sentence-enhancement, are homicide, malicious maiming,
malicious castration, assault, arson, church burning, and stalking. See id.
34. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-401.14 (1999).
35. Id. § 14-401.14(a) (emphasis added). The crime does not necessarily have to be
based on the victim's own race; it may also be based on the victim's association with other
people of a particular race, religion, or other protected class. See STATUTES IN NORTH
CAROLINA, supranote 24, at 1.
36. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-401.14(a).
37. See id. § 14-401.14(b).

2010

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

Third, the North Carolina General Statutes include a penaltyenhancement for misdemeanors, which allows offenders who
perpetrate misdemeanors "because of" a protected characteristic to
be charged under the statute prohibiting the misdemeanor itself, as
well as under section 14-3(c), which increases the penalty because of
the bias.3 8 This penalty-enhancement statute provides that any crime
that is ordinarily punished as a Class 2 or Class 3 misdemeanor "shall
be" punished as a Class 1 misdemeanor if it is committed "because of39
the victim's race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin.
Likewise, if a crime is ordinarily punished as a Class Al or Class 1
misdemeanor, it "shall be" punished as a Class I felony if it is
committed "because of the victim's race, color, religion, nationality,
or country of origin." 40 The penalty-enhancement provision applies
to all misdemeanors defined by North Carolina law except for ethnic
intimidation, of which bias is already an element.41 In writing the
charge for a misdemeanor believed to be committed "because of" the
victim's protected status, a magistrate must specify that the crime was
both in violation of the statute prohibiting the crime itself and in
violation of the penalty-enhancement statute. 42
In April 1999, members of the North Carolina General Assembly
introduced House Bill 884,43 which proposed several amendments to
North Carolina's sentence-enhancement, ethnic intimidation, and
38. See id. § 14-3(c) (1999).
39. Id. (emphasis added); see also supra note 25 (describing North Carolina's
classification system for misdemeanors).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-3(c) (emphasis added); see also supra note 25 (describing
North Carolina's classification system for misdemeanors). The Attorney General's office
notes that some of the most common Class 2 and 3 misdemeanors for which penalties are
enhanced under this statute are first degree trespass, stalking (when no restraining order is
in effect), and second degree trespass. See STATUTES IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note
24, at 3. Some of the most common Class 1 misdemeanors are cross-burning, assault and
battery, willful injury to real property, desecration of gravesites, communicating threats,
and stalking (when a restraining order is in effect). See id.
41. See STATUTES IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 24, at 2; see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-3(c).
42. See STATUTES IN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 24, at 2. The Attorney
General's Office further explains that a charge for a Class 2 or 3 misdemeanor "should
1) refer to the [prohibited motive], 2) refer to the crime as a Class 1 misdemeanor, and 3)
state that the crime was in violation of the underlying crime and N.C.G.S. 14-3(c)." Id. A
charge for a Class 1 misdemeanor "should 1) state that the crime was committed
'feloniously,' 2) refer to the [prohibited motive] of the crime, and 3) state that the crime
was in violation of the underlying statute and N.C.G.S. 14-3(c)." Id.
43. An Act to Honor the Memory of Matthew Shepard by Expanding the Scope of
the Hate Crime Laws and Increasing the Criminal Penalty for Committing a Hate Crime,
H.R. 884, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1999). A companion bill was introduced the same
day in the North Carolina Senate. See S.R. 814,1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1999).
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penalty-enhancement statutes.'4 The Bill, which failed on its second
reading,45 would have amended the causation requirement in the
ethnic intimidation and penalty-enhancement statutes to include
proof of hatred by requiring that the relevant offense not only be
committed "because of" a protected characteristic, but also that it
"arise[ ] out of the offender's generalized hatred of that category of
persons. '46 If this change were the only proposed amendment in the
Bill, the Bill could be seen as an attempt to weaken these two statutes
by limiting them only to cases where the state can prove the
perpetrator's actual hatred.4 7 The Bill as a whole, however, is a plain
attempt to broaden the two statutes in several ways.
First, the Bill's introductory remarks evince the General
Assembly's attempt to address recent incidents of bias-related
violence. The Bill stated that it was prompted in part by the murder
of Matthew Shepard, a young Wyoming man and former North
Carolina resident who "was seemingly a victim of a hate crime, his
sexual orientation being the apparent reason for his murder."' The
Bill also stated that "violent crime is abhorrent, and violent criminal
acts based on a person's group membership are particularly
unacceptable in a civil society. ' 49 Most importantly, as stated in its
title, the Bill's goals were to "expand[] the scope of the hate crime
laws and increas[e] the criminal penalty for committing a hate
crime." 50 Second, every proposed amendment in the original version
of the Bill reflected these goals. The original version, which was
paralleled by Senate Bill 814,11 proposed adding gender, sexual
orientation, and disability to the protected characteristics in the
sentence-enhancement,
ethnic
intimidation,
and
penalty5
2
enhancement statutes. It also proposed reclassifying a violation of
44. See H.R. 884. House Bill 884 was introduced by Representatives Alexander,
Easterling, Hackney, Hensley, Insko, Luebke, G. Miller, Nesbit, Womble, and Wright.
See id.
45. See North Carolina General Assembly, Bill Inquiry (visited Sept. 1, 2000)
<http://www.ncga.state.nc.us>.
46. H.R. 884.
47. See id.
48. Id. Matthew Shepard, a 21-year-old gay University of Wyoming student, was
severely beaten by two men, tethered to a fence and left to die in near-freezing
temperatures outside of Laramie, Wyoming, in October 1998. See Howard Chua-Eoan,
That's Not a Scarecrow, TIME, Oct. 19, 1998, at 72.
49. H.R. 884.

50. Id.
51. Senate Bill 814 was sponsored by Senators Gulley, Ballance, Dannelly, Kinnaird,
Lucas, W. Martin, B. Miller, Reeves, and L. Shaw. See Bill Inquiry, supra note 45, at
<http://www.ncga.state.nc.us>.
52. See H.R. 884,1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1999) (original version).
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the ethnic intimidation statute from a Class I misdemeanor to a Class
I felony, and expanding the penalty-enhancement statute to include
felonies, not just misdemeanors.53
Finally, the proposed amendment to the causation element in the
ethnic intimidation and penalty-enhancement statutes, which would
have required proof of the "offender's generalized hatred," was

added in committee to the original version of the Bill. 4 While this
change might have narrowed the statutes' applicability, it does not
appear to be an attempt to undermine the goal of "expanding the
scope of the hate crime laws."'55 The committee members approved
each of the broad expansions in the original Bill and further proposed
that "age" also be made a protected characteristic.56 This Note views
the proposed "hatred" amendment as an attempt to emphasize and

clarify the targeted motivation, but asserts that it is too specific to
fulfill the Bill's goal of "expanding the scope of the hate crime laws.""
53. See id.
54. See H.R. 884 (after committee substitute).
55. See H.R. 884 (original version).
56. See id.
57. H.R. 884; see infra discussion accompanying notes 58-87. This analysis obviously
starts with the proposition that "bias crimes" laws are an appropriate means of preventing
hate-motivated harms. It is important to note, however, that there has been a great deal
of academic controversy over whether it is a good idea to punish bias more than other
criminal motivations, such as greed or lust. See, e.g., Craig L. Uhrich, Comment, Hate
Crime Legislation: A Policy Analysis, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1467, 1528 (1999) (asserting that
"the issue of punishing motive as an element of the crime is one with which the criminal
law is not adequately equipped to deal"). Generally, commentators argue that biasmotivated offenders are not necessarily more culpable than other offenders, and biasmotivated crime is not necessarily more wrongful than other crime; therefore, offenders
should not be punished more severely. See Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An
Examination of the TheoreticalFoundations of Bias Crime Statutes, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
1015, 1081 (1997) (hesitating to concede that bias crimes laws are theoretically sound). See
generally JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTrER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW &
IDENTITY POLITICS (1998) (arguing against hate crimes laws on numerous legal and
policy-related fronts); Carol S. Steiker, PunishingHateful Motives: Old Wine in a New
Bottle Revives Calls for Prohibition,97 MICH. L. REV. 1857, 1859 (1999) (book review)
(noting that Jacobs and Potter examine all aspects of hate crimes laws and "find nothing,
except perhaps good intentions, to recommend them").
This Note, however, in addressing one way North Carolina's laws can be
improved, accepts the arguments of many scholars, and almost every advocacy group, that
bias crimes laws are philosophically and practically sound, particularly because of the
heightened impact bias crimes have on victims and the community in comparison to other
crimes. See, e.g, LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 58-63 (arguing that the greater harm
justifies a greater penalty); SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, TEN WAYS TO FIGHT
HATE 23 (2000) [hereinafter TEN WAYS] ("Because of the great danger they pose, hate
crimes warrant aggravated penalties."); Alon Harel & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate
and Equality, 109 YALE L.J 507, 523-38 (1999) (formulating a justification for bias crimes
based on distributive justice principles); Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist
Personality: Why the Critics of Hate Crimes Legislation Are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. REV. 739,
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Because of the ambiguity inherent in the causation language of
both the ethnic intimidation and the penalty-enhancement statutes,
the committee properly sought to make the bias element more
specific. 58 A more effective approach, however, would have been to
replace or otherwise clarify the ambiguous "because of' language
instead of merely supplementing that language by imposing the
"hatred" requirement of House Bill 884.59 After discussing the two
major ambiguities of the "because of' language, this Note proposes
an alternative way to amend North Carolina's ethnic intimidation and
penalty-enhancement statutes to clarify further and reflect better the
goal of House Bill 884.0 By specifying exactly the type of causation
they intend to penalize, these two statutes can ultimately become
stronger and more comprehensive parts of North Carolina's scheme
of bias crime laws.
The first type of ambiguity in the "because of" language involves
the degree to which the characteristics of the victim motivated the
"Because of" requires causation between the victim's
crime.
characteristic and the crime, 61 but does not indicate the required level
of causation. 2 One reasonably may assume that the legislature
intended for the race, religion, or other protected attributes of the
victim to be more than just a passing thought,63 but whether the
protected attribute must be the sole cause of the crime, a substantial
cause, or simply one of several causes is unclear. The words "because
of," "by reason of," or "on account of" may be interpreted plausibly
to require any one of the three. 64 Consider the following scenario: A
746-85 (1999) (refuting, on several bases, the argument that hate crimes laws are
theoretically unjustifiable); see also Lawrence, supra note 7, at 145 (1999) ("A federal bias
crime statute is warranted as a matter of... public policy.").
58. See infra discussion accompanying notes 61-87 (discussing the ambiguity an
proposing an alternative approach to resolve the ambiguity).
59. See infra discussion accompanying notes 61-87.
60. See infra discussion accompanying notes 85-87.
61. See WANG, supra note 2, § 10.04[1], at 10-19 (noting that most state courts have
interpreted "because of" to "require a causal connection between the protected
characteristics enumerated in the statute and the criminal conduct"); see also Martinez v.
State, 980 S.W.2d 662, 667 (Tex. App. 1998) (noting same).
62. See Jacobs, supranote 11, at 161 (noting the "ambiguity and imprecision" inherent
in this and similar language); Robert J. Kelly, Introduction, in BIAS CRIME: AMERICAN
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LEGAL RESPONSES, supra note 1, at 3, 11 ("[T]here is some
ambiguity in how strong hate feelings must be in the crime causation sequel."); see also
LAWRENCE, supra note 14, at 36 (observing that "[blecause of bias crimes statutes ...
evade easy classification as either racial animus or discriminatory selection laws").
63. See JACOBS & POTrTER, supra note 57, at 21 (discussing the requisite causal link to
constitute a hate crime).
64. See id. (stating that such language begs the question, "[m]ust the criminal conduct
have been totally, primarily, substantially, or just slightly caused by prejudiced
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young man who was raised to hate Jewish people takes a stroll down
a city sidewalk one afternoon. In the past, he has occasionally taken
advantage of opportunities to vent his Anti-Semitism, but he has yet
to commit any physically violent acts. This afternoon he is only
thinking about how much he could use some extra money. With
nothing in particular to do, he boards a subway car, but hesitates
when he realizes the only other passenger is a woman he knows is
Jewish. He begins to disembark in disgust, but then stops, thinks
again, and sits only two seats away from her just as the subway car
begins to leave the station. After he reassures himself that they are
alone, he hits her over the head until she is unconscious, steals her
purse, and removes her jewelry. He quickly gets off the train at the
next stop and congratulates himself for picking up extra cash and
"giving the Jews what they deserve" at the same time.
If "because of" is interpreted to require that the woman's
religion-the protected characteristic-be the sole motivation for the
crime, the State will not pursue an ethnic intimidation charge or a
penalty-enhancement.65 On the other hand, if "because of" is
interpreted to require that the protected characteristic be a
substantialmotivation for the crime, the young man is more likely to
be charged under either statute. Finally, if the statute allows religion
to be just one of several reasons for the attack, the state is all the
more likely to pursue penalty-enhancement.
Some courts have interpreted "because of" to require only that
the protected characteristic be a substantial cause of the crime.1 For
example, in a leading case, the California Supreme Court examined
the phrase "because of" in a penalty-enhancement statute and
concluded that it did not require that the victim's protected
motivation?"); Jacobs, supra note 11, at 161 ("[S]hould a prosecutor interpret the hate
crime laws to cover situations in which prejudiced motivation played any role in the
defendant's choice of victim?").
65. See WANG, supra note 2, § 10.04[1], at 10-19 to 10-20 (noting the possibility of
interpreting "because of" to require that the protected characteristic be the only
motivation). The following excerpt illustrates a case in which the defendant more or less

admits that ethnicity was his sole motivation:
[A] white man ...attacked ...an Asian man, stabbing him twice in the back,
puncturing a lung, in [a] parking lot. In a statement to police, [the white man]
said, "It all started this morning. I didn't have anything to do when I woke up
....So, I figured, what the fuck, I'm gonna go kill me a Chinaman."
JACOBS & POTrER, supra note 57, at 24.

66. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Aishman), 896 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Cal. 1995)
(adhering to the "substantial factor" holding of In re M.S., 896 P.2d 1365 (Cal. 1995)); see
also Matter of Welfare of S.M.J., 556 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that,
because they require causation, these statutes "exclude offenses committed by a person...
whose bias is not in substantial part what motivated the offense").
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characteristic be the sole cause of the crime.67 The court explained
that, while the legislature did not intend to punish offenders who
entertained bias but acted on other motivations, it also did not intend
to limit the statute to "offenses committed exclusively or even mainly
because of the prohibited bias."' The court concluded instead that
"by employing the phrase 'because of,'" the statute dictates that the
prohibited bias must be a "substantialfactor in bringing about the
crime." 69 At least one other court has suggested that the bias need
not even be a substantialfactor. In State v. Pollard,70 the Washington
Court of Appeals concluded that it was unnecessary to read a
"substantial factor" requirement into a statute that punished certain
conduct committed "because of" the victim's protected
characteristic.7' Under the facts of the case, the court concluded that
the protected characteristic was a substantial motivating factor, but
the court presumably would have upheld a conviction if the
characteristic had been just one of several causes of the crime. 2
Without consensus among other states about the scope of the
"because of" language, it is difficult to predict whether North
Carolina's courts would interpret the ethnic intimidation and penaltyenhancement statutes to require sole, substantial, or just partial
causation. Requiring the protected characteristic to be the sole cause
of the crime, however, is inconsistent with House Bill 884's goal of
"expanding the scope of the hate crime laws." 73 If the General
Assembly attempts again to amend these statutes with the Bill in
mind, it should specify that the relevant crime be either substantially
or partiallymotivated by the protected characteristic.
The second ambiguity inherent in the language of the penaltyenhancement and ethnic intimidation statutes concerns the
perpetrator's mind-set when committing the crime. 74 Controversy

67. See In Re M.S., 896 P.2d 1365, 1377 (Cal. 1995).
68. Id.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. 906 P.2d 976,981 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
71. See id. at 978.
72. See id. at 981-82; see also People v. Nitz, 674 N.E.2d 802, 806 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)
(" 'We find nothing in the language of the statute that would prohibit a person with 'mixed
motives' from being prosecuted under the statute.' ") (quoting In re Vladimir P., 670
N.E.2d 839,844 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996)).
73. H.R. 884, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1999); see also supra notes 48-53 and
accompanying text (discussing the Bill's intended effect of expanding the scope of hate
crime laws).
74. See Dillof, supra note 57, at 1074-75 (explaining that hate crimes can be
interpreted to require different kinds of "intrinsic desire").
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over the precise state of mind required by "because of"'75 has led to
the development of two models of interpretation.76 The first, usually
called the "discriminatory victim selection" model, interprets
"because of" to mean that the offender chose the victim because the77
victim possessed one or more of the protected characteristics,
regardless of whether the offender has any particular animus toward
people with that characteristic.78 Imagine, for instance, a man who
intends to commit rape on a given night. He targets one woman in
particular because she is Asian. He does not, however, wish her any
more harm than if she were any other woman of any other ethnic
group. He only targets her ethnicity because he believes Asian
women to be weak, vulnerable, and unlikely to struggle. Under the
"discriminatory victim selection" model, this man would have
committed the crime "because of" the ethnicity of the victim, and
should therefore be subject to penalty-enhancement.79
The North Carolina legislature could conclude that the ethnic
intimidation statute and penalty-enhancement statute should not
require proof of actual animus. If so, the penalty-enhancement
statute could be drafted as follows: "If the offender intentionally
selected the victim of the [crime] entirely or substantially because the
victim possessed a particular [protected characteristic], the offender
shall be guilty of [a class of crime one level higher than if he or she
had not selected the victim on this basis]." This language would
replace the current language that ambiguously requires the crime to
75. See Lu-in Wang, The Complexities of "Hate," 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 809 (1999).
76. See L.AWRENCE, supra note 14, at 9 (describing the two models); Frederick M.
Lawrence, The Punishment of Hate: Toward a Normative Theory of Bias-Motivated
Crimes, 93 MICH. L. REV. 320,376 (1994) (same); Taslitz, supra note 57, at 739 n.1 (noting
the "two broad categories" and their differences).
77. See Lawrence Crocker, Hate Crimes Statutes: Just? Constitutional? Wise?
1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 485, 487-89 (1993) (describing the "discriminatory victim
selection" model). Previously, scholars also entertained the idea of a "manifests racial
animus" model, but the Supreme Court's decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377 (1992), invalidated this model on the grounds that it unconstitutionally interferes with
First Amendment speech. See supranote 8.
78. See Dillof, supra note 57, at 1076 ("[A]nimus is not required. All that is required
is that the victim's [protected characteristic] play some role in the decision to commit the
crime against the victim."); Harel & Parchomovsky, supra note 57, at 533 ("All that is
required under the discriminatory model is that the [protected characteristic] of the victim
... somehow figure into the offender's decision to act against her.").
79. Professor Lu-in Wang offers another example from an interview with a man
convicted of robbing and murdering a gay Vietnamese man. In the interview, the
perpetrator explained his and his companions' states of mind in choosing their victim:
"'More or less we had it embedded in our head that, you know, they're weak. You know
what I'm saying, we could take theirs ... and get away with it. They wouldn't put up a
fight.'" Wang, supra note 75, at 892.
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be committed "because of' a protected characteristic, and would
focus on simple proof of discriminatory victim selection. Under such
a statute, a person who, for example, vandalizes the property of a
non-English-speaking Latino family would be subject to penaltyenhancement whether that person actually did so to harm Latinos, or
whether he or she simply thought that a language barrier would
prevent the family from reporting the crime.80 This revision would
allow enhanced penalties for a broader range of crimes committed
against members of the protected categories and would, therefore,
reflect House Bill 884's goal of "expanding the scope of the hate
crime laws."'" It would also, however, directly contradict the
committee's proposed amendment specifically requiring the
"offender's generalized hatred of that category of persons. '
The second model of interpretation-the "motivated by animus"
model-requires that the offender not only chose the victim because
of a protected characteristic, but also that the offender "purposely
acted in furtherance of [his or her] hostility toward the target
group."'83 The rapist described above would not be subject to a
statute drafted to reflect this model because he was not motivated by
any particularized hatred of Asian people. Adopting the "motivated
by animus" interpretation, North Carolina's penalty-enhancement
statute could be amended as follows: "If the commission of the
[crime] was motivated [entirely, substantially, or partially] by the
offender's hatred or animus toward the victim's [protected
characteristic], the offender shall be guilty of [a class of crime one
level higher than if the offense had been committed without this
motivation]." This change closely reflects the committee's emphasis
on hatred. 4 As suggested below, however, there is yet another way to
80. If section 14-3(c) applied to felonies as well as misdemeanors, this suggested
redrafting could be read to require that rapists and other sexual assailants be subject to
penalty-enhancement because they select their victims on the basis of gender. Some
scholars argue that this is an acceptable outcome both legally and in terms of policy. See
infra notes 117-24 and accompanying text. As noted before, House Bill 884 proposed
amending North Carolina's penalty-enhancement to include felonies. If the legislature
were to propose such a change in the future, it should take into account the policy
implications of victim-selection language on crimes of rape and sexual assault.
81. H.R. 884, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1999).
82. Id.
83. Lawrence, supra note 76, at 364 (describing the "motivated by animus" model);
see also Dillof, supra note 57, at 1075-76 (same); Wang, supra note 14, at 75 (same). This
model is often termed the "motivated by racialanimus" model, but this Note deals with
bias against more than just race and thus modifies the label to indicate its general
applicability.
84. See H.R. 884 (version after committee substitute).
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draft the statutes that would permit them to focus on crimes

motivated by animus and to further House Bill 884's goal of
"expanding the scope of the hate crime laws."
A revision of the two statutes could require proof that a
particular type of odium against the protected characteristic
motivated the crime, thus narrowing the mental state to hatred. It
could require "hatred," but could also list animus, disgust, intent to
harm, and other similar states of mindY Moreover, the revision
could be drafted to encompass situations where the offense was
motivated by someone else's hatred, animus, or intent to harm the
so long as the perpetrator knew of that
protected characteristics,
86
person's mental state.
A broader revision of the penalty-enhancement statute reflecting
these suggestions could read as follows: "If commission of [the crime]
was motivated substantially or partially by (a) the offender's or
another person's hatred of or animus toward the victim's [protected
characteristic], (b) the offender's intent to harm or intimidate a
person (including the victim) or group because that person or group
possessed the victim's [protected characteristic], or (c) the offender's
intent to exhibit his or her own or another person's hatred of, animus
toward, or intent to harm, a member of the victim's [protected
characteristic] (including the victim), the offender shall be guilty of [a
class of crime one level higher than if the offense had been committed
absent (a), (b), or (c)]." Under either (a), (b), or (c), the offender
would have to be at least partially motivated by hatred, animus,
desire to harm, or a similar mental state. The hatred, animus, or
desire to harm, however, would not have to be the perpetrator's own.
The vandal discussed above would not be charged under this statute
85. As Professor Dillof explains, the "motivated by animus" model, true to its name,
seeks to punish animus, which "comes in many shades." Dillof, supranote 57, at 1075. He
states that the targeted mental state is "roughly the desire that ill befall those of the target
[group] or that those of the target [group] be absent from the [perpetrator's] sphere of
interest." Id.
86. Professor Wang argues for an even broader interpretation of the targeted
motivation in bias crime statutes, but many of her points support the idea that the
requisite "animus" should not have to originate from the offender himself. See Wang,
supra note 75, at 897-900. She points out, for instance, that opportunism-such as
financial gain or impressing friends-motivates many offenders to choose historicallyvulnerable groups, and yet punishing them under bias crimes is justifiable because the
harm to the victims is just as severe. See id. This argument supports the idea that bias
crimes should punish a perpetrator who assaults a black man, not because he hates blacks,
but because his friends do, and he wants to please them. Cf. Harel & Parchomovsky,
supra note 57, at 520-38 (arguing that, to protect the historic vulnerability of certain
groups, society should be allowed a broader range of justifications for bias crimes laws
generally).
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because she chose to increase her chances of getting away with the
vandalism, not because of a particular distaste for Latinos. 87 If,
however, she chose the family because she wanted to impress her
racist friends, she could be charged under the statute because her act
was motivated at least in part by "another person's ... animus"
toward the victim's ethnicity.
Clarifying the causation and motivation language may aid the
investigation and prosecution of bias crimes, which may in turn
increase bias crime data collection.89 The effectiveness of bias crime
statutes depends on police discretion in investigating bias, and on
prosecutorial discretion in charging offenders under the applicable
lawsY0 Statutory ambiguity broadens police discretion in enforcing
criminal laws generally.91 In bias crime laws, however, the ambiguous
element-the requirement of bias motivation-is the very element
that sets these laws apart from others, 92 so the connection between
discretionary under-enforcement and the ambiguity of bias crime laws
is particularly acute. 93 Because bias motivation is especially difficult
87. See supra text accompanying note 80.
88. See infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text (discussing investigation and
prosecution of bias crimes).
89. See infra notes 98-112 and accompanying text (discussing bias crime data
collection).
90. See JACOBS &POTTER, supranote 57, at 92 ("[O]nce these laws are on the books,
police and prosecutors must decide how to enforce them."); LEVIN & MCDEvrrr, supra
note 1, at 179 (explaining that prosecutors must decide how offenders will be charged
when bias is the suspected motivation); id. at 194 ("For such laws to be constructive ...
prosecutors must effectively charge defendants ...

."); Ferry,

supra note 1, at 135 (noting

that bias crime statutes are one of the main sources from which police derive their working
definition of "hate crime"); Jeannine Bell, Note, PolicingHatred: Police Bias Units and
the Constructionof Hate Crime, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 421, 423 (1997) ("As is the case in
most other crimes ... it is the police who are responsible for investigating and later
identifying and classifying bias crimes.").
Because they constitute the primary level of contact between the public and
justice system, police have tremendous discretion over how to maintain order under
existing laws. See Robert E. Worden, Situational and Attitudinal Explanations of Police
Behavior, 23 L. & SOC'Y REV. 667, 672-75 (1989). As one commentator has noted,
"[b]ecause their day-to-day jobs are characterized by a high degree of discretion and
autonomy in organizational activities, [police officers] can determine the amount and
quality of benefits and sanctions to be dispensed to the public." Bell, supra, at 449 (citing
MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY 13 (1980)). If they so choose, police
often have the power to reduce bias crimes laws to virtual political gestures by choosing
not to enforce them. See Samuel Walker & Charles M. Katz, Less than Meets the Eyes:
Police DepartmentBias-Crime Units, 14 AM. J. POLICE 29, 32 (1995).
91. See Bell, supra note 90, at 451 ("Legislatures delegate discretion to the police
through ambiguity in the law.").
92. See supra text accompanying notes 8-13.
93. See JAMES GAROFALO & SuSAN E. MARTIN, NAT'L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BIAS-MOTIVATED CRIMES: THEIR CHARACTERISTICS AND THE
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to identify and prove,94 police working with limited resources may be
reluctant to focus investigations on the bias-related aspects of a crime
to the detriment of a crime's other aspects.95 This is not to suggest
that North Carolina's law enforcement has shown conscious
unwillingness to enforce the ethnic intimidation and penaltyenhancement statutes. To the contrary, in a commentary to police
officers on the penalty-enhancement provision for bias crimes, Ralph
B. Strickland of the North Carolina Justice Academy stated,
"[b]elieve me, the satisfaction of raising a misdemeanor to a felony in
this particular type of case is well worth the effort on your part."96 At
the same time, however, he emphasized that enforcement of this law
is not an easy task. He advised that officers discuss with prosecutors
the difficulties of proving motive and warned that these difficulties
require more detailed prosecution. 97 With a clarified bias-motivation
element in both the penalty-enhancement and ethnic intimidation
statutes, officers seeking to enforce either provision would at least
have a better understanding of which motive to investigate and the
relationship of that motive to the crime's causation. The redrafting
should therefore eliminate at least some of the police discretion that
stems from statutory ambiguity.
In addition, more frequent investigation may lead to increased
documentation and reporting of these incidents for statistical
purposes.9" In 1990, Congress passed the Federal Hate Crimes
LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE 49 (1993) (describing the problem of statutory ambiguity
in police enforcement of bias crimes laws); Bell, supra note 90, at 453 (noting that police
discretion creates "legitimate cause for concern about the effective enforcement of bias
crime laws").
94. See James Garofalo & Susan E. Martin, The Law Enforcement Response to BiasMotivated Crimes, in BIAS CRIME:

AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LEGAL

supra note 1, at 64, 70 (noting that there are many difficult factors involved in
a decision to classify a crime as a bias crime); Staff Project, supra note 2, at 59 (citing
arguments that, in the hate crimes context, an offender's subjective mental state is
inherently difficult to prove); Bell, supra note 90, at 423 ("Enforcing bias crime legislation
would be much easier if identifying bias crime were like identifying homicide.").
95. See Bell, supra note 90, at 452 (noting that "the logic of efficiency supports nonenforcement when limited resources are allocated to conduct considered more deserving
of official action").
96. Ralph B. Strickland, Jr., Just Another Statute at Law: Commentary on North
Carolina General Statutes of Interest to the Law Enforcement Community, Mar. 1996,
(visited May 1, 2000) <http://www.jus.state.nc.us./NCJA/stmart95.htm.>
97. See id.
98. See Marc Lieberman et al., The Case for Hate Crime Legislation, ARIZ. ATr'Y,
Mar. 1996, at 14, 16 (noting that "many police agencies never investigate whether crimes
are perpetrated for discriminatory reasons"); see also Mark Hansen, Curbing Hate Crimes,
A.B.A. J., Apr. 1996, at 104, 104 (citing a study showing that centralized data-collection is
hindered because police misclassify a large percentage of crimes that should be considered
RESPONSES,
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Statistics Act (the "Act"),99 which required the United States
Attorney General to collect and report information from state and

local agencies on crimes motivated by race, religion, sexual
orientation, or ethnicity. 1 ° In general, its purpose was to create a

better basis for understanding the scope of bias crimes occurring
throughout the United States and to provide local agencies with
information useful in reducing these crimesYm'

State and local

compliance with such data collection is encouraged but not
mandatory under the Act.1' 2 Many states, however, have enacted

statutes requiring agencies to report bias-related criminal activities to
a central repository for the purpose of cooperating with the Act. 03
North Carolina has no such statutory reporting requirement, but since
1992, the North Carolina Department of Justice Division of Criminal
Information (DCI) has encouraged state and local agencies to report
incidents identified as potential hate crimes and has provided these
agencies with forms, statistical analysis, and other reporting
assistance." 4
Widespread compilation of data on hate crimes can greatly

strengthen a state's efforts to reduce their incidence. 10 5 The U.S.
bias crimes); Kristine Olson et al., The Government and the Community: A Coordinated
Response to Hate Crime in America, 45 FED. LAW. 47, 47 (Oct. 1998) ("The collection of
...data is only as good as the ability of a given jurisdiction to identify ... bias motivated
crime ....).
99. Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C.A. § 534 (1993 &
Supp. 2000)).
100. See id.; see also Andrew M. Gilbert & Eric D. Marchand, Note, Splitting the Atom
or Splitting Hairs-TheHate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 931, 953
(1999) (describing the Act).
101. See WANG, supra note 2, § 2.05, at 2-34.
102. See POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 5; Gilbert & Marchand, supra note
100, at 956; Maroney, supranote 7, at 594.
103. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 877.19 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000) (requiring police
departments to report monthly); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.550 (1997) (mandating annual
reports); see also POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that by 1997, "19
states had enacted statutes that mandated hate crime data collection").
104. See NORTH CAROLINA STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HATE CRIME
REPORTING 1998,1 (1999) [hereinafter HATE CRIME REPORTING].
105. See Coldren, supra note 2, at 167, 169-70 (arguing that "collection, analysis, and
dissemination of data on bias crime[s]" is one of the "five major areas in which the state
government can provide needed leadership in the response to bias crime"); John P. Cook,
Collection and Analysis of Hate Crime Activities, in BIAS CRIME: AMERICAN LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND LEGAL RESPONSES, supra note 1, at 143, 144 (noting the value to the
community in collecting bias crime data); William A. Marovitz, Hate or Bias Crime
Legislation, in BIAS CRIME: AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LEGAL RESPONSES,
supra note 1, at 48, 52 (stating that reporting is vital because "[t]he first step in addressing
hate crimes is to know the magnitude of the problem"); Gilbert & Marchand, supra note
100, at 986 ("[B]etter reporting. of hate crimes will increase the ability to enforce hate
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Department of Justice has stated that standardized reporting enables
law enforcement to "analyze patterns and trends of bias crime,"
encourages otherwise reluctant victims to report the crimes, shows
communities that law enforcement is "committed to vigorously
pursuing the offenders," and "sharpens community awareness of bias
crime."'10 6 Throughout the states, however, only a small percentage of
7
bias crimes are believed to be reported to central repositories.1'

North Carolina's DCI notes that a limited number of North Carolina
agencies have chosen to participate in centralized reporting, and,
among those, only a few have reported more than one hate crime. 08
While the low level of reporting may indicate to some that few bias
crimes are actually occurring, DCI suggests that North Carolina is no
exception to the general under-reporting problem. DCI states that
"this limited participation is not sufficient to allow valid statewide
measures of the volume and types of crimes motivated by hate
.... ,"I09

Although increased investigation cannot cause victims to

report bias crimes in the first place,110 the police may be more willing
to investigate for evidence of bias if they have a better sense of the
types of bias-motivation that are punishable by law."1
The
investigation, in turn, may generate more bias crime data that can be
reported for statistical purposes."2
crime laws .... "); see also ALTSCHILLER, supra note 4, at 16 (observing that systematic
reporting gives law enforcement officials "the ability to ...discern patterns and forecast
possible racial and ethnic tensions in different localities").
106. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL BIAS
CRIMES TRAINING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND VICTIM ASSISTANCE
PROFESSIONALS: A GUIDE FOR TRAINING INSTRUCTORS 213 (1995).
107. See POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at xii ("[B]ias-motivated crimes
typically are underreported by both law enforcement agencies and victims."); Hansen,
supra note 98, at 104 (noting a study showing that 75% of hate crimes go unreported);
Edward M. Kennedy, Hate Crimes: The Unfinished Business of America, BOSTON B.J.,
Jan./Feb. 2000, at 6 ("[U]nder-reporting is a serious impediment to learning the true
dimensions of the problem."); Lieberman, supra note 98, at 16 ("Authorities believe only
five percent of hate crimes committed are actually reported."); see also TEN WAYS, supra
note 57, at 23 (explaining that hate crimes laws are "flawed by reporting inaccuracies").
108. See HATE CRIME REPORTING, supra note 104, at 1. Between 1992 and 1994, only
a negligible number of agencies reported any bias crimes. Between 1995 and 1998,
between 17 and 83 agencies reported bias crimes. See id.
109. Id.
110. See POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at xii (listing many reasons victims fail
to inform the authorities about bias crimes); Lawrence, supra note 7, at 148 (stating that
many organizations have found that most hate crime victims "do not report incidents at
all"); Olson, supra note 98, at 47 (observing that uncertainty about the law enforcement
response prevents many bias crime victims from contacting the police).
111. See POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 6 ("[H]ate crime reporting is
complicated by the need to determine offender motivation.").
112. See Hansen, supra note 98, at 104; Lieberman et al., supra note 98, at 16; Olson et
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Finally, redrafting the causation and bias-motivation language in
the ethnic intimidation and penalty-enhancement statutes could also
pave the way for other amendments to North Carolina's bias crimes
laws. As discussed above, members of the North Carolina General
Assembly proposed numerous amendments to the penaltyenhancement statute and related statutes in the original House Bill
884 and its companion Senate Bill 814.113 The potential they created
for dramatically expanding the applicability of the ethnic intimidation
and penalty-enhancement statutes may well have been the
committee's impetus for adding the requirement of "the offender's
generalized hatred.""14 If, in a future attempt to expand these laws,
the legislators redraft the "because of" language as suggested above,
they will have a framework within which to address other needed
statutory changes.15
For example, House Bill 884 included an amendment that would
have placed gender among the protected categories." 6 Scholars,
policy organizations, and other groups have advocated for this change
throughout the states generally, 1 7 and many states have already
added gender as a protected category."' Reluctance in other states to
add gender has frequently been caused by disputes over what it
means to commit a crime "because of ... gender."

9

Some hesitate,

on the one hand, to classify crimes such as domestic violence, rape,
and sexual assault as "bias-motivated," even though the victim most
often would not be chosen but for her gender.120 Contrary to the
evidence, many argue that including gender would convert bias
al., supranote 98, at 47.
113. See supra note 48-53 and accompanying text (discussing the original Bill).
114. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing the generalized hatred
addition to the original Bill).
115. See supra pp. 2018-19.
116. See H.R 884, 1999 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1999).
117. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 7, at 145 ("Gender-motivated violence ... [is] as
much [a] bias crime[ ] as racially- and ethnically-motivated crimes."); Anti-Defamation
League, Hate Crimes: Laws: ADL Approach to Hate Crime Legislation: Penalty
Enhancement and the Inclusion of Gender (visited
Sept.
1, 2000)
<http://www.adl.org/frames/front_99hatecrime.html>
[hereinafter Gender Inclusion]
(strongly advocating the inclusion of gender among the protected groups and
acknowledging its inclusion the model ADL legislation).
118. See ADL State Provisions, supra note 2, at <http://www.adl.org/framesl
front_99hatecrime.html>; Gender Inclusion, supra note 117, at <http://www.adl.org/
frames/frontL99hatecrime.html>.
119. Kristin L. Taylor, Note, TreatingMale Violence Against Women as a Bias Crime,

76 B. U. L. REv. 575,598-99 (1996).
120. See Katherine Chen, Note, Including Gender in Bias Crime Statutes: Feminist and
EvolutionaryPerspectives,3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 277,316-30 (1997).
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crimes statutes into little more than penalty-enhancement for sexual
Others argue that violent acts targeting
offenses against women.
persons of a certain gender (women in particular) are just as biasmotivated as other bias crimes, and that legislatures should be
undeterred by arguments that bias is more difficult to prove due to
the complexity of crimes against women. 122
If, however, a bias crime statute is re-drafted to approximate the
revisions suggested above, crime will have to be committed out of
hatred, animus, or intent to harm not necessarily the victim herself,
but the victim's gender generally. 123 This added clarity may allay fear
that, if gender is included, every sex-related crime would fall under
the statute. 24 Those who hesitate to include gender because the
purpose of the statute is ambiguous may be more willing to do so if
the scope is narrowed to "animus."
The original 1999 House Bill 884 ambitiously sought to expand
North Carolina's ethnic intimidation and sentence-enhancement
statutes to protect more groups, cover more crimes, and penalize
offenders more severely.'2 When it added the "hatred" requirement
to the causation language of these two statutes, the House committee
may have been attempting to both reign in the potential impact of
these changes while at the same time supporting the Bill's goals. This
Note has argued that the "hatred" language was too narrow to do
both, has proposed an alternative approach, and has suggested that

121. See Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful
Paradigmfor Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 123, 158 (1999) ("The
prevalence and pervasiveness of crimes such as domestic violence and sexual assault, as
well as biased attitudes surrounding those crimes, produce questions about which of those
crimes should be treated as acts of discrimination."). It should be noted that in states that
have included gender as a protected characteristic, "there has not been an overwhelming
number of gender-based crimes reported as an extension of domestic violence and rape
cases."
Gender Inclusion, supra note 117, at <http:lwww.adl.orglframes/
front_99hatecrime.html>.
122. See, e.g., Goldscheid, supra note 121, at 140 (noting that in cases of bias crimes
based on gender, state courts have managed to find ample evidence of animus toward
gender); Chen, supra note 120, at 318-24 (arguing that difficulty in proving gender bias
"should not be a sufficient reason to exclude gender"); GenderInclusion, supra note 117,

at <http:llwww.adl.orglframes/front99hatecrime.html> (stating that the Anti-Defamation
League added gender to its model legislation after concluding that "gender-based hate
crimes could not be easily distinguished from other forms of hate motivated violence").
123. See suprapp. 2018-19.
124. See supra notes 121 and accompanying text.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 48-53 (discussing the intended effect of
expanding the scope of bias crime legislation).
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this approach may help improve the enforceability and effectiveness
of these two laws, thereby facilitating further improvements to these
and other North Carolina bias crime provisions.
ANN M. ANDERSON

Answering the Call: Wake County's Commitment to Diversity
in Education
When students in North Carolina's elementary and secondary
public schools returned to school this fall, they had more to catch up
on than their summer vacations; they had to get to know their new
classmates. In successive decisions handed down by the District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, public school boards
were instructed that they may no longer consider race when
formulating their student assignment plans.1 After decades of courtordered racial desegregation, school administrators-recently
released from desegregation decrees-must implement student
assignment plans without considering race. For those schools that
elected to maintain racially diverse student bodies, these decisions
undermine their discretionary powers over the operation of their
schools. The decisions challenge school boards to prove their
commitment to diversity in education. Wake County answered this
challenge by developing a student assignment plan designed to ensure
a diverse education without resorting to racial classifications. Wake
County's two-tiered assignment plan incorporates family income and
academic performance as a means to maintain a diverse student
2
body.
This Note first explains the legal impetus for Wake County's
diversity-focused student assignment plan, including the removal of
race as a proper consideration in the educational context.3 The Note
then describes Wake County's new diversity-focused student

1. See Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 133 (4th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (2000); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 705--

07 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000); Capacchione v. CharlotteMecklenburg Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228, 293 (W.D.N.C. 1999), stay granted sub nom. Belk v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 99-2389(L), 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 34574, at
*2-3 (4th Cir. Dec. 30, 1999). For an in-depth critique of these cases, see John Charles
Boger, Willful Colorblindness: The New Racial Piety and the Resegregation of Public
Schools, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1719,1744-1781 (2000).
2. See Todd Silberman, School PlanAdopted, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Jan. 11, 2000, at IA; Tim Simmons, School Plan Signals New Chapterin Integration,NEWs
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 16, 2000, at IA [hereinafter Simmons, School Plan
Signals]; see also infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text (discussing Wake County's new

plan).
3. See infra notes 9-47 and accompanying text.
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assignment plan, which is designed to overcome these barriers.4 Next,
the Note discusses the standards a reviewing court could apply to
Wake County's new plan if its constitutionality was contested and
analyzes the plan in light of each possible standard. 5 Finally, this

Note argues that a reviewing court
should limit its judicial inquiry in
6
this area to rational basis review.

4. See infra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 62-108 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 109-58 and accompanying text. In order to understand why courts
engage in judicial scrutiny of student assignment plans, an overview of the history of
desegregation in American schools is appropriate. A thorough discussion of the topic,
however, is beyond the scope of this Note, which focuses on the aftermath and
implications of forced integration facing current school systems. For a review of the
desegregation dilemma's evolution, see 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights §§ 61-83 (1976 &
Supp. 1999); DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE
LAW 17-58 (1995); see also GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING
DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION Xxixxiii (1996) (providing a caption of the leading decisions on desegregation).
In 1896, Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal" rationale provided American
society with a judicial grant to exploit and discriminate against African-Americans that
lasted for six decades. 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ.
("Brown 1"), 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954). Finally recognizing that separate is "inherently
unequal," the Supreme Court, in 1954, decided the landmark case, Brown v. Board of
Education,which held that, "in the field of public education... 'separate but equal' has no
place." Brown 1,347 U.S. at 495. Although Brown I articulated that segregation in public
schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, it did not provide a
remedy. The Court attempted to fill the void left by Brown I the following term when it
decided Brown v. Board of Education ("Brown I"), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Brown Ps
holding that school boards had to desegregate "with all deliberate speed," id.at 301,
caused more confusion than clarity. See, e.g., Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777
(E.D.S.C. 1955) (finding that Brown I did not require integration, but rather prohibited
state-imposed segregation).
By the time the Court decided Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430
(1968), little progress had been made in dismantling dual school systems. See 15 AM. JUR.
2D Civil Rights § 64 (1976 & Supp. 1999); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1971) (noting the difficulties faced by courts and society in light of
Brown 1). In Green, the Supreme Court announced for the first time that school districts
had an affirmative duty to end dual school systems. See ARMOR, supra, at 28 ("[Green]
was the first decision of the Supreme Court that declared an affirmative duty to
desegregate and, more importantly, that defined desegregation not as ending compulsory
separation but rather as the abolition of white and black schools."). In Green, the Court
struck down a school board's "'freedom-of-choice' plan" because it did not go far enough
to dismantle the "well-entrenched dual system[]." 391 U.S. at 437. The Court reasoned
that the "'freedom-of-choice' plan" was just one step toward dismantling segregation
within student assignments and that the mandates of Brown I extend to the maintenance
of a" 'racially nondiscriminatory school system.'" Id at 435 (quoting Brown 11,349 U.S.
at 301). Because racial identification in this case extended to "every facet of school
operations-faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities," Green,
391 U.S. at 435, the Court ordered the school board to develop a plan "that promises
realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now." Id- at 439. Thus, Green
rejected Brown IYs cautious standard and imposed an affirmative duty on school boards
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to integrate immediately. Courts now look to these "Green factors"-faculty, staff,
transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities-to determine whether a school
system has attained unitary status. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88 (1995);
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 492-93 (1992); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 283
(1977); United States v. City of Yonkers, 197 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v.
Georgia, 171 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 801 (1st
Cir. 1998); Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. of Educ., 90 F.3d 752, 760 (3d Cir.
1996); Dowell v. Board of Educ., 8 F.3d 1501, 1514 (10th Cir. 1993); Capacchione, 57 F.
Supp. 2d at 233.
Notwithstanding the plain language of Green, school authorities and courts
continued to struggle with Brown Ps mandate. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 14. In Swann, the
Supreme Court redefined the requirements of Brown I and established guidelines for
courts and school authorities to follow when implementing those requirements. See id. at
6, 14. The unanimous Court's analysis began with a reminder that the purpose of Brown I
was to eliminate the constitutional violations caused by state-imposed segregation. See id.
at 6. The main issue confronting the Court, therefore, was how Brown I should apply to a
previously segregated school system.
According to the Swann Court, the goal of Brown I was to create a "unitary"
school system, not simply an integrated student body. See id. at 15 (stating that the Brown
decisions were the basis of the Court's holding in Green, which charged school authorities
with the affirmative duty to create a unitary school system). The Court noted that the
schools are responsible for integrating the entire system. See id. at 18-21. Thus, in
addition to student assignment, school authorities must work to eliminate racial
distinctions with regard to the other five Green factors. See id. at 18; see also Green, 391
U.S. at 435 (listing what are now known as the Green factors). Although the Court
provided guidelines with respect to all six of these factors, see Swann, 402 U.S. at 18, 20
(suggesting that with regard to transportation, staff, and extracurricular activities,
eliminating invidious racial distinctions may be sufficient, but that racial differences in
faculty assignment, school construction and abandonment, require specific commands), it
focused on student assignment. See icl. at 22 (noting that the central issue is student
assignment). In analyzing the desegregation plan imposed on the school board by the
district court, see Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 265, 267-70
(W.D.N.C. 1970) (enumerating the desegregation order adopted by the court after the
school authorities failed, for nearly a year, to abide by a previous court order requiring the
school board to adopt a plan), the Court determined that any remedial measure must be
gauged by its reasonableness, effectiveness, and feasibility, but acknowledged that there
are no precise guidelines. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 28, 31. The Court recognized that a
desegregation plan "may be administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in
some situations," but stated that such awkwardness may be necessary to remedy the
vestiges of past discrimination and eliminate the dual system. Id. at 28. With these
principles in mind, the Court found the district court's order, which provided for the
extensive use of busing, to be reasonable and effective as a more realistic assurance of
desegregation than returning to a neighborhood school plan. See id. at 30; ARMOR, supra,
at 12, 29-32 (discussing Charlotte's massive cross-county busing plan and the resulting
widespread use of this remedy in other desegregation plans). The Court then ordered
Charlotte-Mecklenburg to dismantle its dual system and remanded the case to the federal
district court with express directions to retain jurisdiction over Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Schools until the school system is deemed "unitary." See Swann, 402 U.S. at 32; see also
Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (stating that although "[t]he usurpation of a local
school system's student assignment policies by a federal court was an extraordinary
event[,J ... this Court's exercise of its equity power was deemed necessary to eliminate the
conditions and redress the injuries caused by the 'dual school system' ").
Swann addressed not only the concerns of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools,
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Wake County's student assignment plan is unique because it
does not rely on explicit racial classifications. Instead, it integrates
family income and student achievement into the assignment process.
The avoidance of racial classifications is necessary because racial
7
classifications are generally subjected to strict judicial scrutiny;

several student assignment plans integrating racial classifications have
been invalidated under that demanding test.8 The court decisions that
invalidated race-conscious student assignment plans mandate a
colorblind approach to student assignments in sharp contrast with the

long-standing deference granted to local authorities in the
formulation of education policy. To understand the legal impetus for
but also answered most of the lingering questions from Brown L See ARMOR, supra, at 29
("If Brown II was notable for its ambiguity and lack of detail, Swann was exceptional for
its clarity and specificity, which ended much of the legal confusion at that time."). Swann
did not, however, end the resistance to desegregation. In McDaniel v. Barresi,402 U.S. 39
(1971), decided the same day as Swann, the Court relied upon its decision in Swann to
uphold a voluntary elementary school desegregation plan. See id. at 41. McDaniel
involved an equal protection challenge to a student assignment plan designed "to achieve
greater racial balance" by manipulating attendance zones. Id at 40. Plaintiffs, parents of
white children attending the elementary schools, argued that the plan was unconstitutional
because it "'treat[ed] students differently because of their race.' " Id. at 41 (quoting
Baressi v. Brown, 175 S.E.2d 649, 652 (Ga. 1970)). The Supreme Court of Georgia agreed.
See Baressi, 175 S.E.2d at 652. On appeal, however, the United States Supreme Court
held that local school boards may, and are "almost invariably," required to take race into
consideration in conformity with their affirmative duty to dismantle dual school systems.
McDaniel, 402 U.S. at 41.
In direct opposition to forced integration, the North Carolina General Assembly
passed, during the early stages of the Swann litigation, a statute explicitly prohibiting the
use of race-based classifications in busing and student assignment for the purpose of
achieving racial balance. See Anti-Busing Law, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-176.1 (Supp. 1969)
(repealed 1981); see also North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 44
(1971) (noting that the General Assembly enacted the bill after the district court directed
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools to consider various means to effect desegregation).
The Anti-Busing Law provided: "No student shall be assigned or compelled to attend any
school on account of race ... or for the purpose of creating a balance or ratio of race ....
Involuntary bussing [sic] of students in contravention of this article is prohibited, and
public funds shall not be used for any such bussing [sic]." § 115-176.1. In a unanimous
decision, the Supreme Court struck down the statute as directly conflicting with the duty
imposed by the district court in Swann to dismantle the dual system. See North Carolina
State Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. at 45-46. Speaking for the Court, Justice Burger stated, "the
statute exploits an apparently neutral form to control school assignment plans by directing
that they be 'color blind'; that requirement... would render illusory the promise of Brown
.... [R]ace [must] be considered in formulating a remedy." Id. at 45-46.
7. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
8. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 133 (4th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 197 F.3d 123 (2000); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698,
707 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000); Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 807-08;
Capacchione,57 F. Supp. 2d at 292. But see Hunter v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d
1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Wake County's plan, the movement toward applying strict scrutiny to
all racial classifications and the more recent cases applying strict
scrutiny to race-conscious student assignment plans must first be
discussed.
The movement toward strict scrutiny analysis of all race-based
classifications began with Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the
University of Californiav. Bakke.9 In a split decision confronting the
constitutionality of the University of California at Davis Medical
School's minority set-aside admissions policy, Justice Powell stated
that "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect
and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination."' 10 Justice
Powell, however, failed to muster any support for the proposition that
all race-based classifications must be subjected to strict scrutiny-four
justices agreed that the appropriate constitutional standard was an
intermediate level of scrutiny like that applied to gender-based
distinctions, 1 while another group of four failed to reach the
constitutional issue.' 2
Eleven years later, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.," the
Court held that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review
for all race-based classifications. 14 In Croson, the Court struck down
a government-imposed program requiring contractors on city projects
to subcontract at least thirty percent of the contracts to minority
business enterprises. 5 The Court reasoned that rather than
attempting to remedy the effects of past discrimination specifically
within the Richmond construction industry, the plan was based on
"an amorphous claim" of past discrimination in the construction
9. 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (analyzing the University of California at Davis Medical
School's admissions policy, which set aside 16 out of 100 seats for consideration of
minority applications only and left the remaining 84 seats open to members of any race).
10. Id.
at 291.
11. See id at 361-62 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
12. See i at 421 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, CJ., Stewart, & Rehnquist, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). This group refused to decide
the issue on constitutional grounds because the plan could be invalidated on statutory
grounds as violating Title VI. See id.at 412-21 (Stevens, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J.,
Stewart, & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
13. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
14. See id.
at 493 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White,
& Kennedy, JJ.); id. at 520 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
15. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 511. According to the plan, a minority-owned business
enterprise is "'[a] business at least fifty-one (51) percent of which is owned and controlled
...by minority group members.'" Id. at 478 (quoting RICHMOND, VA., CITY CODE § 1223 (1985)). The plan defined "minority group members" as African-American, Spanishspeaking, Asian American, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut U.S. citizens. See id.
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Absent evidence of past discrimination,
industry generally. 6
Richmond could not show a compelling need for even the benign
race-conscious measures.' 7 Further, Richmond was unable to show
that its plan was narrowly tailored to its alleged remedial objective
because the city failed to consider race-neutral means to increase
minority participation in the industry and because the thirty percent
quota amounted only to racial balancing rather than a remedy for
past discrimination.' After Croson, only attempts to remedy specific
instances of past discrimination, such as a city's own historic
discriminatory practices, rather than general discrimination in an
industry, constitute compelling governmental interests sufficient,
which if narrowly tailored, will withstand strict scrutiny.
In 1995, the Supreme Court extended Croson's strict scrutiny
analysis to acts of the federal government, including the limited
category of compelling interests.' In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena,2 the Court examined two provisions of the Small Business
Act,2 ' which provided financial incentives to prime government
contractors to award subcontracts to minority business enterprises.P
In light of Croson, the Court determined that all racial classifications
imposed by a government actor, whether federal, state, or local,
should be reviewed under a strict scrutiny standardP Together
Adarand and Croson demonstrate that any race-conscious
governmental act, regardless of the actor or purpose, will be subject
to strict scrutiny.24
16. Id. at 499 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Relmquist, C.J., White, &
Kennedy, JJ.).
17. See itL at 510-11 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
White, & Kennedy, JJ.).
18. See id at 507-08 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ.,
White, & Kennedy, JJ.) (noting that "it is almost impossible to assess whether the
Richmond plan is narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination since it is not linked to
identified discrimination in any way" as "there does not appear to have been any
consideration of the use of race-neutral means to increase minority business participation
in city contracting").
19. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). "[W]e hold
today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other
words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures
that further compelling governmental interests." Id.
20. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-56 (1994). The two provisions at issue in Adarand were 15
U.S.C. §§ 637(d)(2)-(3) (1994).
22. See Adarand,515 U.S. at 205-10.
23. See iL at 227.
24. For an overview of these cases, see Michael A.B. Turner, Comment, Should Race
Be a Factorin Law School Admissions? A Study ofHopwood v. Texas and How the Equal
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This principle was evident in the three school desegregation

cases decided last fall within the Fourth Circuit. The first of these
cases was Capacchionev. Charlotte-MecklenburgSchools,25 in which a
federal district court enjoined the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School
District (CMS) from using any classifications "that deny students an
equal footing based on race,

and race-based

admissions. 7

26

including the use of mandatory busing

Specifically, the court held that the use

of race in the school district's magnet school admissions policy failed
a strict scrutiny analysis and thus was unconstitutional. The court
decided that the governmental interest at issue was compelling
because CMS was acting under a court order when it implemented
the plan. 9 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the admissions
policy's explicit use of race was not narrowly tailored to further the
Protection Clause Makes Race-Based Classifications Unconstitutional,27 U. BALT. L. REV.
395, 414-21 (1998); Russell N. Watterson, Jr., Note, Adarand Constructors v. Pena:
Madisonian Theory as a Justificationfor Lesser ConstitutionalScrutiny of FederalRaceConsciousLegislation, 1996 BYU L. REV. 301,306-11 (1996).
25. 57 F. Supp. 2d 228 (W.D.N.C. 1999), stay granted sub nom. Belk v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 99-2389(L), 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 34574 (4th Cir. Dec.
30, 1999). Capacchionerepresents the fourth challenge to the duty imposed by Swann on
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education to create a unitary school district. See
Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47, 48 (1971) (per curiam)
(challenging Swann based on North Carolina's anti-busing statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115176.1 (Supp. 1969) (repealed 1981), which the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional,
see N.C. State Bd.of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971)); Cuthbertson v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd.of Educ., 535 F.2d 1249 (4th Cir. 1976) (unpublished affirmance); Martin
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 475 F. Supp. 1318, 1347 (W.D.N.C. 1999)
(refusing to grant plaintiffs injunctive relief enjoining the school board from using race as
a factor in the desegregation plan). In Cappachione, the court held that CMS had
outgrown its judicial babysitter by creating a unitary system with regard to all six of the
Green factors-student assignment, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities,
and facilities. See Capacchione,57 F. Supp. 2d at 242-84. The court blended two distinct
issues, simultaneously answering whether the school system had achieved unitary status
and how the school system may assign students after this declaration. For a discussion of
the unitary status issue in Cappachione,see Boger, supra note 1, at 1745-49.
26. Cappachione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 294. Specifically, the court prohibited CharlotteMecklenburg from "assigning children to schools or allocating educational opportunities
and benefits through race-based lotteries, preferences, set-asides, or other means that
deny students an equal footing based on race." Id.
27. Ironically, the court had previously ordered the District to implement these
measures in order to dismantle their dual system. See id.; see also David L. Marcus, After
the Buses Stop: Virtual Resegregation?, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 13, 1999, at
38 ("The [Capacchione] decision marked the end of busing in the first city to use it three
decades ago to integrate schools, and it left Charlotte officials scrambling to find other
ways to racially mix schools."); supra note 25 (discussing the Capacchione court's holding
that the Charlotte-Mecklenburg district had achieved unitary status).
28. See supra notes 9-24 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of strict
scrutiny analysis in the context of race-based classifications).
29. See Capacchione,57 F. Supp. 2d at 288-89.

2000]

DIVERSITY IN EDUCATION

2033

relevant governmental interest.3 ° The court found that the magnet
30. See iL at 287-90. Regardless of whether racial diversity is a compelling interest,
the court found that CMS's magnet school admissions policy was not narrowly tailored.
See Capacchione, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 290. First, the court found that the use of the 40:60
ratio was unnecessary in light of Swann because it established an unreasonably prohibitive
ratio, the ratio was more race conscious than procedures suggested in Swann, and rather
than focusing on less invidious means, such as attendance zones, the magnet program's
primary focus was on the "individual students' racial identit[y]." Id.at 289. Second, the
court noted the inflexibility and impracticability of the set-aside procedure. See id at 28990. Not only did the procedure fail to address the practicability of achieving a 40:60 ratio
in all of the schools, but it adhered to a rigid construction of this ratio. See id. For
instance, if seats set-aside for racial minority students failed to fill up with racial
minorities, the seat remained vacant even though the school had full waiting lists of nonracial minorities waiting to be admitted to the school. See idt at 289. The court quoted an
excerpt from a letter written to the school's superintendent by Dr. Michael Stolee, who
was appointed by the court to assist the District with the development of its desegregation
plan. The letter stated that the 40:60 black to white student ratio should be sought, but
"'[i]f one race were to be under-enrolled, the other race should not be permitted to fill the
vacant slots." Id. at 287 (quoting the June 11, 1992 memo from Dr. Stolee to Dr.
Murphy) (emphasis in original). According to the court, such harsh inflexibility was not
narrowly tailored. See idt at 289-90. Finally, the court established that preferences for
remedial purposes may only remain in effect until the effects of prior discrimination are
corrected. See idat 290. Because the CMS plan was established to function in perpetuity,
it not only failed strict scrutiny, but "there [was] no reasonable basis for the rigid setasides." Id.
In discussing CMS's asserted interests, the court accepted as a valid objective the
school system's goal of remedying past discrimination because the plan was implemented
while the District was still under court order to desegregate. See id at 288-89. The court,
however, deemed the school system's second asserted interest-the pursuit of racial
diversity in the classroom-irrelevant because it accepted the first interest. See id. at 289.
The court suggested, however, that diversity would not be a compelling interest. See idt
In so doing, the court relied upon recent federal court decisions interpreting Croson and
Adarand, which suggested that racial diversity could not be a compelling governmental
interest. See id (citing Lutheran Church-Mo. Synod v. F.C.C., 141 F.3d 344, 354 (D.C.
Cir. 1998)); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 795-800 (11th Cir. 1998); Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 948 (5th Cir. 1996); Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers
Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207,213 (4th Cir. 1993).
An analysis of whether diversity in public elementary and secondary education
constitutes a compelling interest is beyond the scope of this Note. For an excellent
discussion of the issues and arguments in support of finding a compelling interest, see
Note, The Constitutionalityof Race-ConsciousAdmissions-Programsin Public Elementary
and Secondary Schools, 112 HARV. L. REv. 940, 948-55 (1999) [hereinafter RaceConscious Admissions]; Joanna R. Zahler, Note, Lessons in Humanity: Diversity as a
Compelling State Interest in Public Education, 40 B.C. L. REV. 995, 1013-39 (1999).
Importantly, the Supreme Court has been silent on whether providing a diverse primary
public education can be a compelling interest. See Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd.,
195 F.3d 698, 705 (1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1552 (2000); Zahler, supra, at 1013. In
fact, a body of Supreme Court authority arguably leaves open the possibility that diversity
constitutes a compelling interest. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 237 (1995) ("[We wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but
fatal in fact.'" (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment)); id. at 258 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The proposition that
fostering diversity may provide a sufficient interest to justify such a program is not
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school's admissions policy was "inconsistent with the movement
'
towards race neutrality envisioned by Brown LI 31
A few weeks after the Western District Court of North Carolina
decided Capacchione,the Fourth Circuit decided Tuttle v. Arlington
County School Board and Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public
Schools." In both cases, the Fourth Circuit confronted explicit uses
of race in student assignment plans for purposes other than to remedy
the effects of past discrimination? 4 Although the court "assumed"
that the promotion of racial and ethnic diversity could be a
compelling interest,35 it found that neither policy was narrowly
tailored, and consequently enjoined both school systems from using
race in this fashion. 6 While somewhat similar, the factual distinctions
in Tuttle and Eisenberg expose the Fourth Circuit's perception of
proper student assignment plans.
Tuttle involved a lottery for positions in an oversubscribed
alternative kindergarten that considered a potential student's racial or
ethnic background? 7 The court applied strict scrutiny because the
inconsistent with the Court's holding today ... ."); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 511 n.1 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (suggesting that some race-based measures may have legitimate and beneficial
purposes that should not be dismissed); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286
(1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[C]ertainly
nothing the Court has said today necessarily forecloses the possibility that the Court will
find other government interests ... sufficiently 'important' or 'compelling' to sustain the
use of affirmative action policies."); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) ("[T]he interest in diversity is compelling in the context of a
university's admissions program .... ."); see also Zahler, supra, at 1013 & n.143 (noting that
although the Court has not "squarely addressed" the issue it has left room for holding
diversity to be a compelling interest in public education and citing Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Wygant). But see Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944 ("Any consideration of
race or ethnicity ... for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a
compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.").
31. Cappachione,57 F. Supp. 2d at 290; see also supra note 6 (discussing Brown and its
progeny).
32. 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1552 (2000).
33. 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (2000).
34. See Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 125; Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 700. While the Montgomery
County school system in Eisenberg had never been under court order to desegregate, the
Arlington County school system in Tuttle had been under such an order previously. The
Fourth Circuit, however, had declared Arlington County unitary in Hart v. County School
Board,459 F.2d 981, 982 (1972).
35. See Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 130, 134 ("We will assume, without holding ... that
diversity may be a compelling governmental interest .... No inference may here be taken
that we are of opinion that racial diversity is a compelling governmental interest." (citing
Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 704-05)); Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 705, 707 ("[W]e will assume, without so
holding, that diversity may be a compelling government interest ....
36. See Eisenberg,197 F.3d at 133-34; Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 707.
37. See Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 701-02. During the school term at issue, the school had
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applicant's racial classification was one of the factors considered in
the lottery.38 Notwithstanding the assumption that the promotion of

diversity is a compelling interest, 39 the court held that the plan was
not narrowly tailored' because the school board failed to consider

other race-neutral alternatives, 41 and the plan amounted to nothing
more than racial balancing.42
Less than two weeks later, the Fourth Circuit, in Eisenberg,faced
a district transfer policy for a magnet school that contained an explicit
received 185 applications for admission to fill 69 available seats. The weighted lottery was
designed to further the school's goals of preparing children to live in a diverse society and
to educate a diverse student body. See id.
38. See id at 704. The admissions policy first considered whether the student had
siblings at the school and then filled the remainder of available seats based on three
diversity factors--socioeconomic status, first language, and racial or ethnic background.
See id. at 701-02. The court divorced the first two factors, socioeconomic and first
language status, from the racial component of the lottery and focused on the
constitutionality of the racial classification. See id at 705.
39. See id. at 704-05. After acknowledging that other courts have avoided deciding
this question, the court passed the responsibility onto the Supreme Court by assuming that
diversity may constitute a compelling governmental interest. See id. at 705.
40. In concluding that the lottery was not narrowly tailored because it relied upon
racial balancing, the court examined the following five factors: "(1) the efficacy of
alternative race-neutral policies, (2) the planned duration of the policy, (3) the
relationship between the numerical goal and the percentage of minority group members in
the relevant population or work force, (4) the flexibility of the policy, including the
provision of waivers if the goal cannot be met, and (5) the burden of the policy on
innocent third parties." Id. at 706 (quoting Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement
Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 216 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S.
149,171 (1987))).
First, the court found that other race-neutral diversity policies were available to
the school because the Alternative Schools Admission Study Committee, the group that
ultimately adopted the current policy, had proposed at least one other race-neutral
alternative. See Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 706. Second, the lottery was designed to continue in
perpetuity, rather than terminating at a certain point. See id. Third, the court found that
the relationship between the numerical goal and percentage of minorities was based on
racial balancing because the lottery "skew[ed] the odds of selection in favor of certain
minorities." Id. at 707. According to the court, the asserted goals of diversity do not
require racial balancing. See id. The court also found the policy inflexible. See id. Part of
the flexibility determination is whether the policy treats applicants as individuals. See id(citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978)). The court found that
the admissions policy "does not treat applicants as individuals," but rather "[tihe
race/ethnicity factor grants preferential treatment to certain applicants solely because of
their race." Id. Finally, in looking at the burden of the policy on innocent third parties,
the court noted that the policy ironically purports to promote individuality while in fact it
fosters conformity and has a pernicious effect on four-year-old children. See id at 707 &
n.12. Having essentially failed all five factors, the court concluded that the policy was not
narrowly tailored to achieve diversity. See id at 708.
41. See id. at 706.
42. See iL at 705 (stating that "[s]uch nonremedial racial balancing is
unconstitutional").
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racial classification.4' While the Fourth Circuit again "assumed" that
diversity is a compelling interest, it held that the classification was not
narrowly tailored and was thus unconstitutional. 44 The transfer policy
at issue prohibited transfers when the transfer would upset the
present racial balance of either school involved in the transfer 5 The
court reasoned that the Montgomery County policy attempted to
counter racial imbalances brought about by a student's private
decision to attend a magnet school.46 Taken together, Tuttle and
Eisenberg suggest that student assignment policies cannot involve
either non-remedial racial balancing or remedial racial balancing, if
the school is trying to remedy imbalances caused by private choices,
rather than state-sanctioned policies.47
Confronted with the "racial piety" 48 of Capacchione, Tuttle, and
Eisenberg, school systems are now under pressure to adjust their
student assignment policies if they want to maintain diversity.4 9 Some
districts are returning to a neighborhood school system, whereby
students attend the school closest to their homes with total disregard
to racial balance5 Those districts that wish to provide a diverse,
integrated education, however, must develop a new formula that
produces racial integration but does not employ express racial
classifications.' Wake County is leading the state in this endeavor.
43. Eisenberg, 197 F.3d 123, 128 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (2000).
Although other factors are taken into consideration with regard to transfer requests, the
court noted that "absent a 'unique personal hardship,' [such as siblings attending or
parents teaching at the requested school] if the assigned school and the requested school
are both stable and their utilization/enrollment factors are acceptable for transfers," race
will be the decisive factors. Id.at 129.
44. See id.The court again assumed that the district's purported interest in promoting
diversity was compelling. See id.at 130-31,134.
45. See id. at 125 n.1, 126-27. The County considered other factors that could
outweigh the impact on diversity. These factors included the stability of the school,
utilization/enrollment, and the reason for the request. See id. at 126.
46. See id. at 131. In holding that the plan was not narrowly tailored, the court stated
that "any racial or ethnic imbalance is a product of 'private choices [and] it does not have
constitutional implications.'" Id. at 132 (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495

(1992)).
47. In other words, schools within the Fourth Circuit may use race as a factor in
student assignment plans, but only if they are attempting to remedy the existing effects of
deliberate discrimination within their school systems.
48. Boger, supranote 1, at 1722.
49. See id. at *2, 76-92; T. Keung Hui & Todd Silberman, Wake Needs New Ways to
Diversify Schools, Leaders Say, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 10, 1999, at 1B;
Ben Wildavsky, A Question of Black and White, U.S. NEWvS & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 10,
2000, at 26.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1177-78 (1987); Riddick v.
School Bd., 627 F. Supp. 814,817 (E.D. Va. 1984); ARMOR, supranote 6, at 51.
51. See supra notes 25-47 and accompanying text (showing that in the Fourth Circuit
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Traditionally, Wake County has relied primarily upon raceconscious assignment and transfer policies to ensure racial balance.53
Wake County's previous use of magnet programs and racial quotas
enabled its schools to achieve unparalleled success in desegregation.5
While the nation educates seventy percent of its minority students in

predominantly minority schools, only twenty-one percent of Wake
County's black students are in schools with minority enrollment

above fifty percent 5
To maintain this level of diversity, which Wake County believes
is integral to student academic success,56 the school system has shifted

its focus from traditional approaches to other educationally driven
factors, namely family income and academic skills5 In making this
change, school authorities relied upon research indicating that the
presence of relatively large numbers of students living in poverty or
performing at or below grade-level on year-end exams negatively
impacts the academic performance of the entire student body.5
Therefore, beginning with the current 2000-2001 school term, Wake

County student assignment and transfer decisions reflect a diverse
student population in terms of socioeconomic status and student
performance. 59 These factors are ideal because of their educational
express racial classifications in the school assignment context will be subject to strict
scrutiny and deemed unconstitutional).
52. See Silberman, supra note 2, at 1A (quoting Wake County Superintendent Jim
Surratt as stating, "'This is a brave new world .... It's a momentous decision. We're
going to try to make it work.' "); Wildavsky, supra note 49, at 26-27 (highlighting Wake
County's plan as a solution to the race-blind mandate imposed by recent federal cases).
53. See Todd Silberman, Schools Facing Diversity Dilemma, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 26, 1999, at 1A [hereinafter Schools Facing] (discussing the use of
magnet programs and racial quotas).
54. See id (stating that "Wake County stands out among large school districts in
North Carolina and across the country, both for its extent of its integration and for the
harmony with which the integration has been achieved").
55. See iL

56. See Wake County Public School System, Student Assignment 6200 (visited Sept. 1,
2000) <http://www.wcpss.netpolicy-.fleslpolicy-pdfs/600C-series.pdf> [hereinafter Student
Assignment 6200] ("The Wake County Public School System believes that maintaining
diverse student populations in each school is critical to ensuring academic success for all
students .... ").

57. See id. (noting that research supports the link between diverse student bodies and
academic success).
58. See id.; see also infra notes 75-81 (discussing the disparate impact of poverty and
poor performance on minority students).
59. See Student Assignment 6200, supra note 56; Wake County Public School Systems,
Transfer of School Assignment 6203 (visited Sept. 1, 2000) <http://www.wcpss.net/

policy-files/policy.pdfs/6000_series.pdf> [hereinafter Student Assignment 6203]; see also
Silberman, Schools Facing, supra note 53, at IA (describing Wake County's new income
and performance-based student assignment plan); Simmons, School Plan Signals, supra
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value and race-neutrality. Specifically, the student assignment
process will integrate considerations of school capacity, utilization,
enrollment, and proximity to the student's home. Where racial
considerations, however, once came into play, the school system will
consider "[d]iversity in student achievement (percentage of students
scoring below grade level should be no higher than [twenty-five
percent], averaged across a two-year period) ...[and] [d]iversity in

socioeconomic status (percentage of students eligible for free or
reduced price lunch will be no higher than [forty percent])."60 Based
on these diversity factors, "[a]bout [thirty-eight] percent of Wake's
minority students will no longer be automatically targeted for
integration ....
Wake County's decision to replace explicit consideration of race
with race-neutral alternatives allows the plan to avoid the
constitutional infirmity identified in Capacchione, Tuttle, and
Eisenberg. The districting plans or policies in those cases were
invalidated because they invoked the general rule that explicit racial
classifications trigger strict judicial scrutiny.6 2 Absent consideration
of race, however, the constitutional inquiry into Wake County's new
student assignment plan should be less rigorous because neither
socioeconomic status nor academic skills is a suspect classification,
causing the court to apply strict scrutiny.63 Whether Wake County's
plan should be examined under strict scrutiny is the determinative
question-the degree of scrutiny likely will dictate whether the plan
withstands a constitutional attack. 64
note 2, at 1A (same); Tim Simmons & Todd Silberman, Diversity in Schools, NEWS &

OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 23,2000, at 15A (same).
60. Student Assignment 6200, supranote 56.
61. Simmons, School PlanSignals, supra note 2, at IA.
62. See supra notes 25-47 and accompanying text (discussing Capacchione, Eisenberg,
and Tuttle).
63. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973)
(holding that wealth discrimination in a school financing case does not invoke strict

scrutiny); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 140-43 (1971) (holding that a state
constitutional provision requiring popular referendums to approve low-rent housing
projects does not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 485 (1970) (holding that rational basis review applies to economic and social welfare
classifications).
64. Student assignment plans are more likely to face political challenges than
constitutional challenges. Unless school boards are truly committed to maintaining
diversity in their classrooms, they will probably not adopt student assignment plans that
require the continued use of busing or annual reassignment of students, especially if they
sense a hostility from courts with regard to integration plans. If school boards choose to
follow Wake County's lead, they will also face political challenges at the ballot box during

the next school board election. See Wildavsky, supra note 49, at 27 (citing Gary Orfield as
suggesting that a plan like Wake County's is educationally beneficial, but "unsustainable
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Wake County's plan may be subject to strict judicial scrutiny
under the federal constitution because a reviewing court may
conclude that the plan has a potentially invidious discriminatory
intent. In determining whether to apply strict judicial scrutiny, courts
may look beyond a plan's facial neutrality to its actual purpose; if the
differential treatment of a class is intentional, and not merely
incidental, courts will apply strict scrutiny.65 The North Carolina
State Constitution may also prove to be a barrier to Wake County's
plan. Specifically, the Wake County plan may be struck down
because a recent North Carolina Supreme Court opinion recognized
the right to a "sound basic education" as a fundamental right under
the state constitution.6
Although facially neutral, the school board may be forced to
defend its new policy against an almost certainly fatal legal challenge
if a court concludes that its actual purpose is discriminatory in
nature. 67 In Washington v. Davis,' the Court established that facially
neutral policies that impose a disparate impact upon a racial minority
require rational basis review.69 The Court noted, however, that such
politically").
65. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 622-23 (1982) (finding circumstantial
evidence sufficient to support an inference of purposeful discrimination); Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,264-65 (1977) (stating that intentional
discrimination need not be the sole motive of the regulation; the presence of
discrimination as a "motivating factor" is sufficient); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
242 (1976) (concluding that disparate impact on its own is insufficient to establish an intent
to discriminate, but may be considered circumstantial evidence of such an intent).
66. Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 347, 357, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255, 261 (1997) (holding
that the North Carolina Constitution guarantees to every child the right to a "sound basic
education," denial of which is "a denial of a fundamental right"); see also Kelly Thompson
Cochran, Comment, Beyond School Financing: Defining the Constitutional Right to an
Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 399, 401 & nn.13-14 (noting the holding of
Leandro); James Martin, Note, North Carolina'sCourt Fails North Carolina'sChildren:
Leandro v. State and the Case ForEqual School Funding, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745,
748-56 (1998) (discussing the details of the Leandro case); William Kent Packard, Note, A
Sound, Basic Education North Carolina Adopts an Adequacy Standard in Leandro v.
State, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1483-95, 1501-16 (1998) (discussing the Leandro case and
analyzing the court's holding) .
67. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, but fatal in fact"), overruled in
part by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). But see Adarand, 515
U.S. at 237 (stating that strict scrutiny need not be "'strict in theory, but fatal in fact'"
(quoting Fullilove,448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment)).
68. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
69. See id at 242; see also Personnel Adm'r v. Tenney, 44.2 U.S. 256, 280 (1979)
(holding that a hiring preference for veterans does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
even though it disproportionately and inherently impacts women because there was no
evidence of a discriminatory intent); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270 (holding that the
government's refusal to re-zone a parcel of land to permit the construction of low-income
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policies might prompt strict judicial scrutiny if discriminatory intent is

evident.07 The Davis Court considered an equal protection challenge
to the Washington, D.C. Police Department's use of a verbal skills

test as a prerequisite to employment.' The plaintiffs alleged that the
test bore no relationship to job performance and that it
disproportionately excluded black applicants.7 2 Although the Court

recognized that disproportionate impact on a certain race is a factor
to consider when determining the underlying purpose, it refused to

apply strict scrutiny to the use of the verbal skills test and stated that
"[s]tanding alone, it does not trigger" strict scrutiny analysis.73
According to the Court, evidence of the police department's positive

efforts to recruit black officers and the fact that the examination was
related to the new officers' training program outweighed any

potential inference of discriminatory intent. 74
Although the facts of Davis failed to convince the Court that a
discriminatory purpose existed, Wake County's student assignment
plan may provide the facts necessary to cross the threshold set forth
in Davis. Scholars argue that "[s]egregation by race is strongly

related to segregation by poverty."'75 Furthermore, research reveals
the correlation between race and poverty, as well as between race and
academic achievement.76 For example, in North Carolina alone, of
housing did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the plaintiffs failed to show
an invidious discriminatory intent).
70. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
71. See id. at 232.
72. See id. at 233, 235.
73. Id at 242 (citation omitted).
74. See id. at 246.

75. GARY ORFIELD, THE GROWTH OF SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS:
CHANGING PATTERNS OF SEPARATION AND POVERTY SINCE 1968, A REPORT OF THE
HARVARD PROJECT ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION TO THE NATIONAL SCHOOL
BOARDS ASSOCIATION 1 (1993); see generally RACE, POVERTY, AND AMERICAN CITIES
(John Charles Boger & Judith Welch Wegner eds., 1996) (providing a collection of essays
that explore the relationship between race and poverty in America's urban centers);
GARY ORFIELD & JOHN T. YuN, RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS, A REPORT
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY 16-17 (1999).
76. See generally THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP (Christopher Jencks &
Meredith Phillips eds., 1998) (examining several issues related to the discrepancies in
performance on standardized tests between African-American and Caucasian students);
ORFIELD, supra note 75, at 1 (identifying discrepancies among African-Americans and
Caucasians in the incidence of poverty and academic achievement); William L. Taylor,
The Continuing Struggle for Equal Educational Opportunity, in RACE, POVERTY, AND
AMERICAN CIrIEs 463 (John Charles Boger & Judith Welch Wegner eds., 1996)
(analyzing recurring obstacles to equal educational achievement and proposing a political
agenda to facilitate equal educational opportunity); see also Johnathan Goldstein, Riley's
Visit Energizes High School, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 23, 2000, at 1B
(" 'We must look at the stark reality that there is a continuing achievement gap between
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the 400,000 African-American students within its school systems,
more than half failed year-end standardized math and reading tests,
while eighty percent of the white students passed both exams." This

problem, however, is not confined to North Carolina. Studies show
that white students on average perform substantially better on

standardized tests than African-American students. 7 s The Harvard
Project on Desegregation issued a report concluding that "[a] student

in an intensely segregated African-American and Latino school was
[fourteen] times as likely to be in a high poverty school as a student in
a school with less than a tenth black and Latino students. ' '79 The
national data is even more telling: "Three-fifths of all high poverty
schools in the U.S. have majorities of black and Latino students."8 0

Furthermore, "[thirty] percent of poor children in schools with a high
proportion of students living in poverty score in the lowest tenth
percentile, three times the percentage of those who are in schools

with a low proportion of students living in poverty."'"
Therefore, the overwhelming impact of Wake County's new
student assignment plan, which considers these disparate factors, will
most likely fall on the county's minority students.' But, as Davis
instructed, although "an invidious discriminatory purpose may often
be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts," a mere showing of
the rich and the poor and between whites and minority students.' " (quoting Richard
Riley, Secretary of Education)); Tim Simmons, Teachers Should Get Bonuses for Closing
Learning Gap, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 2, 2000, at 3A [hereinafter
Simmons, Teacher Bonuses] ("With the exception of Asian-American students, the test
scores of North Carolina's minorities consistently lags behind those of white children.").
77. See Simmons, Teacher Bonuses, supranote 76, at 3A.
78. See William L. Taylor, The Continuing Struggle for Equal Educational
Opportunity, in RACE, POVERTY, AND AMERICAN CITIES 463, 465 (John Charles Boger
& Judith Welch Wegner eds., 1996) (footnote omitted). Studies show that "black children
born in 1971 scored an average of 189 on [standardized] reading tests" at age nine, "236
when they were thirteen, and 274" at age seventeen. Id.Comparatively, white students
"born in 1971 scored 221, 263, and 295" at the same points in time. Id. Although the
racial disparity decreased nearly fifty percent by the time the children were seventeen, this
data is striking. See id. In a study sponsored by the Harvard Project on Desegregation,
"among the 5,047 schools with [ninety to one hundred] percent African-American and
Latino students, [fifty-seven] percent were high poverty schools." ORFIELD & YUN, supra
note 75, at 22.
79. ORFIELD & YUN, supranote 75, at 22.
80. Id.
81. Taylor, supra note 78, at 469 (emphasis added). In contrast, "30 percent of poor
children who are in low-poverty schools score in the top half, compared with only 16
percent who are in high-poverty schools." Id (footnote omitted).
82. See Simmons, School PlanSignals,supra note 2, at 1A ("O all of [Wake] county's
public school students who either read below grade level or come from low-income
families, about 58 percent are African-American and 11 percent are members of other
minority groups.").
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a racially disproportionate impact is not enough to shift the standard
of review to strict scrutiny. 3 Unlike Davis, in addition to the
circumstantial statistical data from which a court can infer a
discriminatory purpose, statements of Wake County officials may
support an inference of discrimination. For example, an attorney for
the school board was quoted as saying "[w]e're really trying to look at
educationally driven factors that might have (integrated schools) as a
byproduct." 84 This statement exemplifies the implication that
maintaining a certain level of racial balance, which Wake County had
been so successful in attaining, was the motivating factor behind this
new plan.
These arguments aside, the willingness of courts to adopt this
line of reasoning is questionable. Such a bold step would indicate
that courts are not willing to support any student assignment plan that
does not resemble a neighborhood school system without regard to
diversity. Also, the language of Croson and Adarand would seem to
reject this logic. In Adarand,the Court went to great pains to clarify
that the extension of suspect status to all race-based measures would
not automatically invalidate every provision that considers race.85
The Court stated, "we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is
'strict in theory, but fatal in fact,' ",86 and that "[t]he unhappy
persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial
discrimination against minority groups in this country is an
unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in
response to it." T In Croson, Justice O'Connor suggested other raceneutral means by which the City of Richmond could have furthered
its goal of increasing minority participation in the local construction
industry that did not pit members of one race against members of
another.s Wake County's plan considers and employs race-neutral
means. Thus, these cases suggest that Wake County's facially raceneutral student assignment plan would at least require analysis
beyond Croson. If the Court in fact intended to strike every
provision that directly and indirectly impacts race, regardless of
narrow tailoring, its reassurance in Adarand would be mere
hyperbole and its suggestions in Croson would be superfluous.
83. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,242 (1976).
84. Silberman, Schools Facing,supra note 53, at IA.
85. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,237 (1995).
86. Id (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment)).
87. Id.
88. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,507-08 (1989).
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Moreover, Davis instructs that despite a racially disproportionate
impact, a court is not likely to infer a discriminatory purpose from a

facially race-neutral classification. 89

Absent this inference, the

classification would not trigger heightened scrutiny and the rational

basis standard would apply. 90 Neither Adarandnor Croson overruled

this distinction. 9' A plaintiff challenging Wake County's race-neutral
student assignment plan, therefore, would have to prove that the

school board intended to racially discriminate before a reviewing
court would apply strict judicial scrutiny. 92 This requires the plaintiff
to satisfy a requirement "that is virtually impossible to meet." 93 Wake
County's burden, therefore, would probably be limited to showing

that the two-tiered system is rationally related to its pedagogical
interest in diversity.
Wake County's plan may also be subjected to strict scrutiny
under the state constitution. When a fundamental right is at issue,
North Carolina courts apply the federal test of strict scrutiny,
regardless of whether a suspect classification is present 4 In Leandro
v. State,95 the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that the right
to a "sound basic education" is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
North

Carolina

Constitution. 96

Leandro involved

an

equal

opportunity challenge to the current school financing system, which,
the plaintiffs alleged, created educational disparities between wealthy
and poor school districts.97 The plaintiffs alleged that these wealth
89. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,246 (1976).
90. See iLat 235.
91. See Adarand,515 U.S. at 246 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. See generally Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1960) (holding a
redistricting plan unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment because of its
disproportionate and intentional impact on racial minorities).
93. ORFPIELD & YUN, supranote 75, at 6.
94. See State ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Carolina Util. Customers Ass'n, 336 N.C. 657,
680-81, 446 S.E.2d 332, 346 (1994) ("'The North Carolina cases applying the equal
protection clause of the state and federal constitutions to challenged classifications have
used the same test the federal courts use ....
'"(quoting Duggins v. North Carolina Bd. of
Certified Pub. Accountant Examiners, 294 N.C. 120, 131, 240 S.E.2d 406, 413 (1978)));
Town of Beech Mountain v. County of Watauga, 324 N.C. 409, 412, 378 S.E.2d 780, 782
(1989) ("When a legislative act ... interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, the
upper tier or 'strict scrutiny' standard is applied, requiring the government to demonstrate
that the challenged statutory classification is necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest.").
95. 346 N.C. 336,488 S.E.2d 249 (1997).
96. Id. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261.
97. See id. at 342, 488 S.E.2d at 252. Leandro represents a trend of school finance
challenges across the country. For an excellent review of school financing arguments, see
Cochran, supra note 66, at 402-58. See also Martin, supra note 66, at 767-79 (discussing
the three waves of school finance litigation); Packard, supra note 66, at 1497-500 (same).
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disparities denied their children "a sufficient education to meet the

minimal standard for a constitutionally adequate education."98
The

North Carolina Supreme Court held that the right to a free public

education is guaranteed by article I, section 1599 and article IX,
section 2(1)10 of the North Carolina Constitution. The court also
held that this guaranteed right to a "sound basic education" '
"prepar[es] students to participate and compete in the society in
which they live and work."'" A fundamental right of equal access to
a sound basic education notwithstanding, the court refused to extend
this right to equal funding or equal educational opportunities in all
districts. 103 As a result, the fundamental right to a sound basic
education in North Carolina does not require the State to make up
for the discrepancies in funding caused by local taxing schemes. The
court then remanded the case to determine whether the funding
system in fact denied students their right to a sound basic
education. 1°4 If so, the defendants will be required to prove that the
funding system was "'necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest.' "105

On remand, the trial court must decide what constitutes a
violation of the right to a sound, basic education. The North Carolina
Supreme Court has suggested several factors that the trial court
98. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 342,488 S.E.2d at 252.
99. "The people have a right to the privilege of education, and it is the duty of the
State to guard and maintain that right." N.C. CONST., art. I, § 15.
100. "The General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and
uniform system of free public schools, ... wherein equal opportunities shall be provided
for all students." N.C. CONST., art. IX, § 2(1).
101. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255. The Court provided a lengthy
definition of "a sound basic education," including "sufficient ability to read, write, and
speak the English language and a sufficient knowledge of fundamental mathematics and
physical science... [and] of geography, history, and basic economic and political systems,"
as well as "sufficient ... skills" to prepare students for further education or employment.
Id.
102. 1d. at 345, 347, 488 S.E.2d at 254-55. Earlier, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals found no right to a qualitatively adequate education in the state constitution. See
Leandro v. State, 122 N.C. App. 1, 11,468 S.E.2d 543,550 (1996).
103. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 349, 488 S.E.2d at 256. The Court stated that "the North
Carolina Constitution requires that all children have the opportunity for a sound basic
education, but it does not require that equal educational opportunities be afforded to
students in all of the school districts of the state." Id at 351, 488 S.E.2d at 257.
Furthermore, "[a]ny disparity in school funding among the districts resulting from local
subsidies is directly attributable to Article IX, Section 2(2) [which allows a local
government to help finance their school programs] itself ... [and] a constitution cannot
violate itself." Id. at 352, 488 S.E.2d at 258.
104. See id, at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261.
105. Id. (quoting Town of Beech Mountain v. County of Watauga, 324 N.C. 409, 412,
378 S.E.2d 780,782, cert.denied, 493 U.S. 954 (1989)).
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should consider in deciding this question, including student
performance on standardized tests. 10 6 Thus, the plaintiffs in Leandro
may be able to establish an inadequate education claim based on the
evidence submitted at trial that revealed significant discrepancies in
standardized test scores.107
Similarly, future plaintiffs may bring inadequate education claims
against Wake County by alleging that a state policy is not providing
students an opportunity to receive a sound basic education as
evidenced by poor performance on standardized tests. The potential
for litigation is particularly acute here, where evidence links poverty
and race to poor academic achievement. 10 Wake County's new
student assignment plan, however, appears to contribute to, rather
than interfere with, the right to a sound basic education by preventing
the resegregation of schools by race and class. This two-tiered
assignment plan promotes learning and diversity by limiting the
number of poor and low performing students in each classroom.
Also, the plan is narrowly drawn to serve Wake County School
District's compelling interest in providing all of its students with a
constitutionally adequate education.
Given the alternativesegregated neighborhood schools-the North Carolina State
Constitution may require Wake County to establish an assignment
plan that takes this social science evidence into consideration.
A reviewing court should resist the urge to heighten the standard
of review applicable to Wake County's new student assignment plan
and adhere to a rational basis review of the wealth and academic
achievement classifications. Several law and policy considerations
support a deferential review of the board's decision. First, neither
wealth nor education is a suspect classification warranting strict
scrutiny. 0 9 Second, control over the operation of schools is
predominantly a local concern." 0 Third, schools are endowed with
106. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 355-57, 488 S.E.2d at 259-60 (suggesting that the trial
court could consider legislative goals and standards, per-pupil expenditures, and
standardized test scores in determining whether schools are providing a sound, basic
education, but that these are neither exclusive nor dispositive); see also Packard, supra
note 66, at 1494-95, 1506-16 (discussing the various factors and analyzing the potential
outcomes based on each factor).
107. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 342, 488 S.E.2d at 252; Packard, supra note 66, at 1486

n.39 (reporting that only 19.2% of students in the rural districts performed at or above
proficiency level on the standardized end-of-grade tests and that 37.3% of students

statewide performed at or above the proficiency level).
108. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text (discussing the correlation between
race and poverty and race and standardized test scores).
109. See infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.

2046

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

the mission to prepare children for the future."' Additionally, placing
a judicial harness on school powers has consistently been recognized
as detrimental to school authority and student learning. 1 2 Finally,

applying strict scrutiny to Wake County's plan risks the silent return
to segregated schools."'

First, non-suspect classifications" 4 and non-fundamental rights" 5
111. See infranotes 128-34 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
114. Non-suspect classifications are any classifications that do not grant disparate
treatment to groups that historically have been the subject of discrimination.
Traditionally, only the following three classifications have been considered "suspect" by
the Court: (1) race, see, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(holding that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny"); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493-98 (1989) (extending strict scrutiny to any
racial classification, regardless of intent); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
291 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) ("Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are
inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination."); (2) national
origin, see, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (holding that the defendant,
who was of Mexican descent, was entitled to a jury selected without regard to national
origin); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (acknowledging that
restrictions based on national origin are "immediately suspect"); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) ("Distinctions between citizens solely because of their
ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
upon the doctrine of equality."); and (3) alienage, see, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717,
722 (1973) (holding that the state failed to meet its burden for establishing guidelines to
practice law based on alienage); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding
that a state law denying welfare benefits based on alienage violates the Equal Protection
Clause). But see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-30 (1982) (refusing to extend suspect
status to illegal aliens and applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to strike down a
Texas statute denying free public education to children of illegal aliens). Other
classifications, however, have been characterized by the Court as "quasi-suspect" and
enjoy "heightened" scrutiny. These include gender-based classifications, see, e.g., United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (holding that Virginia failed to show an
"exceedingly persuasive justification" for excluding women from the Virginia Military
Institute); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976) (holding that Oklahoma did not show
an "important governmental interest" for establishing different legal drinking ages for
males and females), and statutes restricting the rights of illegitimate children, see, e.g.,
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988) (concluding that Pennsylvania's six year statute of
limitations for paternity actions does not withstand heightened scrutiny).
115. Fundamental rights are rights judicially determined to be fundamental to basic
human life. They include those rights guaranteed by the Constitution, other than in the
Equal Protection arena, or those rights that are so important so as to be implicitly granted
by the Constitution. Specifically, fundamental rights include the following: (1) interstate
travel, see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969) (holding that a statute
requiring a one year residency as a prerequisite to receiving welfare assistance violates the
basic right to travel provided by the Constitution), overruled on other grounds by Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); (2) the right to vote, see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (stating that "the right to vote is too precious, too
fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned" by a poll tax); (3) access to the courts, see,
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are subject to mere rationality review, which is the least demanding
level of review. Under this standard, the classification is analyzed
with substantial deference toward the policy-maker." 6 Examined
under these principles, Wake County's new student assignment plan

appears to be constitutional. Wake County's purported purpose for
the two-tiered plan is to maintain "diverse student populations in

each school" because it believes that such diversity "is critical to
ensuring academic success for all students.""n 7 At a minimum, this
interest in diversity is a legitimate pedagogical objective." 8 The
question remains whether the plan adopted is rationally related to
this legitimate governmental objective. Considering the link between

race, poverty, and academic achievement," 9 a court would likely find
e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 381 (1971) (holding a Connecticut statute, which
required the payment of court fees and costs for the service of process, invalid because it
denied indigents access to courts); and (4) marriage, see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967) ("Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very
existence and survival." (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942))). The
Court has failed, however, to extend heightened scrutiny to wealth and necessities. See
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973) (holding that wealth
discrimination in a school financing case does not invoke strict scrutiny); James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 140-43 (1971) (holding that a state constitutional provision
requiring popular referendums to approve low-rent housing projects does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (holding that
rational basis review applies to economic and social welfare classifications).
116. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam)
(articulating the standard as "rationally related to a legitimate state interest"). Other
cases have extended the level of deference such that a statute or regulation will only be
found unconstitutional if it is "arbitrary." See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177-79 (1980) ("The only remaining question is whether Congress
achieved its purpose in a patently arbitrary or irrational way ....Where, as here, there
are plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at an end."); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) ("The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's
objective."); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (noting that the
law will be stricken only if "purely arbitrary"); see also Cochran, supra note 66, at 438-39
(discussing the traditional rational relation test).
117. Student Assignment 6200,supra note 56.
118. Courts' willingness to assume, without analysis, that an interest may be compelling
suggests that legitimacy is a readily surmountable standard. See Eisenberg v. Montgomery
County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123,130,134 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (2000)
("We will assume, without so holding, as the Tuttle court assumed, that diversity may be a
compelling government interest .... No inference may here be taken that we are of
opinion that racial diversity is a compelling government interest."); Tuttle v. Arlington
County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 705, 707 (4th Cir. 1999), cerL dismissed, 120 S.Ct. 1552
(2000) ("We will assume, without so holding, that diversity may be a compelling
government interest ....); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 800 (1st Cir. 1998)
(finding that the Boston Latin School's diversity policy did not satisfy the Bakke standard
for a compelling governmental interest in diversity in the public education context); see
also supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the Tuttle and Eisenberg holdings).
119. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text (discussing the correlation between

2048

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

that basing student placements on socioeconomic status and academic
performance would result in a diverse classroom. Thus, because these
factors are traditionally subject only to deferential review, Wake
County's plan should survive a constitutional attack.
Second, deference to Wake County is consistent with the most
persistent theme and "deeply rooted""
"tradition in public
2
education:' ' "local control over the operation of schools."' The
Supreme Court even recognized a school board's "broad
discretionary powers" in Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of
Education when it completely usurped local control over the school
district's student assignment policy.12 The Court has reiterated this
proposition in desegregation cases repeatedly1 24 and explicitly
reaffirmed it in Freeman v. Pitts.'25 In Freeman, the Court declared
that "'local autonomy of school districts is a vital national
tradition' "Iu that must be restored by "[r]eturning schools to the
control of local authorities at the earliest practicable date."127
Requiring a school board to show that a pedagogical decision
complies with the non-deferential strict scrutiny strips the local
authority of its discretionary power and impedes the effective
operation of public schools. Rational basis review, on the other hand,
allows local authorities to examine their school's individual needs and
employ their discretionary powers with legitimate, distinctly tailored
interests in mind.
Third, returning control of policy decisions to local authority is
not only a "national tradition,"' but is paramount to the school's

race, poverty, and academic achievement).
120. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,741 (1974).
121. Id
122. Id
123. 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (acknowledging the "broad power" of school authorities
"to formulate and implement educational policy"); supra note 6 (discussing Swann in
light of the history of desegregation in American public schools).
124. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 99 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,490
(1992); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247-48 (1991); see also Boger, supra note
1, at 1750 n.156 (noting several Supreme Court cases that have expressed concern for
maintaining local authority over public schools).
125. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
126. Id at 490 (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406,410 (1977)).
127. Id. (emphasis added). The Freeman Court addressed the issue of whether a school
could be declared unitary with respect to only some Green factors or whether a system as a
whole must comply with the factors indicated in Green before that system could be
declared unitary. See id at 485; supra note 6 (discussing Green). The Court concluded
that a school can attain incremental unitary status. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490-91.
128. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490 (quoting DaytonBd. of Educ., 433 U.S. at 410).
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11'Chief Justice
ability to perform its "unique mission."129 In Brown 1,
Warren stated that, "education is perhaps the most important

function of state and local governments .... [I]t is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him

for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
to his environment.' 13' The Court later spoke of the "singular
importance" of public primary education "in the preparation of
individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of
values on which our society rests,' 3 2 and asserted that "the

inculcation of fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system' ' 3 is one of "the objectives of public

education. ' ' 34

School administrators, therefore, are uniquely

responsible for the academic and social development of each child.
Additionally, the assertion that school districts can effectively
educate children under a judicial magnifying glass is doubtful, if not
implausible. The Court has consistently recognized the unique nature
of public education and analyzed other constitutional claims arising
within the educational context with these principles in mind. 35 A

lower court should likewise limit its constitutional analysis of student
assignment plans to a standard of review that allows genuine

consideration of the school's interests. Although deferential, rational
basis review requires a school board to formulate policies that
129. Zahler, supranote 30, at 996.
130. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); supra note 6 (discussing Brown I and its progeny).
131. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493.
132. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,76 (1979).
133. Id.at 77.
134. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
135. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (holding
that random drug testing of student athletes in public schools does not violate the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures);
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that the contents of
a school newspaper is a curricular matter within the school's discretion and therefore, the
principal's significant edits did not implicate the First Amendment); Bethel, 478 U.S. at
685 (holding that a sexually suggestive student government speech was not protected by
First Amendment free speech and expression rights); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
339-41 (1985) (holding that requiring school administrators to have probable cause before
conducting a search and seizure would hamper the school's interests and articulating a
"reasonable suspicion" test for Fourth Amendment cases in the public primary school
context); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (holding that "the Eighth
Amendment does not apply to the paddling of children as a means of maintaining
discipline in public schools"); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-84 (1975) (holding that a
student's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are limited in cases of
short-term school suspension); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (upholding students' First Amendment rights to passive political
expression in the form of wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War).
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purposefully further legitimate pedagogical interests. A student
assignment plan based on illegitimate interests should be apparent
and will be struck down. 136 Strict scrutiny, however, brings with it the
underlying presumption of "stigmatic harm" and invalidity, which
school boards would have to overcome.137 This standard fails to
consider adequately the nature of public, primary schools. Unlike
government contracts,'138 professional schools, 39 or merit-based,
entry-exam elementary and secondary schools,'140 assignment to
primary public schools is not a zero-sum game-the furtherance of
diversity in this context does not hinder any individual citizen's
rights. 4 Every child who wants to attend public school will receive a

public education. Although differences exist between schools from
state to state and within districts, courts have never recognized
142
parents' right to choose which public school their child will attend.
School systems must decide how best to allocate their students among
the schools within their district. These decisions lack the potential to
stigmatize students and they do not breed the notions of inferiority
associated with affirmative action decisions because they reflect only
the school's interest in providing a diverse education rather than
"reflect upon the character of students or their ability to perform." 14 3
Thus, the need to "'smoke out' "144 illegitimate uses of race or racerelated classifications, which underlie a court's use of strict scrutiny, is
not present in the public education context.
Finally, strict scrutiny analysis could yield results that are
inconsistent with the goals embodied in the Brown progeny. 145 If a
court deems Wake County's plan unconstitutional, the expected
result would be a judicial mandate to return to neighborhood schools
136. See Lemon v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 444 F.2d 1400, 1401 (1971) (holding that a
new student assignment plan, which was based on achievement test scores, was obviously
geared toward resegregation because it was implemented only one term after the school
system was declared unitary).
137. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989).
138. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,204-10 (1995); Croson, 488
U.S. at 477-83.
139. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272-75 (1978); Hopwood v.
Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 935-38 (5th Cir. 1996).
140. Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790,792-94 (lst Cir. 1998).
141. See Boger, supra note 1, at 1763-65 (discussing the differences between public
primary education and affirmative action).
142. See Boger, supra note 1, at 1764 & n.210; see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that parents have a qualified right to direct the
upbringing of their children by choosing between public and private schooling).
143. Boger, supra note 1, at 1633-65.
144. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989).
145. See supra note 6 (discussing Brown and its progeny).
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where children attend the school closest to their homes." Given the
nearly pervasive level of neighborhood segregation today, such a
decision may result in the resegregation of American schools. 47
Although the Supreme Court has held that school systems are
4
not responsible for segregation caused by private choices,1 8
persuasive justifications exist for voluntarily undertaking to prevent
this phenomenon. Diversity in public schools gives many students
"their first relatively extended interracial experiences" because of the
widespread residential segregation noted above. 14 9 This attribute of
diverse schools is not simply Pollyannaish, but is requisite to a sound,
basic public education in today's multicultural society. The modem
world is increasingly diverse and students must be taught how to live
Desegregation of public schools
and work in a pluralistic society.'
has made substantial headway in this area. Desegregation of public
schools has led to increased tolerance among students, 51' minority
academic achievement, 5 2 occupational success, 5 - and residential
choices.Y Furthermore, "graduates of desegregated schools are more
146. See Boger, supranote 1, at 1726-28.
147. See id.at *5-6 & n. 18; ORFIELD & YUN, supra note 75, at 11-15, 20 tbl.17; see
also Race-Conscious Admissions, supra note 30, at 950 (noting the "prevalence of
residential segregation").
148. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971).
149. Zahler, supra note 30, at 1024; Race-Conscious Admissions, supra note 30, at 950;
supra note 147 and accompanying text (noting the prevalence of residential segregation).
150. See Zahler, supra note 30, at 1022-23. As noted above, schools are not solely
armed with the responsibility to teach students reading, writing, and arithmetic, but have
the responsibility to "awakeno the child to cultural values, ... prepar[e] him for later
professional training, and ... help him to adjust normally to his environment." Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 347, 488
S.E.2d 249, 255 (1997) (including knowledge of skills to enable a student to perform
successfully in a "changing society" and competitively in the job market in the definition
of a "sound, basic education"); supra notes 128-134 and accompanying text (discussing the
unique function of public education).
151. See Race-Conscious Admissions, supra note 30, at 950; Zahler, supra note 30, at
1023-24.
152. See Robert L. Crain & Rita E. Mahard, Minority Achievement: Policy
Implications of Research, in EFFECrIVE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: EQUITY, QUALITY
AND FEASIBILITY 55, passim (Willis D. Hawley, ed. 1981); Boger, supra note 1, at 1766 &
n.216; Race-Conscious Admissions, supra note 30, at 950-51; Zahler, supra note 30, at
1025-26.
153. See James M. McPartland & Jomills Henry Braddock II,Going to College &
The Impact of Desegregation, in EFFECIVE SCHOOL
Getting a Good Job:
DESEGREGATION: EQUITY, QUALITY AND FEASIBILITY 141, passim (Willis D. Hawley,
ed. 1981); Boger, supra note 1, at 1766 n.216; Race Conscious Admissions, supra note 30,
950-51; Zahler, supranote 30, at 1024.
154. See McPartland & Braddock, supra note 153, at 152; Boger, supra note 1, at 1766
n.216.
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likely as adults to freely choose desegregated colleges,
neighborhoods, places of work, and schools for their children,
'155 If
reducing the need for future public policies in these areas.
school boards are required by judicial fiat to assign students to
schools based solely on where they live, we will "float[] back toward
an educational pattern that has never in the nation's history produced
equal and successful schools. There is no good evidence that it will
work now."'5 6 Wake County's student assignment plan could prevent
this resegregation and subsequent educational deterioration from
recurring.
Wake County has reason to fear that recent federal court
decisions will dictate the composition and appearance of its
classrooms. Recent Fourth Circuit decisions have made it harder for
school systems to support their elective integration efforts. But
absent such affirmative action by school systems, Wake County public
schools risk silently returning to segregation. 7 This regression would
engender a sense of inferiority in a large number of children.
Significant gains have been made in the education of North Carolina's
youth since the 1970s. 158 A departure from this commitment to
equality will surely end this progress and will likely foster a steep
regressive curve in academic achievement. Wake County's plan is a
logical and constitutional approach to this problem. By focusing on
socioeconomic status and academic skills, Wake County has
identified non-racial integration indicators that should not trigger
heightened scrutiny. Furthermore, the plan reflects Wake County's
commitment to a diverse and rewarding education for all of its
students. Wake County should be commended for its commitment to
education, North Carolina's youth, and society.
ELIZABETH JEAN BOWER

155. McPartland & Braddock, supra note 153, at 152.
156. ORFIELD & YUN, supranote 75, at 28.
157. See id. at 339 ("[Case studies] show that courts and many communities across the
United States are quietly turning back to segregation, assuming it will work this time.").
158. See Taylor, supra note 78, at 466 (relating the rise in academic achievement of
minority students to desegregation).

Potential Violence to the Bottom Line-Expanding Employer
Liability for Acts of Workplace Violence in North Carolina
In 1995, a recently terminated employee returned to his former
workplace with a gun and opened fire on his former colleagues killing
two of them.' On May 4, 1999, a North Carolina jury found the
employer liable for the two deaths and awarded nearly eight million
dollars in damages to the employees' estates.2 North Carolina
employers will certainly take notice of this case, if for no other reason
than the substantial size of the jury award.
Recent studies support the notion that the workplace is no
bastion of safety? The news media vigorously report high profile
incidents of workplace violence4 such as shootings, robberies, and
rapes.5 While grim and attention grabbing, the news reports often fail
1. See Terry Hammond, Workplace Violence: North Carolina Jury Awards $Z9
Million to Families of Two Killed in Plant Shootings, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), May 6,
1999, availablein Westlaw, BNA-DLR database.
2. See id.
3. According to the National Crime Victimization Survey, U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, nearly one million people are victims of workplace violence each year. See
THOMAS CAPOZZOLI & R. STEVE MCVEY, MANAGING VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE
2 (1996). Also, a 1993 American Management Association survey found that 20% of the
respondents have experienced an act of workplace violence since 1990 with 8% reporting
that the act resulted in a fatality. See id.; Barbara Etorre & Catherine Romano,
Reengineering: The HR Perspective, HR FoCus, June 1, 1994, at 1. Also, a 1999 Society
for Human Resource Management study found that 57% of survey respondents reported
an act of workplace violence between January 1996 and July 1999. See Reports of
Workplace Violence Increase, Employers Step-up Security, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
AND SAFETY REPORTS, 594 (1999) [hereinafter Shem Study]. These results represented a
48% increase in reports of workplace violence compared to Shem's 1996 survey. See id.
Finally, in 1998, 709 workplace homicides caused by workplace violence were reported.
See id.; John Perez, Guardians of Security; Workplace Safety Under Scrutiny, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Aug. 6, 1999, at D1. These homicides represent 12% of all
workplace fatalities. See Shem Study.
4. See, e.g., Lisa Grace Lednicer, Two State Agencies Boost Security as Result of
Threats; Possible Danger from Disgruntled Ex-Employees Prompts the Actions,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 5, 2000, at C5 (reporting that after a former Oregon
Department of Human Services employee told his wife that he might injure the agency's
staff, the agency took precuationay measures and required proof of identification for entry
into the agency's building); Seattle Man Arrested in Shipyard Shooting, AUGUSTA
CHRON., Jan. 6, 2000, at A3 (reporting that a Seattle shipyard shooting was an act of
workplace violence). See generally Sue Anne Pressley, Year of Mass Shootings Leaves
Scar on U.S.; Sense of Safety Suffers as Fewer Believe 'It Can't Happen Here', WASH.
POST, Jan. 3, 2000, at Al (discussing how the numerous incidents of violence in 1999 left
the public with an "acute... awareness that violent tragedy can occur anywhere").
5. Workplace violence, as used in this Note, encompasses: (1) an employee acting
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to reveal the full extent of the problem. In 1998 alone, 709 homicides,
1.5 million simple assaults, 396,000 aggravated assaults, 51,000 rapes
and sexual assaults, and 84,000 robberies resulted from workplace
violence. 6 Moreover, workplace violence is the leading cause of onthe-job deaths for female workers and the second-highest cause for
men. 7 Deaths resulting from workplace violence are the fastest
growing type of homicide in the United States.8
The human costs and economic consequences of workplace
violence are undoubtedly high. Nationally, workplace violence costs
employers 876,000 lost workdays and sixteen million dollars annually
in lost wages.9 In addition, employers lose revenue, incur litigation
costs, and must combat decreased employee morale as a result of
workplace violence. 10 In 1993, the National Safe Workplace Institute
violently in the workplace thereby injuring a fellow employee; (2) an employee acting
violently in the workplace, thereby injuring a customer; (3) a third party entering the
workplace and injuring an employee; and (4) a third party entering the workplace and
injuring a customer.
6. See Workplace Violence: Job Homicides Decline in 1998, Non-FatalAssaults Still
High, OSHA Says, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH DAILY (BNA), Sept. 21, 1999,
available in Westlaw, BNA-OSHD database. From 1992 through 1996, nearly two million
workers were victims of violent crimes or violence threatened in the workplace. See
Workplace Violence: Two Million Workers Attacked, Threatened on Job Each Year,
Justice Department Says, EMPLOYMENT POL'Y & L. DAILY (BNA), July 27, 1998,
availablein Westlaw, BNA-EPLD database. For the twelve months from July 1992 to July
1993, " '[o]ne out of every four employees was harassed, threatened or attacked.'" Mary
Helen Yarborough, Securing the American Workplace, HR FOCUs, Sept. 1994, at 1
(quoting Joseph A. Kinney, Executive Director of the National Safe Workplace Institute).
7. See Rick Garr, ABA: Workplace Violence Bigger Threat Than You Know, S. FLA.
BUS. J. (Miami), Dec. 3, 1999, at 8; Workplace Violence: CALIOSHA Conference Outlines
Approaches For Preventing On-the-Job Assaults, Murders, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
HEALTH DAILY (BNA), Apr. 20, 1994, available in Westlaw, BNA-OSHD database
(citing a California Division of Labor Statistics and Research study).
8. See LYNNE FALKIN MCCLURE, RISKY BUSINESS: MANAGING EMPLOYEE
VIOLENCE INTHE WORKPLACE 2 (1996).
9. See Garr,supra note 7, at 8. A less conservative study estimated that workplace
violence annually costs employers 1.751 million lost work days and at least $55 million in
lost wages. See CAPOZZOLI & MCVEY, supra note 3, at 2 (referencing The National
Crime Victimization Survey).
10. See Workplace Violence: Employers That Ignore Hazards Face PotentialLiability
Problems, Groups Told, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH DAILY (BNA), Mar. 3,
1997, available in Westlaw, BNA-OSHD database (stating that workplace violence
damages employee morale, productivity, and public confidence). A recent survey the
extent of unpleasant interactions among co-workers revealed the following: 12% of the
respondents quit to avoid an unpleasant co-worker; 10% decreased their time spent at
work; 53% lost work time worrying about the unpleasantness; 37% decreased their
commitment to the organization; and 22% decreased their work output. See Kerry Hall,
Uncivil LibertiesIncivility Permeates the Workplace and Cuts Into the Bottom Line, A New
Study Shows, NEWS & REC. (Greensboro, N.C.), Dec. 12, 1999, at Fl; see also MCCLURE,
supra note 8, at 152 (stating that employers face increased health and disability costs
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estimated the total annual economic cost of workplace violence to be
$4.2 billion."
Not surprisingly, most employers are concerned about
minimizing losses due to workplace violence. This Note explores
ways in which employers can limit their exposure to liability for acts
of workplace violence under North Carolina law.' More specifically,
the Note reviews the theories under which North Carolina courts
have held employers liable for workplace violence.' 3 For each
liability theory, this Note then assesses the likelihood of employer
liability and recommends actions that employers can take to limit
their liability risk.' 4 In addition, this Note evaluates how North
Carolina courts have applied the North Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act 5 when employees sue their employers in tort for
injuries suffered due to workplace violence, and it suggests that North
Carolina employers should not assume that an employee's recovery
under workers' compensation bars a related tort action. 6
To minimize the costs associated with workplace violence, North
Carolina employers must understand the different theories under
which they may be held liable. With this understanding, employers
can assess their potential liability by measuring their current
workplace environment's safety regulations and safety procedures in
light of North Carolina law. To that end, this Note reviews several
theories of liability under which North Carolina employers may be
held liable for acts of workplace violence.'
The common-law doctrine of respondeat superior is the
traditional theory of liability under which employers may be held
liable for the tortious acts of their employees.'" According to this
doctrine, employer liability arises if the employee's tortious behavior
occurs while the employee is the employer's agent. In North
Carolina, agency is established when the employer expressly
authorizes the employee's actions or when the employee commits the
because workplace violence increases overall physical and mental health costs).
11. See Yarborough, supra note 6, at 1.
12. For a broader treatment of employer liability, see PHILLIP D. DICKINSON,
WORKPLACE VIOLENCE & EMPLOYER LIABILrY 5-10, 20-26 (1997); Ann E. Phillips,
Comment, Violence in the Workplace: Reevaluating the Employer's Role, 44 BUFF. L.
REv. 139,149-93 (1996).
13. See infra notes 18-88 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 106-94 and accompanying text.
15. Act of Mar. 11, 1929, ch. 120, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws 117 (codified as amended at

N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to 97-200 (1999)).
16. See infra notes 89-105 and accompanying text

17. See infra notes 18-105.
18. See CAPOzzOLI & MCVEY, supranote 3, at 3.
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tortious act "within the scope of... and in furtherance of his master's
business."'19 Acts of workplace violence are usually intentional torts,
and North Carolina courts generally have held that intentional
tortious conduct is neither employer-authorized nor within the
employee's scope of employment.02 Snow v. DeButts21 illustrates the
North Carolina Supreme Court's analysis of employer liability under
respondeat superior. In Snow, the court found that one of the
defendant employer's managers acted outside the scope of his
employment when he assaulted the plaintiff employee after the
employee criticized the employer at a public hearing.' The Snow
court concluded that the assault exceeded the scope of the employee's
implied authority and that the employer did not authorize the
assaultP Thus, the employer was not held liable for the plaintiff
employee's damages under respondeat superior.2 4
On rare occasions, however, a court will conclude that the
employer authorized, either explicitly or implicitly, the employee's
intentionally tortious action. In Robinson v. McAlhaney,2 the
plaintiff claimed that the defendant's employee assaulted him during
the repossession of his property.2 6 The plaintiff argued that under
respondeat superior the defendant employer was liable for damages
resulting from the assault because the attacker was the defendant's
employee who was acting in the course and scope of his employment
at the time of the assault. 27 The Robinson court held that whether the
attacker was the defendant's employee and whether the attacker was
acting in the scope of his employment were factual issues for the jury
to decide.?
In addition to respondeat superior, other liability theories have
developed that hold employers liable for injuries caused by workplace
19. Snow v. DeButts, 212 N.C. 120, 122, 193 S.E. 224, 226 (1937); see also Troxler v.
Charter Mandala Ctr., Inc., 89 N.C. App. 268, 271, 365 S.E.2d 665, 668 (1988) ("To be
within the scope of employment, an employee, at the time of the incident, must be acting
in furtherance of the principal's business and for the purpose of accomplishing the duties
of his employment.").
20. See Brown v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 93 N.C. App. 431, 437, 378 S.E.2d 232, 235,
(1989). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958) (setting forth
the elements of respondeat superior).
21. 212 N.C. 120,193 S.E. 224 (1937).
22. See id. at 125-26,193 S.E. at 228.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. 214 N.C. 180,198 S.E. 647 (1938).
26. See id. at 182,198 S.E. at 649.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 183, 198 S.E. at 650.
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violence. Typically, plaintiffs are more successful in recovering
damages from employers under these additional theories than under

respondeat superior. The two most common liability theories are (1)
negligent hiring and (2) negligent supervision

and retention.

Although often litigated together, these two theories possess different
legal elements and they apply to different factual scenarios. Given

these distinctions, this Note discusses the two theories separately.
Under the theory of negligent hiring, a plaintiff must prove the
following: (1) the tortious act occurred,2 9 (2) the employee was

incompetent for the job, 0 (3) the employer knew or should have
known of the employee's incompetence but nevertheless hired the
employee, 31 and (4) causation.32 Although North Carolina's courts
recognize the tort of negligent hiring,33 its applicability to workplace

violence is unresolved because few North Carolina cases have
addressed this issue.'

Nevertheless, a review of case law from other

jurisdictions reveals that negligent hiring cases, premised on acts of
workplace violence, usually turn on two interrelated issues-duty and
29. See Medlin v. Bass, 327 N.C. 587, 591, 398 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1990) (quoting S.A.
Walters v. Durham Lumber Co., 163 N.C. 536,541,80 S.E. 49,51 (1939)); B.B. Walker Co.
v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 108 N.C. App. 562,567,424 S.E.2d 172,175 (1993).
30. See Medlin, 327 N.C. at 591, 398 S.E.2d at 462-63 (establishing that the employee
who has an inherent tendency for violence or who has acted violently in the past satisfies
the incompetence element).
31. See id.
32. See id. At least one jurisdiction has added the additional requirement that the
employer owe a legal duty to the plaintiff. See Baugher v. A. Hattersley & Sons, Inc., 436
N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a claim of negligent hiring was not
established because employer owed no legal duty to plaintiffs because they were not
customers, patrons, or invitees).
33. See, e.g., Medlin, 327 N.C. at 590-91, 398 S.E.2d at 463; O'Connor v. Corbett
Lumber Corp., 84 N.C. App. 178, 182-83, 352 S.E.2d 267, 270-71 (1987); see also Alex B.
Long, Note, Addressing the Cloud Over Employee References: A Survey of Recently
Enacted State Legislation, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 177,183 (1997) (stating that almost all
states recognize the tort of negligent hiring). For a comprehensive discussion of the
theory of negligent hiring, see John C. North, Note, The Responsibility of Employers for
the Actions of Their Employees: The Negligent Hiring Theory of Liability, 53 CHI.-KENT.
L. REV. 717,717-30 (1977).
34. This issue was raised in Medlin when the plaintiff student claimed that her school
was liable, under a theory of negligent hiring, for the school principal's assault on her. See
Medlin, 327 N.C. at 589-90, 398 S.E.2d at 461. While North Carolina case law is not well
developed in this area, the weight of authority in other jurisdictions clearly establishes that
the tort of negligent hiring extends to acts of workplace violence. See, e.g., Rahmel v.
Lehndorff, 76 P. 659, 660-61 (Cal. 1904) (en banc) (holding that a claim of negligent hiring
could be asserted against a hotel owner who hired an individual with a known history of
violence or disorderly conduct when the employee assaulted a customer); Abbott v.
Payne, 457 So. 2d 1156, 1157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that an employer has a
duty to investigate a prospective employee's background and the failure to do so in a
reasonable manner exposes the employer to liability for negligent hiring practices).
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foreseeability.35 Employers have a well-established duty to hire
competent employees. 6 In the context of workplace violence, this
duty requires that employers reasonably and accurately assess
potential employees' backgrounds to determine whether they pose a
foreseeable safety risk to other employees or customers. 7 To satisfy
this duty, employers must reasonably investigate a potential
8
employee's background before hiring the individual
Although a negligent hiring claim focuses the court's attention
on the employer's pre-hire actions, 39 the employer's responsibility
35. See, e.g., Golden West Broadcasters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. Rptr. 95, 9899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (affirming grant of summary judgment because the parties
conceded that the violent employee's supervisor had no knowledge of the employee's
violent tendencies); Hall v. SSF, Inc., 930 P.2d 94, 99 (Nev. 1996) (holding that evidence of
the defendant's employee's past fights was admissible because it helped the plaintiff
establish that the defendant "knew or should have known" of the employee's past actions
and violent tendencies); Santamarina v. Citrynell, 609 N.Y.S.2d 902, 903 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994) (affirming summary judgment on negligent hiring claim because the plaintiff failed
to establish that the defendant employer "had any knowledge of a propensity of violence
on the part of the employee); see also Stephen J. Beaver, Comment, Beyond the
Exclusivity Rule: Employer's Liability for Workplace Violence, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 103,
110 (1997) (reviewing cases regarding workplace violence and workers' compensation).
36. Cf Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments, 331 N.W.2d 907, 913-15 (Minn. 1983) (holding
that the defendant employer had a duty to exercise reasonable care in hiring its employees
and that the defendant breached this duty when it hired an employee who then acted
violently in the workplace).
37. See Beaver, supra note 35, at 110.
38. See Lindbergh Porter, Jr., Employment Torts: High Risk Componentsof Wrongfil
DischargeLawsuits, in 25TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 65,102 (PLI Lit.
& Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Series No. H4-5237, Oct. 1996). Employers may utilize
several approaches to satisfy their duty of reasonably investigating the backgrounds of
potential employees prior to hiring them. First, employers may perform psychological
tests on job candidates to uncover latent violent tendencies. See CHARLES E. LABIG,
PREVENTING VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE 52-54 (1995); GERALD W. LEWIS &
NANCY C. ZARE, WORKPLACE HOSTILITY MYTH AND REALITY 88 (1999). But see infra

notes 122-27 and accompanying text (reviewing the inaccuracies and difficulties in certain
psychological screening techniques).

Second, well-trained employees of the potential

should conduct interviews that include open-ended questions about how the interviewee
handled a situation when she felt she was treated unfairly. See STEVE ALBRECHT, FEAR
AND VIOLENCE ON THE JOB: PREVENTION SOLUTIONS FOR THE DANGEROUS
WORKPLACE 125-27 (1997); CAPOZzOLI & MCVEY, supra note 3, at 101-4)2; MICHAEL
MANTELL, TICKING BOMBS DIFFUSING VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE 60-66 (1994).
Third, the employer could gather background information on the employee that includes
driving, military, credit, work, and criminal records. See LEWIS & ZARE, supra, at 89;

infra notes 131-34 and accompanying test (discussing potential problems that arise from
using criminal records in the hiring process).

Finally, employers should verify all

information submitted on the job application, including checking applicant provided
references. See Kimberly Gee Smith, Violence in the Workplace: The Armed and Angry
Employee, 29-FALL BRIEF 8,19 (Fall 1999).
39. See Frank C. Morris, Jr., Workplace Privacy Issues: Avoiding Liability, SD52
ALI-ABA 697,760 (1999), availablein Westlaw, ALI-ABA database (reviewing examples
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does not end with the hiring decision, because employers have ongoing duties to provide reasonable supervision and to make
reasonable employee retention decisions. In North Carolina, the
breach of either post-hire duty results in the tort of negligent
supervision and retention. 4 Unlike a negligent hiring claim, the locus
of attention for negligent supervision and retention is on the actions
an employer takes after hiring an employee and whether the
employer failed to act when confronted with knowledge that one of
its employees posed a potential threat to safety.
To prove negligent supervision and retention, a plaintiff must
show the following: (1) the employer knew of an employee's
incompetence prior to the incident in question, (2) the employer
failed to take reasonable actions to remedy the incompetence, and (3)
the plaintiff suffered an injury as a result of the employer's inaction
and employee incompetence. 41 Moreover, the plaintiff must
overcome a presumption that the employer properly performed its
duty by showing, "by the greater weight of the evidence," 42 that the
plaintiff was injured due to the employer's negligence in retaining the
incompetent employee.43 Courts tend to pay specific attention to the
adequacy of supervision and the reasonableness of employers'
responses to alleged employee misconduct-particularly violent
behavior.44
North Carolina courts have recognized claims of negligent
supervision and retention when an employee commits an act of46
45
workplace violence that injures the plaintiff. In Lamb v. Littman,
the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed a nonsuit decision
against a plaintiff employee who asserted a claim of negligent hiring
of cases when employers were held liable for negligent hiring claims arising from the
employer's failure to take reasonable precautions in the pre-hire employment decision).
40. See Smith v. Privette, 128 N.C. App. 490, 494, 495 S.E.2d 395, 398 (1998) (citing
Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 373, 410 S.E.2d 897, 903 (1991)).
41. See Smith, 128 N.C. App. at 494, 495 S.E.2d at 398; Braswell,330 N.C. at 373, 410
S.E.2d at 903; Graham v. Hardee's Food Systems, 121 N.C. App. 382, 385, 465 S.E.2d 558,
560 (1996) (quoting Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 495, 340
S.E.2d 116, 124 (1986)). See generally Morris, supra note 39, at 759-63 (reviewing
negligent retention and supervision).
42. Braswell,330 N.C. at 374,410 S.E.2d at 904.

43. See id. at 376,410 S.E.2d at 904-05.
44. See VAUGHAN BOWIE, COPING WITH VIOLENCE: A GUIDE FOR THE HUMAN
SERVICEs 35-53 (1996) (describing effective strategies for intervening in a workplace
conflict); LEWIS & ZARE, supra note 38, at 67-80 (identifying employee behaviors that

indicate violent propensities).
45. See generallyPorter, supra note 38, at 109-12 (reviewing the elements of negligent
supervision and retention claims in jurisdictions outside of North Carolina).
46. 128 N.C. 361,38 S.E. 911 (1901).
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and retention when the evidence suggested that the employer knew
that the employee-supervisor was surly, violent, and ill-tempered and
nevertheless retained him as a supervisor. 7 The Lamb court
reasoned that the supervisor's reputation and prior reports of his
aggressive workplace behavior constituted sufficient notice to trigger
the employer's duty to take reasonable steps to protect the other
employees. 4 In addition to the notice element, the court emphasized
that the aggressor was a supervisor charged with caring for the very
person he injured. 49 Thus, the relative status of the parties involved
may be important to a court in determining an employer's liability for
workplace violence.
More recently, in Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club,50 the plaintiff
informed her employer that a fellow employee sexually harassed her,
but the employer's supervisory staff took little, if any, action to
prevent the reoccurrence of sexual harassment." The Hogan court
reasoned that the employee's report of sexual harassment, if true,
placed her employer on notice that a supervisor threatened
workplace safety. 2 Additionally, the court found that the employer's
complete disregard of the employee's report and apparent failure to
act were enough proof for a reasonable jury to conclude that the
employer was negligent.53
Lamb and Hogan demonstrate that a plaintiff's claim of
negligent retention and supervision against an employer may prevail
when an employee causes injury to the plaintiff in an act of workplace
violence. As evidenced by the numerous lower court dismissals of
such cases sustained by North Carolina appellate courts, 54 maintaining
47. See id. at 362-63, 38 S.E. at 911-12. The supervisor injured the plaintiff employee,
a ten-year-old mill sweep, when he pushed the plaintiff to the floor. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. 79 N.C. App. 483,340 S.E.2d 116 (1986).
51. See id. at 492, 340 S.E.2d at 122.
52. See id.
53. See id.; see also Shorter v. Mooresville Cotton Mills, 198 N.C. 27, 30-31, 150 S.E.
499, 500 (1929) (sustaining a judgment for a plaintiff when the plaintiff had warned the
employer in the morning that a co-employee was dangerous and later that afternoon the
co-employee's incompetence caused plaintiff's hand to be damaged).
54. See, e.g., Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 375-76, 410 S.E.2d 897, 903-05
(1991); Wegner v. Delly-Land Delicatessen, Inc., 270 N.C. 62, 65-66, 153 S.E.2d 804, 807
(1967) (holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie case when no
evidence suggested that the employer knew the employee was a "high tempered,
quarrelsome or dangerous man"); O'Connor v. Corbett Lumber Corp., 84 N.C. App. 178,
182-83,352 S.E.2d 267,270-71 (1987) (denying plaintiff's claim when a prisoner in a workrelease program inflicted personal injuries and property damages on the plaintiff because
the complaint was pleaded insufficiently); cf. Pleasants v. Barnes, 221 N.C. 173, 177, 19

2000]

WORKPLACE VIOLENCE

2061

a negligent retention and supervision claim is quite difficult. In
Braswell v. Braswell,5s the North Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed
the plaintiff's case because the court found that the employer did not
know nor have reason to know of its employee's violent, domestic
tendencies because the employee was "otherwise known as stable and
even-tempered. ' s6 The Braswell court also suggested that plaintiffs
would have much greater difficulty overcoming the presumption that
an employer fulfilled its duty of due care when an employee acted
violently outside the workplace or when off duty. 7 Further, the
Braswell court rejected the argument that section 317 of the
RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS s could be a basis for
establishing a claim of negligent supervision and retention in North
Carolina, 9 thus indicating that North Carolina courts will not allow
plaintiffs to make out prima facie cases of negligent supervision and
retention based solely on the fact that an employee used his
employer's chattel in committing an act of violence.
In addition to respondeat superior, negligent hiring, and
negligent supervision and retention, an employer may also be liable
based on its general duty to provide a safe working environment for
its employees. Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (the "OSH Act"), 6° employers must provide "a place of
S.E.2d 627, 629 (1942) (holding that the employer had insufficient notice of co-employee's
dangerousness when one employee complained of the work methods his co-employee was
utilizing).
55. 330 N.C. at 363,410 S.E.2d at 903.
56. Id. at 374,410 S.E.2d at 903.
57. See id. at 374,410 S.E.2d at 903-04.
58. Section 317 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides that:
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant
while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from
intentionally harming others ... if (a) the servant ... is using a chattel of the

master, and (b) the master (i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability
to control his servant, and (ii) knows or should know of the necessity and
opportunity for exercising such control.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965).
59. See Braswell, 330 N.C. at 374-75, 410 S.E.2d at 904. At the intermediate appellate
level, Judge Green relied on O'Connorv. Corbett Lumber Corp., 84 N.C. App. at 182-86,
352 S.E.2d at 270-72 (1987), as authority for holding that North Carolina recognized
section 317 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS as a viable basis for alleging
negligent hiring and retention. See Braswell v. Braswell, 98 N.C. App. 231, 239-42, 390
S.E.2d 752, 757-58, (Green, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Green
further contended that the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of negligent supervision or
retention because the sheriff's department could have prevented the act of violence by not
giving the gun used to kill the decedent to the deputy. See id. at 242, 410 S.E.2d at 758
(Green, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651678 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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employment which [is] free from recognized hazards that are causing
or likely to cause death or serious physical harm. ' 61 A breach of this
general duty provides an injured plaintiff or the government with a
cause of action against the employer.62
Traditionally, a safe working environment was interpreted to
mean an environment where employees were not exposed
unreasonably to risks from production processes.63 Conventional
inquiries questioned whether the employer provided safety training
on machinery, whether the work site had adequate ventilation and
lighting, and whether the work equipment was ergonomically
correct.64 Recently, however, the duty to provide a safe workplace
has been extended to include an environment that decreases the
likelihood of workplace violence. Even though the OSH Act does
not reference workplace violence specifically, much less establish
related standards, this silence does not relieve employers from the
duty to provide a work environment free from threats of workplace
violence. 6
The OSH Act can be used to sanction employers when they
should reasonably expect that workplace violence may occur because
of the general working conditions. 67 The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) issued guidelines in 1996 to help its
inspectors identify when employers breach their general duty to
provide a safe work environment.(
These guidelines identify
61. 29 U.S.C. 654(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Congress enacted the OSH Act in
1970 "to assure as far as possible for every working man and woman... safe and healthful
working conditions." lId § 654(b).
62. See, e.g., Maulden v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 196 N.C. 122, 123, 144 S.E.
557, 558 (1928) (citing Jefferson v. Raleigh, 194 N.C. 479, 481, 140 S.E. 76, 76 (1927));
DICKINSON, supranote 12, at 1-9.
63. See Maulden, 196 N.C. at 123-24, 144 S.E. at 558.
64. See id.; David J. Kolesar, Note, Cumulative Trauma Disorders: OSHA's General
Duty Clause and the Need for an Ergonomics Standard, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2079, passim
(1992) (reviewing the OSH Act's general duty clause and ergonomics).
65. See DICKINSON, supra note 12, at 1-9.
66. See Smith, supra note 38, at 9; see also LEWis & ZARE, supra note 38, at 3-4
(noting that since the passage of the OSH Act in 1970, the workplace has become much
safer in terms of both the physical and psychological working environments).
67. See Beaver, supra note 35, at 126; Phillips, supra note at 12, at 144. The OSH
Act's general duty violations are classified as either "serious" or "non-serious." See 29
U.S.C. § 666(b), (c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The maximum penalty assessable for a
"serious" violation is $70,000 and for a "non-serious" violation, the maximum fine is
$7,000 per day that the violation remains uncorrected. See Smith, supra note 38, at 9.
68. See Richard T. Sampson & Jonathan R. Topazian, Violence in the Workplace, FOR
THE DEFENSE, Dec. 1996, at 20. For a compilation of the OSHA promulgated guidelines
for health care and social service workers, see RICHARD V. DENENBERG & MARK
BRAVERMAN, THE VIOLENCE-PRONE WORKPLACE: A NEW APPROACH TO DEALING
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potential sources of violations and assist employers' compliance with

the OSH Act.69 Although OSHA has stated that its guidelines do not
form the basis of general duty violations7 and that issuing citations to
employers who violate the OSH Act's general duty requirement will
not reduce workplace violence, 7' OSHA has issued citations when
employers create a workplace where an unreasonable risk of
potential workplace violence exists.72 Thus, employers should not
overlook their OSHA obligations when assessing their potential
liability for acts of workplace violence.
In light of the general duty to create a working environment that
is reasonably safe from acts of workplace violence, many employers
undertake safety measures and initiatives to comply with this duty.73
In so doing, employers may expose themselves to liability under the
fifth liability theory-assumption of duty. This theory is based on the
premise that when an employer, by its actions or words, assumes a
duty to protect a third party,74 that employer may be held liable if it
fails to perform its assumed duty. North Carolina has adopted the
position of section 324A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
WITH HOSTILE, THREATENING, AND UNCIVIL BEHAVIOR 247-55 (1999).
69. See Sampson & Topazian, supra note 68, at 21. The guidelines that OSHA drafted
applied specifically to health care and social service workers and night retail
establishment. See id. Some commentators, however, have suggested that the general
principles set forth in the guidelines apply to all industries. See id. See generally Beaver,
supra note 35, at 126-27 (summarizing the general nature of the guidelines and the
obligations that these guidelines impose). Furthermore, the four main components of the
violence prevention program suggested in the OSHA guidelines are arguably relevant to
all businesses. See Smith, supra note 38, at 10. The four components are as follows: (1)
securing a commitment by management and employees to prevent workplace violence; (2)
analyzing the workplace for safety concerns; (3) controlling and preventing workplace
violence; and (4) providing health and safety training. See id.
70. See Workplace Violence: OSHA Tells Field Not to Use Workplace Violence
Guidelines as Basis for Citations, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH DAILY (BNA),
Apr. 10, 1996, availablein Westlaw, BNA-OSHD database.
71. See Enforcement: OSHA Official Tells Conference CitationsNot Best Approach to
Violence, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH DAILY (BNA), Nov. 24, 1995, availablein
Westlaw, BNA-OSHD database (summarizing position of Ray Donnelly, OSHA's
director of general industry compliance assistance); see also infra note 155 (providing
examples of unreasonable risk warranting an OSHA citation).
72. See Employers Face Catch-22 in Addressing Hazard, Attorney Tells Conference
Attendees, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 2331 (Apr. 12,1995).
73. To satisfy the general duty requirement, OSHA requires employers "to do
everything reasonably necessary to protect employees' life, safety, and health, including
furnishing safety devices and safeguards and adopting practices reasonably adequate to
create a safe and healthful workplace." LABIG, supra note 38, at 62. Addressing security
issues and providing training concerning workplace violence are two of the most effective
ways to comply with the general duty requirement. See id.
74. The third party can be either a fellow employee or a customer.
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that allows the assumption of a duty to protect a third party which
may lead to tort liability if the protection is negligently provided.75
More specifically, North Carolina recognizes that (1) a duty is created
when an employer assumes the protection of a third party while
rendering the services necessary for the third party's protection, (2)
this duty is breached when reasonable care is not used, and (3) the
third party relied on the protective measures to her detriment.76
Employers must be concerned with identifying the point at which
they assume a duty to protect third parties and the actions they must
undertake to satisfy this assumed duty.
North Carolina courts have not addressed specifically the point
at which the employer assumes a duty of reasonable protection. In
the cases presented thus far, North Carolina courts have assumed,
without analysis, that a duty to protect employees exists and that this
duty may be breached when workplace violence harms an employee.
Courts in other jurisdictions, however, have approached the question
of how employers assume a duty to protect their employees more
analytically. 78 These courts have articulated four theories under
79
which employers may assume a duty to protect their employees 75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 324A (1965).
76. See Matternes v. City of Winston-Salem, 286 N.C. 1, 19, 209 S.E.2d 481, 491
(1974); Mozingo v. Pitt City Mem. Hosp. Inc., 101 N.C. App. 578, 587, 400 S.E.2d 747, 752
(1991).
77. See Holshouser v. Shaner Hotel Group Properties, 134 N.C. App. 391,398-99,518
S.E.2d 17, 24 (1999) (asserting that an employer may be liable for breaching its duty to
protect employees when an employee was assaulted in the employer's parking lot), aff'd,
351 N.C. 330, 330, 524 S.E.2d 568, 568-69 (2000); Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Safety
Nat'l Cas. Corp., 127 N.C. App. 33, 38-42, 487 S.E.2d 789, 792-94 (1997) (assuming that
the employee's estate can collect workers' compensation for the employee's death that
resulted when a co-employee abducted the employee from the defendant's parking lot and
subsequently murdered her). North Carolina courts impose a "positive duty [on
employers] to use ordinary care in providing employees with reasonably safe methods and
means to do the work for which they are employed." Maulden v. High Point Bending &
Chair Co., 196 N.C. 122,123,144 S.E. 557,558 (1928) (citing Jefferson v. Raleigh, 194 N.C.
479, 481, 140 S.E. 76, 76 (1927)). This positive duty, however, traditionally has been
applied to job duties that employers required of employees. See, e.g., Jefferson, 194 N.C.
at 481,140 S.E. at 76.
78. See, e.g., Fettke v. City of Wichita, 957 P.2d 409,414 (Kan. 1998) (holding that the
police department's policy not to disclose the identity of any police officer involved in a
shoot-out to the media did not create an independent duty to protect the plaintiff officer
from the risk of retaliation from individuals involved in the shoot-out); Brooks v. National
Convenience Stores, Inc., 897 S.W.2d 898, 902-03 (Tex. App. 1995) (holding that employer
did not assume a duty to protect the employee from harm when the employer did not have
control over the security defects on the lease premises).
79. See generally Phillips, supra note 12, at 149-93 (reviewing a different theoretical
basis for finding that an employer has a duty to protect its employees); Porter, supra note
38, at 160-82 (reviewing theories under which courts have found a duty for employers to
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voluntary assumption of contractual obligations,8 0 a special
relationship
between
employer and
employee,8'
special
circumstances,8 or a statutory provision.'

Because North Carolina

courts have not yet adopted an analytical framework for examining
under what circumstances an employer assumes a duty to protect its

employees, North Carolina employers should proceed cautiously
when implementing workplace safety measures or when assuring

employees that they are committed to providing a safe workplace.' 4
Under negligent misrepresentation-the fifth liability theory
discussed in this Note-an employer can be held liable when a former
employee commits an act of workplace violence at his new place of
employment. This theory of liability allows a plaintiff to recover from

the perpetrator's former employer for injuries suffered due to
workplace violence when the perpetrator's former employer provided

the current employer with a positive recommendation that omitted
protect their employees from violence); Tanja Lueck Thompson, Note, Weapons in the
Workplace: The Effect of Tennessee's ConcealedWeapons Statute on Employer Liability,
28 U. MEM. L. REv. 281,286 (1997).
80. Courts have found that an employer has a contractual obligation, either express or
implied, to protect its employees when the employer undertakes action to protect
employees. See Vaughn v. Granite City Steel Div. of Nat'l Steel Corp., 576 N.E.2d 874,
879-80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that voluntary statements published in the employee
manual implied the defendant employer's duty to protect its employees).
81. See Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 461-62 (1947) (per curiam) (holding that
because of the employer's special relationship with the employee, who was a female, the
employer had a duty to protect its employee). But see Parham v. Taylor, 402 So. 2d 884,
885-86 (Ala. 1981) (limiting liability to "the most extraordinary and highly unusual
circumstances" rather than rejecting the idea of a special employer-to-employee
relationship imposing a duty on the employer to protect the employee).
82. The special circumstances are usually when the employer knows or has reason to
know that workplace violence is likely to harm an employee. For example, in Isaacs v.
Huntington Memorial Hospital, the plaintiff doctor was shot in the hospital parking lot
during an attempted robbery. See 695 P.2d 653, 655 (Cal. 1985). The plaintiff claimed that
the defendant hospital had a duty to provide adequate parking lot security because the
hospital was in a high crime area and there had been several thefts near the parking lot.
See iL The California Supreme Court recognizing a "special circumstance" held that
determining whether the assault was foreseeable was a jury question. See id. at 659.
83. See infra notes 154-61 and accompanying text (discussing liability under the Act).
84. Employers may seem better off not implementing workplace safety measures
because they expose themselves to liability under the assumption of duty theory. While
employers undertake some risk when adopting safety measures, one should remember
that this risk only develops when the employer adopts and then negligently performs the
safety measures. Furthermore, by adopting safety measures, employers comply with their
duty under the OSH Act to provide a safe work environment and may limit their liability
in terms of negligent supervision and retention claims. Moreover, employers may benefit
from increased employee moral by providing a safe work environment. Finally,
affirmative acts to prevent workplace violence may allow an employer to avoid negative
publicity when workplace violence occurs on a job site.
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mention of past acts of violence or similar misbehavior.8 5 In Randi W.
v. Muroc Joint Unified School District,86 the California Supreme
Court held that the former employer of a vice principal accused of
sexual assault could be liable for negligent misrepresentation when
the former employer gave the principal a positive recommendation
but did not disclose that disciplinary measures had been taken against
him for alleged sexual misconduct.7
To establish a claim for negligent misrepresentation in North
Carolina, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant negligently
supplied the plaintiff with false information, (2) the plaintiff relied on
this false information in the course a business-related transaction, and
(3) the plaintiff's pecuniary interests were negatively affected because
of her reliance on the false information.8 While these elements seem
applicable to workplace violence cases, the state courts have not
decided whether negligent misrepresentation applies to employers
who provide employment recommendations but omit information
concerning past violent acts. North Carolina courts may eventually
85. See Anthony J. Sperber, Comment, When Nondisclosure Becomes
Misrepresentation: ShapingEmployer Liabilityfor Incomplete Job References, 32 U.S.F. L.
REv. 405, passim (1998) (reviewing the basis for negligent misrepresentation claims and
relevant state trends). To date, no jurisdiction has created an affirmative duty for past
employers to give a former employee a reference. See Long, supra note 33, at 185-86.
Thus, employers may refuse to provide references. See id. (citing Moore v. St. Joseph
Nursing Home, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 100, 102 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (describing employers'
duty to give references as a moral or social obligation)).
86. 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
87. See id. at 584; see also Workplace Violence: Judge Allows Plaintiffs to Seek
Damages Over Recommendation of Violent Employee, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
160, at D-7 (Aug. 18, 1995) (discussing Jerner v. Allstate Insurance Co., an unpublished
Florida Circuit Court opinion, which held a past employer liable under the theory of
negligent misrepresentation), available in Westlaw, BNA-LB database. In Jerner, the
former employer-Allstate-provided the perpetrator's new employer with a
recommendation that said the perpetrator had voluntarily resigned when, in reality,
Allstate had required the resignation because the perpetrator came to work with a gun.
See id. After being fired again, the perpetrator shot five employees at his new place of
business. Allstate was held liable because it had provided a misleading reference that
contributed to the employees' deaths. See id. But see Cohen v. Wales, 518 N.Y.S.2d 633
(N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (holding that the school district, which recommended a teacher for
a job with another school district but failed to reveal that the teacher had been charged
with sexual misconduct, was not liable when the teacher molested a pupil).
88. See Roberson v. William, 240 N.C. 696, 701, 83 S.E.2d 811, 814-15 (1954)
(allowing a negligent misrepresentation claim involving a timber sale for less than half the
market value to go to the jury); Ausley v. Bishop, 133 N.C. App. 210, 218, 515 S.E.2d 72,
78 (1999) ("The tort of negligent misrepresentation occurs when ... [an individual]
supplies false information for the guidance of others in a business transaction, without
exercising reasonable care in obtaining or communicating information." (quoting Fulton v.
Vickery, 73 N.C. App. 382, 388, 326 S.E.2d 354, 358 (1985) (reviewing the primary
elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim))).
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interpret, as other jurisdictions have, the definition of negligent
misrepresentation broadly enough to allow such an extension.
While the contours of employer liability for workplace violence

remain largely undefined, North Carolina courts have been clear that
such liability exists. Though some North Carolina employers may
assume that any such liability will extend only to customers because
North Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act 9 bars their employees'
claims, that assumption may prove erroneous. 90 Under North
Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act, an employee who suffers an
injury as a result of his employment may not bring an action in tort
against his employer when the injury is compensable under the
statute. 91

The key question facing North Carolina employers is

whether the state courts will deem an employee's injuries due to
workplace violence compensable under the Workers' Compensation
Act. Resolution of this issue will dictate whether employees may
recover in tort against their employers when workplace violence
caused the injury. 92 North Carolina courts, however, have not
provided clear guidelines on the applicability of the Act to such
situations.9 3

Currently, North Carolina courts apply a three-prong test for
determining when an employee's injury is compensable under the

Workers' Compensation Act. 4 First, the employee's injury must be
an accident 95 and must not be "expected or designed by the person
89. Act of Mar. 11, 1929, ch. 120, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws 117 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to 97-200 (1999)).

90. See generally LABIG, supra note 38, at 72-76 (reviewing California's workers'
compensation laws and concluding that some forms of workplace violence perpetrated
against an employee are not covered under the worker's compensation system); supra
note 77 and accompanying text (reviewing North Carolina cases where the courts held that
workers' compensation did not bar workplace violence claims).
91. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1999); Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Safety
Nat'l Cas. Corp., 127 N.C. App. 33, 40-42, 487 S.E.2d 789, 793-94 (1997). See generally
Jennifer Moyer Gaines, Comment, Employer Liability for Domestic Violence in the
Workplace: Are Employees Walking A Tightrope Without a Safety Net?, 31 TEX. TECH L.

REv. 139, 144-45 (2000) (stating that workers' compensation laws limit employee
recoveries from employers and noting that not all acts of workplace violence are covered
by workers' compensation laws).
92. See George A. Staton & Greg J. Thompson, A PracticalPerspective on Employer
Violations and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 35 APR-ARIZ. ATr'Y 32, 32 (1999)

(noting that the exclusivity principle of workers' compensation is being eroded in the area
of workplace violence).
93. See Holshouser v. Shaner Hotel Group Properties, 134 N.C. App 391, 518 S.E.2d
17 (1999), aff'd, 351 N.C. 330,524 S.E.2d 568 (2000).
94. See Shaw v. Smith & Jennings, Inc., 130 N.C. App. 442, 445, 503 S.E.2d 113, 116
(1998).
95. See id.
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who suffers the injury."96 Second, the employee's injury must arise
out of the employee's employment with the employer. 7 North
Carolina courts have defined the term "arising out of" as "refer[ing]
to the origin or causal connection of the accidental injury or death to
the employment."9' Finally, the employee's injury must be within the
course of the employee's employment;9 9 courts have defined the term

"within the course of" to "refer[ ] to the time, place and
circumstances under which the injury occurred."' 10 0
No clear answer to the question of coterminous coverage exists,
even though the North Carolina Supreme Court, without comment,
recently affirmed Holshouser v. Shaner Hotel Group Properties,1 1 a
case that initially seems to support the notion that North Carolina
allows an injured employee to recover under both workers'
compensation and tort law. The Holshouser court rejected the
defendant employer's assertion that the plaintiff employee was barred
from suing in tort because workers' compensation covered the
plaintiff's injuries suffered as a result of an act of workplace
violence." While the court's decision seems to indicate that, at least
in some instances, North Carolina courts will permit an injured
employee to sue her employer in tort for injuries suffered due to

workplace violence, the contours of this rule remain vague. This
vagueness stems from the apparent conflict between Holshouser and
Wake County HospitalServices v. Safety National Casualty Corp.103 96. Id. (citations omitted).
97. See id.
98. Ross v. Mark's, Inc., 120 N.C. App. 607, 610, 463 S.E.2d 302, 304 (1995) (citing
Gallimore v. Marilyn's Shoes, 292 N.C. 399,402,233 S.E.2d 529,531 (1977)).
99. See Shaw, 130 N.C. App. at 445,503 S.E.2d at 116.
100. Schmoyer v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 81 N.C. App. 140, 142,
343 S.E.2d 551,552 (1986) (citations omitted).
101. 134 N.C. App. 391, 518 S.E.2d 17 (1999), affd, 351 N.C. 330, 524 S.E.2d 568
(2000). In Holshouser,the hotel required the plaintiff employee to park in a back parking
lot even though hotel management knew that violent criminal activities recently occurred
in the parking lot. The plaintiff was raped in the parking lot just before she was scheduled
to start her shift. See id. at 393, 518 S.E.2d at 20-21.
102. See id. at 401-02, 518 S.E.2d at 25-26. The court of appeals reversed summary
judgment for the employer on the theory that the plaintiff's claim was not barred by
workers' compensation because the attack was outside the scope of plaintiff's
employment. See id. at 402, 518 S.E.2d at 26. More specifically, the Holshouser court
reasoned that the hazard the plaintiff encountered was a "'hazard to which ... [she]
would have been equally exposed [to] apart from [her] employment'" and thus the rape
did not arise out her employment. Id. at 401, 518 S.E.2d at 26 (quoting Bartlett v. Duke
Univ., 284 N.C. 230,233,200 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1973)).
103. 127 N.C. App. 33, 487 S.E.2d 789 (1997). In Wake County Hospital Services, the
plaintiff was killed on a nearby street after a fellow employee abducted her from the
employee parking lot. At the time of her abduction, the plaintiff was carrying work-
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a case with facts similar to Holshouser in which the court of appeals
barred the plaintiff from suing her employer in tort because of
available coverage under workers' compensation. More specifically,
it is unclear whether the North Carolina Supreme Court accepted the
court of appeal's artificial distinction0 4 of Holshouser from Wake
County Hospital Services or overruled Wake County HospitalServices
in its decision. The answer to this issue will determine largely the
breadth of employers' liability to employees for injuries suffered due
to workplace violence. 0 5
While North Carolina's workers' compensation law, as applied to
employee injuries suffered due to workplace violence, is unsettled,
employers should not assume that workers' compensation will shield
them from tort liability when an employee is injured due to
workplace violence. This potentially broader liability gives employers
an added incentive to create working environments that reduce the
risk of violent acts occurring in the workplace. Analyzing a potential
plaintiff's likelihood of recovery under the theories of liability
identified earlier is an effective way to design workplace safety
measures to reduce the possibility of workplace violence and limit any
resulting liability. Given the well-established nature of respondeat
superior, a logical place to start such an analysis is with this theory.
The key to a successful respondeat superior claim, and arguably
the most difficult element to prove, is establishing that the employee's
conduct falls within the scope of the employment. Most acts of
workplace violence will fall outside the scope an employee's job
because employers usually do not explicitly or implicitly authorize
their employees to act violently toward each other or to customers.
Consequently, a claim of respondeat superior seems likely to fail
when applied to damages resulting from workplace violence.
Nevertheless, to guard against litigation, employers should ensure
that employees do not interpret employer conduct or policies as

related materials. See id. at 37, 487 S.E.2d at 791.
104. The Holshouser Court distinguished its case from Wake County HospitalServices
by focusing on the following differences: (1) the plaintiff was not carrying work-related
materials; (2) the abduction took place in an overgrown wooded area, not on a street; (3)
the assailant was not a co-employee; (4) the employee had not yet reported to work; and
(5) there had been reports of criminal activity on the hotel premises. See id. at 402, 518
S.E.2d at 26.
105. One potential touchstone for employer liability that may emerge from the North
Carolina Supreme Court's affirmation of Holshouser is that workers' compensation may
not cover an employee who encounters a hazard that would have occurred regardless of

"employee" status. See id (citations omitted).
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implicitly authorizing violent acts. °6 For example, an employer who
knows that certain employees act aggressively toward each other but
fails to take corrective action may be perceived as sanctioning and
thereby authorizing violent conduct because an employee could
reasonably interpret the employer's inaction as authorizing such
behavior. 1' 7
Employers also should be particularly cognizant of how their
employees interact with the public. Employers who require their
employees to engage in potentially adversarial conduct with
customers, such as repossessing property for non-payment, have a
heightened duty to make sure that the employees are not aggressive
or violent toward customers. 08 To this end, employers need to train
their employees to deal with hostile or demanding customers without
becoming threatening, angry, or physically aggressive.0 9 Along the
same lines, employers can reduce the stress that these employees
experience to reduce the risk of a violent outburst.llO Part of creating
a comfortable work environment involves hiring people capable of
performing the job. As many human resource professionals admit,
hiring qualified people is an exceptionally difficult and demanding
task."' Nevertheless, this task is critical for overall business success.1
Effective hiring practices are a key way for employers to reduce
106. To prevent such misunderstandings, employers should investigate all claims of
aggressive employee behavior and take corrective action as necessary. See MANTELL,
supra note 38, at 135-60; see also LABIG, supra note 38,'at 99-109 (suggesting that
intervention is one of the best ways to prevent workplace violence and recommending the
formation of company violence response teams to conduct such interventions). In
addition, employers should adopt a written zero-tolerance policy to workplace violence
that defines what is meant by zero-tolerance and communicate this policy to employees.
See ALBRECHT, supra note 38, at 130-38.
107. When employees exhibit aggressive behavior toward customers and the employer
is aware of such behavior but does nothing to stop it, the customer may have at least a
colorable argument that the employee believed that the aggressive behavior was part of
the scope of the employment. See Robinson v. McAlhaney, 214 N.C. 180, 182-83, 198 S.E.
647, 649-50 (1938).
108. See, e.g., Robinson, 214 N.C. at 182-83, 198 S.E. 647,649-50 (1938).
109. See Tips for Minimizing Violent Injuries, WORKERS' COMPENSATION MONITOR,
Feb. 11, 2000 [hereinafter Tips].
110. See LABIG, supra note 38, at 135-36 (stating that "stressed" workers are subject to
twice the threat of violence and harassment compared to employees with lower stress
levels); MANTELL, supranote 38, at 226-27 (suggesting mechanisms of stress management
for employees). Employers should create a comfortable work environment for employees
and ensure that any customer service quotas are attainable and reasonable. See
CAPOZZOLI & MCVEY, supra note 3, at 34-35.
111. See Look Beyond Normal QualificationsTo Find the Ideal Job Candidate,HR ON
CAMPuS, Dec. 1998, at Al.
112. See id.
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their liability for acts of workplace violence." 3

Employers are

increasingly faced with plaintiffs who claim that the employer's
114

negligent hiring of the violent employee lead to their injuries.

Reasonably investigating every potential hire's job history prevents
negligent hiring claims, because such an investigation negates the

inference that the defendant failed to satisfy the applicable standard
of care."5 A reasonable investigation rebuts the plaintiffs claim that
the employer knew or should have known that the potential hire
either had an inherent tendency to act violently or that the potential
hire had acted violently in a prior workplace. Because notice is
required to establish a negligent hiring claim, a reasonable
investigation will cause the plaintiff's claim to fail.
The crucial decision for employers is to determine what degree
of inquiry into a potential hire's past employment history or her
psychological make-up constitutes a reasonable investigation.
Presently, no simple formula exists to define the appropriate scope." 6
Nevertheless, three well-settled points serve as guidelines.

First,

employers must conduct some type of pre-employment
investigation." 7 Second, employers hiring for positions that require
contact with the public are required to conduct a more thorough
investigation for their actions to qualify as reasonable."' Third,
criminal background checks of potential employees are generally not
113. See Beth Lindamood, Prevention Programs Target Workplace Violence,
WORKERS' COMPENSATION MONITOR,

May 1998, at Safety and Health 1; Tips, supra

note 109.
114. See DICKINSON, supra note 12, at 20-22.
115. See id.
116. See CAPOZZOLLI & McVEY, supra note 3, at 97 (noting that there are no clear
guidelines for how thoroughly an employer must investigate a potential employee's
background and suggesting that the safest rule is more investigation rather than less).
117. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that employers who conduct no
investigation into potential employees' backgrounds during the pre-hire stage breached
their duty of due care. See Weiss v. Furniture in the Raw, 306 N.Y.S.2d 253, 255 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1969) (holding the defendant employer liable because it hired an unqualified
employee without making any inquiry into the employee's past); Estate of Arrington v.
Fields, 578 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tex. App. 1979) (holding employer accountable for
information that employer could have obtained by conducting a reasonable pre-hire
investigation of employee).
118. See Connes v. Molalla Transport Sys., Inc., 831 P.2d 1316, 1322 (Colo. 1992)
(requiring criminal background check depending on nature and extent of employee
contact with the public); Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments, 331 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Minn.
1983) (holding that the scope of a reasonable investigation depends on the extent of the
risk to others). See generally Kristine L. Hayes, Note, PrepostalPreventionof Workplace
Violence: Establishingan Ombuds Programas One Possible Solution, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 215, 221 (1998) (discussing employer's duty to conduct reasonable
investigations of employees).
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required to deem an investigation reasonable." 9
As part of the pre-hiring investigation process, employers should
screen potential hires for violent tendencies. 10 Checking the
potential hire's references and asking about any gaps of employment
are generally sufficient to avoid a claim of negligent hiring;121
however, some employers may wish to screen potential hires more
aggressively. One way to screen applicants more aggressively is to
administer integrity or honesty tests.'n Generally, the tests contain
questions regarding politics, personal finances, family relationships,
church affiliations, and drinking and smoking habits."z Although the
idea of such testing may sound appealing, it is wrought with problems.
No consensus exists as to the accuracy of the tests. 24 Moreover, these
tests are not "routinely designed to detect aggressiveness or violent
tendencies ...[and] ...they bear little substantial relationship to the
types of conduct at issue in traditional negligent hiring claims."1 5
Furthermore, the tests may be inappropriate under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA)126 when the individual being tested has a

119. See Abraham v. S.E. Onorato Garages, 446 P.2d 821, 825 (Haw. 1968); Evans v.
Morsell, 395 A.2d 480, 484 (Md. 1978); Butler v. Hurlbut, 826 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Mo. Ct. App.
1992); see also MANTELL, supra note 38, at 53 (suggesting appropriate ways an employer
may inquire into a candidate's history of criminal convictions). See generally Dermot
Sullivan, Note, Employee Violence, Negligent Hiring,and CriminalRecords Checks: New
York's Need to Reevaluate Its Prioritiesto Promote Public Safety, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
581, 600-05 (1998) (arguing that a legal duty should be created requiring employers to
check the criminal background of each potential hire).
120. See LABIG, supranote 38, at 51-52; MANTELL, supranote 38, at 46-49.
121. See Porter, supra note 38, at 119.
122. Honesty and integrity tests are allowed under the Federal Employee Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646 (1988) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). See DICKINSON, supranote 12, at 36-38.
The Federal Employee Polygraph Protection Act prohibits most private sector employees
from using a polygraph or like procedure to screen employees. See id. at 36.
123. See DICKINSON, supra note 12, at 39-40; see also CAPOZZOLI & MCVEY, supra
note 3, at 98-99 (reviewing different psychological screening tests and suggesting that
certain questions on standard psychological screening tests are inappropriate for use in the
workplace).
124. See Beaver, supra note 35, at 116. For a thorough empirical study of integrity
testing's reliability, see Deniz S. Ones and Chockalingam Viswesvaran, Integrity Testing in
Organizations, in DYSFUNCTION BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS: NON-VIOLENT
DYSFUNCTIONAL BEHAVIOR 243, 243-76 (Ricky W. Griffin et al. eds., 1998) (reviewing
integrity testing's reliability and validity and determining that some integrity testing
provides valuable information for employers).
125. Katrin U. Byford, Comment, The Quest for the Honest Worker: A Proposalfor
Regulation of Integrity Testing, 49 SMU L. REV. 329,361 (1996).
126. Act of July 26, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (1995 & Supp. 2000). For a general introduction
to the ADA, see DENENBERG & BRAVERMAN, supra note 68, at 240-46.
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qualifying disability, such as a mental impairment.
The tests may
also be inappropriate under equal employment laws when the tests
pose highly personal questions."
A second way to screen more aggressively is to perform a
criminal background check on all applicants. Although Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964129 does not prevent the use of criminal
background checks in employment screening, an employer may
exclude a potential hire from a job because of her criminal
background only if the crime directly relates to the person's ability to
perform the job. 30 In addition, courts and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have ruled that an employer
cannot have a broad policy of not hiring applicants with criminal
convictions.' 3 '
Employers who check the criminal backgrounds of potential
employees should follow a few simple guidelines to reduce their Title
VII exposure. 32 First, the employer should require the disclosure of
all convictions, including felonies and misdemeanors, on the
employment application. 133 Second, the employer should consider
whether the conviction is job-related and only disqualify the applicant
T M Third, the
if the conviction relates to anticipated job performance.
employer should not place an employee in circumstances where, due
to its knowledge of the employee's conviction record, the employee
127. See Beaver, supra note 35, at 116. The key question for determining whether the
test implicates ADA coverage is whether it is considered a test of mental health. See
DICKINSON, supra note 12, at 38. See generally Staton & Thompson, supra note 92, at 3334 (reviewing which employees with mental illnesses qualify for ADA coverage).
128. See DICKINSON, supranote 12, at 38.
129. Act of July 2,1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
130. See LABIG, supra note 38, at 57-58; Louis P. DiLorenzo and Darren J. Carroll,
The Growing Menance: Violence in the Workplace, 67-Jan. N.Y. ST. B.J. 24, 25 (1995);
Morris, supranote 39, at 774.
131. See Morris, supra note 39, at 774 (reviewing criteria that an employer must satisfy
to determine that an employee, because of her criminal record, is incompetent for the
position to which she applied). The Eighth Circuit has held that an employee can make
out a prima facie case of racial discrimination when an employer has a policy of refusing to
hire anyone for employment who has been convicted of a non-traffic related crime
because such a practice is not job-related and operates to disqualify a higher percentage of
blacks than whites from employment with the employer. See Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R.
Co., 523 F.2d 1290,1298-99 (8th Cir. 1975).
132. See Steven C. Bednar, Employment Law Dilemmas: What to Do When the Law
Forbids Compliance,12 BYU J. PUB. L. 175,178-79 (1997).
133. See id. at 179. The employer should also include with this question a notice that
making false statements on the employment application is grounds for dismissal. See
MANTELL, supra note 38, at 53.
134. See Bednar, supra note 132, at 179; Morris, supra note 39, at 772-73.
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foreseeably may act in a violent manner. 13 5
Employers should exclude from their criminal background
checking process any inquiry into a potential employee's arrest
136
record,'
because the EEOC has stated clearly that considering an
arrest record when deciding whether to offer an applicant a position
is illegal. 37 The EEOC's position, however, does not mean that an
employer cannot require applicants to disclose prior arrests on the
application and disqualify any applicant who fails to make a truthful
disclosure on the theory that the applicant falsified information on
the application. 38 But employers who request arrest information put
themselves in the position of having to explain why they requested
such information if it is not considered during the hiring process.139
Formulating a convincing answer is difficult, especially because a
stand-alone arrest is not evidence of any criminal activity, so it is not
considered to be an accurate predictor of a potential employee's
character traits. 40 Moreover, the EEOC has suggested that merely
requesting arrest record information from applicants may violate
Title VII because "such requests tend to discourage minority
applicants and encourage false or incomplete answers from which the
applicant may be penalized.''
Thus, employers may expose
themselves to a greater liability under Title VII for checking arrest
records than they face by excluding arrest record checks from their
pre-employment background check.
Employers cannot assume that their duty to investigate their
135. See Bednar, supra note 132, at 179.
136. See MANT.ELL, supra note 38, at 53; Ramona L. Paetzold, Workplace Violence and
Employer Liability: Implicationsfor Organizations,in 23B DYSFUNCTIONAL BEHAVIOR
IN ORGANIZATIONS: VIOLENT AND DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 143, 151 (Ricky W. Griffin et
al. eds., 1998). In Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., the employer withdrew a job offer after
it discovered that the applicant had been arrested numerous times, because the employer
had a policy of hiring no one with more than one arrest. 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal.
1970). The court held that the employer's policy was discriminatory and had no business

justification. See id.
137. See EEOC Decision No. 74-92 (1974), availablein 1974 WL 3853.
138. See Jimerson v. Kisco Co., 404 F. Supp. 338,341-42 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
139. See Kurt H. Decker, Employment Privacy Law for the 1990's, 15 PEPP. L. REV.
551, 563 (1998) (stating that use of arrest records during the employment screening
process raised privacy concerns).

140. See id.
141. Morris, supra note 39, at 775; accord Litton Systems, 316 F. Supp. at 403. A 1962
study showed that only 33% of employers would hire a person who had been arrested and

acquitted of assault. See Gary T. Lowenthal, The Disclosure of Arrest Records to the
Public Under the Uniform CriminalHistory Records Act, 28 JURIMETRICs J. 9, 13 (1987)
(citing Schwartz & Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 133,
134-38 (1962)).
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In North Carolina,

employers have a duty to investigate complaints about current
employees' violent tendencies and, if substantiated, take appropriate

remedial steps to safeguard the workplace. 43 Failure to satisfy this
duty may result in employer-liability for acts of workplace violence
under a theory of negligent supervision and retention.'"
To avoid liability under a theory of negligent supervision and
retention, employers must be cognizant that any act of employee
violence or misbehavior, no matter how slight, may lead to future
liability if left unchecked. 45 Consequently, employers should develop

mechanisms for employees to report incidents of actual or suspected
workplace violence and ensure that each reported incident is

investigated and handled appropriately. 46 At the same time,
however, employers must not assume that any act of workplace
violence or tendency to be aggressive is an automatic ground to
dismiss the employee 47 Rather, employers should base their actions
on the legal standard of care that inquires as to whether they acted

reasonably when they knew, or should have known, that an employee
posed a threat to a third party's safety. Experts have suggested that
reasonable responses to incidents of workplace violence may include
the following: (1) requiring employee counseling, (2) placing the

142. See Morris, supra note 39, at 763 (reviewing general principles of negligent
supervision and cases where the employer failed to exercise reasonable care after hiring an
employee).
143. See Mills v. Brown & Wood, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 903, 910 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (holding
that a supervisor's use of inappropriate language on one occasion was insufficient to
trigger liability for the defendant employer's failure to investigate the supervisor for
possible sexual harassment); cf. Bryant v. Thalhimer Bros., 113 N.C. App. 1, 10-11, 437
S.E.2d 519, 524-25 (1993) (holding an employer liable for employee's emotional distress
when the employee complained of sexual harassment and the employer did nothing in
response to the complaint).
144. See Leftwich v. Gaines, 134 N.C. App. 502, 513-14, 521 S.E.2d 717, 726 (1999)
(stating that a plaintiff must show that the employer either knew or had reason to know of
the employee's incompetent behavior and that the employer's failure to act allowed the
employee's incompetent behavior to injure the plaintiff) (quoting Smith v. Privette, 128
N.C. App. 490,494-95,495 S.E.2d 395,398 (1998)).
145. See Mills, 940 F. Supp. at 910 (suggesting that employers must investigate reported
threats of workplace violence but holding that the use of foul language on one occasion
did not constitute a threat of workplace violence).
146. See DICKINSON, supra note 12, at 61-62; see also ALBRECrr, supranote 38, at 7982 (discussing the need for management intervention when an employee exhibits violent
tendencies at work). For suggestions on how threat reports should be handled and
investigated, see CAPOZzOLI & MCVEY, supra note 3, at 119-22.
147. In some instances, this standard requires that the violent employee be dismissed
because dismissal is the only reasonable action; however, in other instances, an array of
alternatives constitute reasonable actions.
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employee in a new job assignment with less public contact, (3)
reprimanding the employee, (4) instituting a zero-tolerance policy for
workplace violence, and (5) training employees on anger and stress
management. 48
Finally, employers must be aware that their decision to terminate
or take adverse action against employees due to a violent act or
threats of violence may implicate the ADA. 49 In a case decided in
Florida, an employee was terminated because he brought a firearm
onto company property.5 0 Prior to this event, the employee was
diagnosed with a mental disorder and the employee argued that the
poor judgment exhibited in bringing the weapon to work was a
symptom of the mental disorder.'5 ' Because the employee qualified
for ADA coverage, the court allowed the jury to consider the
plaintiff's claim.
Thus, employers must consider whether the
employee exhibiting violent behavior is covered under the ADA
before making termination and discipline decisions. When an
employee has committed a violent act in the workplace but is also
covered by the ADA, the employer must decide whether a
reasonable accommodation can be made with respect to the
employee's disability while also providing for the safety of the other
employees. 53
Besides reasonably investigating current employees' workplace
behavior and potential employees' past employment histories,
employers have a general duty to maintain a safe workplace pursuant
to Occupational Safety and Health Act (the "OSH Act").154
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
investigators have cited a few employers under the general duty
requirement for workplace violence,155 but the fines for preliminary
148. See DICKINSON, supra note 12, at 62, 65 (recommending zero-tolerance policy,
training, and record keeping of incidents of aggressive behavior); MCCLURE, supra note 8,
at 165-67 (recommending employee counseling, training, and stress management classes).
149. See LABIG, supra note 38, at 71-72; Bednar, supra note 132, at 186-88.
150. See Hindman v. GTE Data Serv., Inc., No. 93-1046-CIV-T-17, 1994 WL 371396, at
*1 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 1994).

151. See id.
152. See id. at *3
153. See id. at *3-4; LABIG, supra note 38, at 72.
154. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing OSHA's general duty
provision as well as Congress's underlying intent).
155. For instance, in 1995, the Dairy Barn chain was cited by OSHA for "a serious
violation of the agency's general duty clause," Employers Face Catch-22 in Addressing
Hazard,Attorney Tells ConferenceAttendees, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 2231 (Apr.
12, 1995), when three employees were shot during robberies. In settlement, Dairy Barn
agreed to hire crime prevention personnel, train its workforce in safety procedures, and
provide OSHA with status reports. See id. at 2231-32.
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The scarcity of OSHA

citations issued for breaches of the general duty regulation for
workplace violence indicates that OSHA is either not interested or is

unable to use the general duty regulation as an effective mechanism
to motivate employers to create safer workplaces. 15 7 Consequently,

employers face minimal liability for workplace violence under the
OSH Act.
While the threat of liability under the OSH Act's general duty

requirement is minimal, employers should take compliance with the
general duty seriously because plaintiffs may use a breach of an
In North Carolina,
OSHA regulation to establish negligence.'
violations of OSHA regulations are not negligence per se. 15 9
Nevertheless, plaintiffs can use OSHA regulation violations to
establish that an employer had a duty and breached that duty.'"
Consequently, OSHA violations can lead to a finding of negligence.
While the case law on this issue is limited,' 6 ' the North Carolina Court
of Appeals has followed other jurisdictions that limit the class of
plaintiffs who can use OSHA violations as evidence of negligence to
156. Fines for preliminary citations range from $750 to $5000. See Phillips, supra note
12, at 145 (citing Employer Liability, OSHA CriminalActs, Workplace Violence Discussed
at ABA Meeting, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 624 (Aug. 17, 1994); Psychiatric
Hospital in Chicago Cited by OSHA for Workplace Violence, 23 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No.
22, at 646 (Oct. 27, 1993)).
157. Prior to issuing a citation for the breach of the general duty, OSHA must find that:
(1) the workplace was not free of hazards, (2) the employer knew of the hazards, (3) the
Labor Department had specified specific steps to reduce the hazard that the employer
should have undertaken, and (4) suggested steps were both feasible and likely to produce
results. See DICKINSON, supra note 12, at 6. The fact that the Labor Department has not
issued many specific steps to reduce the hazards of workplace violence may be a partial
explanation for the few OSHA citations for workplace violence.
158. See, e.g., Sloan v. Miller Bldg. Corp., 119 N.C. App. 162, 168, 458 S.E.2d 30, 33
(1995) (plaintiff attempted to establish negligence based on violation of OSHA general
safety duty and repeated violation of OSHA's regulations for maintaining safe outrigger
scaffolds); Cowan v. Laughridge Constr. Co., 57 N.C. App. 321, 324, 291 S.E.2d 287, 289
(1982) (plaintiff attempted to establish negligence based on violation of OSHA guardrail
regulation).
159. See Cowan, 57 N.C. App. at 324, 291 S.E.2d at 289; see also Geiger v. Guilford
College Community Volunteer Firemen's Assoc., 668 F. Supp. 492, 497 (M.D.N.C. 1987)
("[A] violation of OSHA regulations is not negligence per se under North Carolina law.").
160. Some jurisdictions have limited the class of plaintiffs who can use OSHA
violations as evidence of negligence to employees. See, e.g., Trowell v. Brunswick Pulp &
Paper Co., 522 F. Supp. 782,784 (D.S.C., Charleston Division 1981) (holding OSHA does
not create a duty of compliance with respect to non-employee plaintiffs in a negligence

suit).
161. The author was unable to find any North Carolina case that established that a
plaintiff could use a breach of OSHA's general duty regulation to establish negligence in
maintaining a workplace that is unsafe due to incidents of workplace violence.
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employees when it held that invitees can use an OSHA violation as
some evidence of negligence. 62 Because North Carolina seems
willing to allow non-employees to use OSHA violations to establish
negligence, employers should take steps to comply with the general
duty requirement to provide a safe working environment under the
OSH Act.
When complying with the OSH Act's general duty requirement,
employers must be aware that the very actions they take to avoid
workplace violence may be interpreted as the voluntary assumption
of an additional duty to protect employees. Employers may
unintentionally assume such a duty if employees or customers rely on
the employer's assertions that the employer is taking measures to
create a safe workplace. For instance, employers who adopt a zero
tolerance policy for workplace violence, 163 prohibit concealed
weapons in the workplace, 164 and form workplace violence
intervention teams' 65 may enhance their legal duty to provide a safe
workplace because the employee reasonably relies on these initiatives
to protect his safety.' 66 As a result, employers should only propose
and promulgate anti-workplace violence initiatives that they are able
to enforce.
Employers are in a "Catch-22" because they assume a duty to
protect employees and customers when they undertake safety
measures to prevent workplace violence but are required to
undertake such measures pursuant to their OSHA general duty
obligations. Thus, arguably, employers should take the minimal steps
necessary to comply with the Act and not adopt innovative safety
measures and protocols if their sole goal is to prevent liability for acts
of workplace violence. 67 No easy answers exist to this dilemma.
Each employer will have to weigh the potential cost and benefits of
adopting safety procedures that exceed their OSHA duties. Clearly,
however, employers must effectively implement any workplace safety
initiative they undertake.
This same imperative applies to employers providing references
162. See Cowan, 57 N.C. App. at 324-25, 291 S.E.2d at 289-90 (holding that plaintiff
who was an invitee could use evidence of an OSHA violation to establish negligence).
163. See ALBRECHT, supra note 38, at 129-42; DENENBERG & BRAVERMAN, supra
note 68, at 179-80.

164. See DENENBERG & BRAVERMAN, supra note 68, at 238-39; Smith, supra note 38,
at 16.
165. See DENENBERG & BRAVERMAN, supranote 68, at 214; LABIG, supra note 38, at
92-94; LENWIS & ZARE, supranote 38, at 94.
166. See LABIG, supra note 38, at 65-66.
167. See Bednar, supra note 132, at 188-99.
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to future employers. An employer should either give a complete and
accurate reference or none at all. Whether North Carolina courts will
extend the tort of negligent misrepresentation to the scenario in
which a past employer gives a prospective employer a reference but
omits information concerning past acts of violence is unresolved. i6
' A
plaintiff would face several obstacles in convincing the North
Carolina courts to make such an extension. First, a general practice
exists of omitting negative employee information in employment
recommendations.
Thus, employers should know that the
recommendations are inherently incomplete and not reliable to reveal
negative information.'6 9 Second, North Carolina requires that the

tortfeasor make the misrepresentation in the course of a
transaction, 70 and, arguably, no transaction exists when a past
employer gives a prospective employer information about an
employee. Finally, when the plaintiff is not the new employer but an
employee or customer of the new employer, the past employer did
not communicate directly with the plaintiff.
Therefore, the
communication requirement between the defendant and the plaintiff
is not satisfied. Notwithstanding these factors, North Carolina
employers must remember that plaintiffs in other jurisdictions with
similar definitions of negligent misrepresentation have been
successful. 17' Through prudent actions, such as refusing to provide
any employer recommendations, employers can shield themselves
almost entirely from even the possibility of liability under the theory
of negligent misrepresentation. 172 No jurisdiction has held that
employers have a duty to give employee recommendations, and
liability under the tort of negligent misrepresentation can only attach
when an employer makes some type of disclosure. Thus, no
disclosure equals no liability.
A nondisclosure policy, however, may not be best alternative
168. Cf Paetzold, supra note 136, at 151-52 (recognizing that the possibility of liability
for negligent referral is small but possible).
169. See Deborah Daniloff, Employer Defamation: Reasons and Remedies for
Declining References and Chilled Communications in the Workplace, 40 HASTINGS L.J.
687 (1989) (noting that employers are reducing the amount of information that they
provide in job references).
170. See Ausley v. Bishop, 133 N.C. App. 210, 218, 515 S.E.2d 72, 78 (1999) (quoting
Fulton v. Vickery, 73 N.C. App. 382,388,326 S.E.2d 354,358 (1985)).
171. See Sperber, supra note 85, at 408-09 (citing recent decisions where employers
held liable because of incomplete employee job references).
172. See D. Scott Landry & Randy Hoffman, Walking a Fine Line on Employee Job
Reference Information: New Law Provides Statutory Immunity to Encourage Disclosure
by FormerEmployers, 43 LA. BUS. J. 457, 457-58 (1996) (stating employers are reluctant
to provide recommendations).
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because employee job references serve several important functions.173
References help employers hire skilled employees and determine
which prospective employee are most appropriate for their
organizations. 4 Also, job references provide an incentive for
employees to remain committed to their jobs because they know that
a positive job recommendation can help their long-term career
advancement. 5 Thus, employers should establish policies and
procedures that provide employees and their future employers with
while also limiting their liability for disclosure
job recommendations
7 6

of this information.
North Carolina's legislature has greatly assisted employers'
ability to disclose employee information without exposing themselves
to liability. 7 If an employer decides to provide recommendations to
employers, it should make sure that the
prospective
recommendations represent an accurate reflection of the employer's
professional experience with the former employees. North Carolina
General Statute section 1-539.12 grants employers immunity from
civil liability when they disclose employment information about a
current or past employee. 7 8 To qualify for this immunity, the
disclosure must meet several conditions. First, the disclosure must
relate to the employee's job history or job performance. 79 Under the
statute, job history and job performance are defined very broadly.180
They include information about the suitability of the employee for reemployment,' 8 ' the employee's job-related skills, abilities, and
traits," and the reason why the employee is no longer working for
Second, the employer cannot provide information
the employer.

173. See Sperber, supra note 85, at 406-08 (discussing the emergence of "select
omissions" in employee references).
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See Morris, supra note 39, at 764-65.
177. See generally Markita D. Cooper, Beyond Name, Rank and Serial Number: "No
Comment" Job Reference Policies, Violent Employees and the Need for Disclosure-Shield
Legislation, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 287, 306-39 (1998) (reviewing the impetus behind
states' passage of immunity laws for employee recommendations, listing the states who
have passed such laws, and identifying the key differences among enacted state immunity
laws).
178. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.12 (1999). To date, no North Carolina appellate
court has interpreted or applied this statute.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id. § 1-539.12(b)(1).
182. See id. § 1-539.12(b)(2).
183. See id. § 1-539.12(b)(3).
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that it knows to be, or that it should know to be, false184 Third, the
information must be correct. 85 Finally, the disclosure must be at the
86
request of the employee or the employee's prospective employer.
Also of significance is that the complaining plaintiff employee has the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
disclosed information was false and that the employer knew or should
have known that the information was false.' 7
Employers should take great care to ensure that their employee
recommendation procedures comply with the statute and that the
information that the recommendations are based on is correct18
Employers are shielded from liability for providing accurate
recommendations, but incomplete disclosure may expose them to a
negligent misrepresentation claim. Also, employers should require
written authorization from the employee prior to providing anyone
with an employment recommendation.8 9 The authorization should
state who will receive the recommendation and that the employee
understands that the recommendation may contain positive as well as
negative information.Y° Another prudent practice involves a policy in
which the terminated employee must "sign off" on the reference
letter that the former employer will provide to prospective
employers. 91' The employee and employer should sign an agreement
indicating that the letter is truthful and that the employee holds the
employer harmless should the employer send the job reference out to
a prospective employer.Y Also, regardless of whether the employer
elects to release references to prospective employers, the employer
should maintain accurate records of all employees' past job
Employers should limit recommendations to
performance. 93
184. See id. § 1-539.12(a)(2).
185. See id. § 1-539.12(a)(1).
186. See id. § 1-539.12(a).
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See Morris, supranote 39, at 771 (sample request for recommendation letter).
190. See id.
191. See Felhaber, Larson, Fenlon, & Vogt, P.A., Agreement on a Specific Reference
Letter May Protect the Employer, MINNESOTA EMPLOYMENT LAW LETTER, June 1997,
availablein Westlaw, 7 No. 4 SMMNEMPLL 1.
192. See id.
193. This practice requires documenting any disciplinary actions or corrective measures
taken against the employee. The employee should be made aware of this documentation
procedure and be informed of what her job performance file contains. See id.; cf. Jones,
Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere, & Denegre L.L.P., Employer Wins Age Case by
Carefully Documenting Performance Deficiencies, LOUISIANA EMPLOYMENT LAW
LETTER, March 1999, available in Westlaw, 7 No. SMLAEMPLL 3 (reviewing a case
where employer was not held liable for an age discrimination claim because the employer
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information documented in employee job performance files and
ensure that the recommendation accurately reflects all the
information in the file. 94
North Carolina employers face liability for acts of workplace
violence under several different theories of liability. 95 While the
contours of theories under which an employer will be held
responsible for acts of workplace violence are still developing, the
trend indicates that North Carolina employers will face a great
volume of litigation stemming from acts of workplace violence. To
respond effectively to this trend, North Carolina employers need to
do more than answer and defend each complaint that arises against
them. Instead, North Carolina employers should carefully review
their current hiring processes to ensure that they are screening
potential employees for violent tendencies.
Performing such
screening is difficult because employers must ensure that their hiring
practices comply with the American with Disabilities Act and Title
VII. In addition, North Carolina employers should also be aware that
retaining or improperly supervising employees who on prior
occasions have acted violently in the workplace can subject them to
liability. Therefore, employers should develop a mechanism to
encourage reporting and resolving incidents of workplace violence.
Employers also need to recognize that the acts they undertake to
guard against workplace violence may be interpreted as a voluntarily
assumption of the duty of protection. While such an assumption
seems counterproductive, realistically employers must undertake
initiatives to provide safe working environments to comply with
OSHA's general duty to provide a safe workplace and because
employees, customers and the community expect safe places to work
and conduct business. In short, employers should choose safety
initiatives that are practical and then make sure that the initiatives are
implemented.
JULES M. DAVIS

had maintained records showing the employee's performance deficiencies that supported
the employers rationale for terminating the employee).
194. See id.
195. See supra notes 18-88 and accompanying text.

Revisiting Rutledge: A Survey of Recent Developments in
Occupational Disease Law Under the North Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act
During the past two decades, the number of cases in North
Carolina involving workers' compensation for occupational disease
has increased tremendously.' Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yam, 2
decided in 1983, marked the onset of this increased litigation. Prior
to Rutledge, an employee could be compensated for occupational
disease only to the extent that the disease was attributable to or
caused by his or her employment. Thus, while causation was the
critical issue, the courts had difficulty articulating a standard for
determining whether a causal link existed between the disease and
the employment. 4 In particular, when both work-related and non1. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn, 308 N.C. 85,301 S.E.2d 359 (1983);
Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 290 S.E.2d 682 (1982); Hansel v. Sherman
Textiles, 304 N.C. 44,283 S.E.2d 101 (1981); Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 282
S.E.2d 458 (1981); Fuller v. Motel 6, 526 S.E.2d 480, 2000 N.C. App. LEXIS 150 (2000);
Jarvis v. Food Lion, Inc., 134 N.C. App. 363, 517 S.E.2d 388, review denied by 351 N.C.
356, 1999 N.C. LEXIS 1326, at *1 (Nov. 4, 1999); Keel v. H & V Inc., 107 N.C. App. 536,
421 S.E.2d 362 (1992); Perry v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 80 N.C. App. 650, 343 S.E.2d 215
(1986); Preslar v. Cannon Mills Co., 80 N.C. App. 610, 343 S.E.2d 209 (1986); Lumley v.
Dancy Const. Co., Inc., 79 N.C. App. 114, 339 S.E.2d 9 (1986); Calloway v. Mills, 78 N.C.
App. 702, 338 S.E.2d 548 (1986); McHargue v. Burlington Indus., 78 N.C. App. 324, 337
S.E.2d 584 (1985); Grant v. Burlington Indus., 77 N.C. App. 241, 335 S.E.2d 327 (1985);
Gibson v. Little Cotton Mfg. Co., 73 N.C. App. 143, 325 S.E.2d 698 (1985); Robinson v.
J.P. Stevens & Co., 57 N.C. App. 619, 292 S.E.2d 144 (1982); Lumpkins v. Fieldcrest Mills,
56 N.C. App. 653, 289 S.E.2d 848 (1982); Hyatt v. Waverly Mills, 56 N.C. App. 14, 286
S.E.2d 837 (1982); Moore v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 47 N.C. App. 744,269 S.E.2d 159 (1980).
North Carolina defines occupational disease as "[a]ny disease ... which is proven
to be due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular
trade, occupation or employment ... excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the
general public is equally exposed outside of the employment." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9753(13) (1999). Occupational diseases were first made compensable under the North
Carolina Workers' Compensation Act in 1935. See Act of Mar. 26, 1935, ch. 123, § 1(a),
1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 130 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-52 (1999)).
2. 308 N.C. 85, 101, 301 S.E.2d 359, 369-70 (1983) (allowing compensation to the full
extent of disability even when non-work-related factors significantly contributed to the
disease).
3. See Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 18, 282 S.E.2d 458, 470 (1981)
(holding that when work-related and non-work-related factors contribute to a disability, a
plaintiff may be compensated only for "that portion of the disability caused, accelerated or
aggravated by the occupational disease").
4. See Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 94, 301 S.E.2d at 365 (comparing the majority and
dissenting opinions in Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 283 S.E.2d 101 (1981), and
in Morrison, 304 N.C. at 1, 282 S.E.2d at 458); Hansel,304 N.C. at 52, 283 S.E.2d at 106
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work-related factors contributed to the disease, courts faced the
difficult task of apportioning causation among the contributing
factors.5
Rutledge radically simplified the legal landscape by requiring a
claimant seeking compensation under the North Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act 6 (the "Act") to show merely (1) that she suffered
from an occupational disease, and (2) that her last injurious exposure
to the conditions causing the disease occurred while she was working
for the defendant. 7
According to Rutledge, a disease is
"occupational" when employment exposes a worker to any risk that
causes the disease or significantly contributes to the disease's
development.8
Accordingly, diseases originating outside of the
employment setting became compensable if employment
"significantly contributed to the disease." 9 Indeed, according to the
Rutledge court, a claimant's last employer would be liable for the full
extent of disability if working conditions "proximately augmented the

disease or preexisting condition to any extent, however slight."10
(noting that an award cannot be sanctioned unless it is shown that "the disease was
incident to or the result of the particular employment") (quoting Booker v. Duke Med.
Ctr., 297 N.C. 458,475,256 S.E.2d 189,200 (1979)).
5. See Morrison, 304 N.C. at 6-7 & n.2, 282 S.E.2d at 463 & n.2. (finding that only
fifty-five percent of the claimant's disability resulted from work-related factors and
awarding compensation for that amount); Hansel, 304 N.C. at 54-55, 283 S.E.2d at 107
(requiring apportionment in a case in which non-work-related factors contributed to the
disease).
6. Act of Mar.'11, 1929, ch. 120, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws 117 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to 97-200 (1999)).
7. See Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 89, 301 S.E.2d at 362. In articulating the standard for
determining causation in occupational disease cases, the North Carolina Supreme Court
relied on the language of section 97-57 of the North Carolina General Statutes, which
states that "[i]n any case where compensation is payable for an occupational disease, the
employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards
of such disease ... shall be liable." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-57 (1999).
8. See Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 369-70.
9. Id. Under the last injurious exposure rule, the claimant will be compensated by
the employer responsible for the last exposure to the conditions that caused or
significantly contributed to the disease's development, regardless of how long the
employment relationship lasted. See id. at 89, 301 S.E.2d at 362; see also Haynes v.
Feldspar Producing Co., 222 N.C 163, 164-65, 22 S.E.2d 275, 275-76 (1942) (affirming the
Commission's award of compensation to the claimant who contracted silicosis from
exposure to silica dust from working in North Carolina feldspar mines for 28 years
although he only worked for the defendant for four months); LEONARD T. JERNIGAN JR.,
NORTH CAROLINA WORKERS' COMPENSATION:

LAW AND PRACrICE

§ 16-3 (2d ed.

1995) ("[A]ssume that an employee developed byssinosis (cotton dust disease) while
working for one employer for 30 years, and then changed employers for the last six
months of his work history. If he was injuriously exposed ... during these last few
months, the last employer would be solely liable.").
10. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 102,301 S.E.2d at 370 (emphasis added).
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Rutledge's departure from precedent sparked tremendous

controversy and delivered a devastating blow to employers by
threatening to tip the scales in favor of employees."

The four-to-

three decision was met with both a strong dissent 2 and a legislative
effort to overturn the decision.

Despite criticism, Rutledge became

the law and was closely followed in subsequent cases.
Recently, several North Carolina cases have appeared to retreat

from Rutledge's causation standard by requiring a successful claimant
to show that her exposure while in the defendant's employ "caused or
significantly contributed to" her disease. 4

In effect, these cases

collapse the two separate elements required by Rutledge-causation,
which is inherent in the definition of occupational disease, and last
11. Rutledge was criticized because it marked an abandonment of North Carolina
precedent that required apportionment of causation and allowed compensation of a
disability only to the extent the disability was caused by employment. See Gregory Stuart
Smith, Note, Workers' Compensation-Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn: Leaving
Precedent in the Dust?, 62 N.C. L. REV. 573, 573-74 (1984); see also supra notes 34-48 and
accompanying text (describing pre-Rutledge precedents). While the court did not
expressly overrule Morrison and other decisions requiring apportionment, the
precedential value of these cases diminished significantly. See Smith, supra, at 574. The
significant contribution standard established in Rutledge was more favorable to employees
because it allowed compensation for the full extent of the disability if employment (1) was
a primary cause of the disease or (2) augmented a pre-existing disease. See Rutledge, 308
N.C. at 101-02,301 S.E.2d at 369-70.
12. See Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 109-31, 301 S.E.2d at 374-87 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Meyer, joined by Justice Copeland and Chief Justice Black, reasoned that chronic
obstructive lung disease was not a single disease but a general name for a combination of
diseases and that the claimant's condition should not have been designated an
occupational disease. See id. at 121, 126, 301 S.E.2d at 381, 384 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
The dissenters argued that, by lumping all of the claimant's specific lung diseases under
the rubric "'chronic obstructive lung disease'" and collectively calling them an
occupational disease, the majority thereby avoided the apportionment requirement
espoused in previous cases. Id (Meyer, J., dissenting); see also Smith, supra note 11, at
578-79 (discussing the dissenting opinion's criticism of the Rutledge court's failure to
examine the causes of each of the claimant's specific lung diseases independently).
13. See S. 471, 1983 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1983). Textile manufacturers hired former
North Carolina Supreme Court Justice Huskins, author of the Morrison opinion, to draft a
bill to invalidate Rutledge and require apportionment. See Elizabeth Leland, Ex-Justice
Hired to Write Bill to Stymie Compensation Ruling, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
May 5, 1983, at 1A. The bill caught the attention of the local press and led victims of
byssinosis to march inside the state legislative building, forcing legislators to observe their
severe disabilities. See Elizabeth Leland, Workers Unite to Urge Rejection of Change in
Compensation Law, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), May 19, 1983, at 1C [hereinafter
Leland, Workers Unite]. The bill was introduced in the Senate but never made it beyond
committee hearings due to strong opposition expressed during the hearings.
14. See Hardin v. Motor Panels, Inc., 524 S.E.2d 368, 371-72, 2000 N.C. App. LEXIS
5, at *6-10 (2000); Jarvis v. Food Lion, Inc., 134 N.C. App. 363, 367-68, 517 S.E.2d 388,
391, review denied by 351 N.C..356, 1999 N.C. LEXIS 1326, at *1 (Nov. 4, 1999); Locklear
v. Stedman Corp./Sara Lee Knit Products, 131 N.C. App. 389, 393-94, 508 S.E.2d 795, 798
(1998); Baker v. City of Sanford, 120 N.C. App. 783,463 S.E.2d 559 (1995).
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injurious exposure. After a brief discussion of the history of the
North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act and the court's decision
in Rutledge,5 this Note evaluates two of the most recent North
Carolina Court of Appeals occupational disease cases and discusses
16
the current trend toward tempering Rutledge's causation analysis.
The Note also examines whether North Carolina courts have
continued to apply the last injurious exposure rule as enunciated in
Rutledge.'7 Finally, the Note proposes changes in the state's existing
workers' compensation law
to foster effective resolution of
8
occupational disease cases.'
To put the present cases in context, it is imperative to
understand the history of the North Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act and the pre-Rutledge cases that set the stage for
the Rutledge decision. In 1929, the General Assembly adopted the
North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act in response to the
inequities of common law fault-based remedies for on-the-job
injuries. 20 Under the common law, it was difficult for employees
injured on the job to be compensated promptly and adequately. 21
Because workers' claims were based on negligence, employers could
assert many effective defenses, including the fellow servant rule,
assumption of risk, and contributory negligence.Y In drafting the
Workers' Compensation Act, legislators hoped to "provide speedy
compensation to an employee for an injury arising out of and in the
course of his employment, without requiring the employee to show
any fault by the employer,"' 3 and also to promote "uniformity,
15. See infra notes 18-65 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 66-98 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 115-45 and accompanying text.
19. Act of Mar. 11, 1929, ch. 120, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws 117 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to 97-200 (1999)). The Act was originally denominated The
North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act. See id. at ch. 120, § 1(a).
20. See JERNIGAN, supranote 9, § 1-1.
21. See id.
22. See John Richard Owen, Note, The North CarolinaWorkers' CompensationAct of
1994: A Step in the Directionof RestoringBalance, 73 N.C. L. REV. 2502, 2504 (1995). At
common law, an employer escaped liability if a worker was injured by the negligence of a
fellow worker, or "fellow servant." See id. at 2504 n.27. Under the assumption of risk
defense, a negligent employer who contributed to an injury was not liable if the injury
resulted from ordinary employment risks. See id. at 2504 n.28. Further, a worker's claim
was barred if the worker's negligence contributed to the injury to any extent. See id. at
2504 n.29.
23. James R. Martin, Comment, A Proposalto Reform the North Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act to Address Mental-Mental Claims, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 193, 194
(1997); see also JERNIGAN, supra note 9, § 1-2 (noting that "the employee no longer had to
prove negligence on the part of the employer"); MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL.,
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efficiency, predictability, and fairness."2 4 The Industrial Commission,
an independent review board that adjudicates claims, was created to
aid in the accomplishment of these goals.25
At the core of the workers' compensation system is the principle
of balance, or quid pro quo, between employers and employees. 26
The system guarantees a worker regular income benefits and medical
coverage, regardless of fault, when that worker is injured.27 In return,
the employer receives immunity from litigation over injuries covered
by the Act. 2 Although the original North Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act covered only physical injuries,29 the Act was
amended in 1935 to allow compensation for occupational diseases.30
In 1971, coverage was extended further to allow compensation for
more diseases. For example, prior to the 1971 amendment, section
97-53(13) allowed compensation for "[i]nfection or inflammation of
the skin or eyes or other external contact surfaces or oral or nasal
cavities."' 31 After amendment, section 97-53(13) defined occupational
disease as "[a]ny disease ... which is proven to be due to causes and
conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular ...
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 6.24 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that the nation's first workers'
compensation statutes were designed to replace common law fault remedies with no-fault
coverage).
24. Joan T.A. Gabel, Escalating Inefficiency in Workers' Compensation Systems: Is
FederalReform the Answer?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1083,1083 (1999).
25. The Industrial Commission, a governmental agency under the authority of the
Department of Commerce, is charged with resolving workers' compensation claims. See
JERNIGAN, supra note 9, § 1-3.
Employers and employees with disputes over
compensation may apply for an initial hearing before a commissioner or deputy
commissioner. See id. §§ 24-1 to -2. Decisions at the initial hearing may be appealed to
the full Commission, see id. § 25-1, and then to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, see

iL§ 26-1.
26. See Gabel, supranote 24, at 1083-84.
27. See JERNIGAN, supra note 9, §§ 1-2,17-1, 29-1.
28. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1999) ("If the employee and the employer are
subject to and have complied with the provisions of this Article, then the rights and
remedies herein granted to the employee ... shall exclude all other rights and remedies of
... at common law or otherwise on account of such injury.").
29. See Act of Mar. 11, 1929, ch. 120, 1929 N.C. Sess. Laws 117 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to 97-200 (1999)); see also ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 23,
§ 6.24 (noting that, because conventional tort liability had extended to only "accidental"
injuries, the country's early workers' compensation statutes did not address occupational
diseases).
30. See Act of Mar. 26, 1935, ch. 123, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 130 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-52 (1999)) (stating that disability or death caused by occupational
disease would be compensable in the same manner as disability or death resulting from an
accidental injury).
31. Act of Mar. 26, 1935, ch. 123, § 1(b), 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 130, amended by Act of
June 14, 1971, ch. 547, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 477 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13)
(1999)).
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employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the
general public is equally exposed."'3 As a result, workers brought
increasing numbers of claims. Legislation was proposed to reduce
the number of claims brought, but it ultimately proved unsuccessful.33
Employers, however, were able to gain relief from the courts.
In at least two North Carolina Supreme Court decisions prior to
Rutledge, the court concluded that apportionment between workrelated and non-work-related factors was appropriate. 4 In Morrison
v. Burlington Industries3 5 the Industrial Commission attributed only
fifty-five percent of the plaintiff's chronic obstructive lung disease to
work-related byssinosis and calculated her compensation
accordingly.
The supreme court determined that the evidence
overwhelmingly supported the Commission's findings and affirmed
the apportionment of damages.37
In Hansel v. Sherman Textiles 3 8 medical testimony demonstrated
that the plaintiff's chronic obstructive lung disease was caused by
work-related byssinosis and non-work-related asthma and chronic
bronchitis.3 9 The Commission concluded that the plaintiff had a
compensable occupational disease and awarded her full
compensation. 40 The North Carolina Supreme Court found sufficient
evidence to support the Commission's factual findings, but believed
that the findings did not justify the Commission's conclusions as to
causation and award.4 ' Consequently, the court remanded the case
for a determination of the relative contributions of occupational and
non-occupational factors. 42 Thus, as in Morrison, the court required
the Commission to determine what percentage of the claimant's
disability was due to her occupational disease.
Critics scrutinized the apportionment rule espoused in Morrison
32. Act of June 14, 1971, ch. 547, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 477 (codified at N.C. GEN.

STAT. § 97-53(13) (1999)).
33. See S. 471, 1983 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1983); Leland, Workers Unite, supra note

13, at IC; Smith, supra note 11, at 582.
34. See Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 6-7, 282 S.E.2d 458, 463 (1981);
Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 54-55, 283 S.E.2d 101, 107 (1981). These two
cases were decided on the same day.
35. 304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981).

36. See id,304 N.C. at 2,282 S.E.2d at 461.
37. See id., 304 N.C. at 6-7,282 S.E.2d at 463.
38. 304 N.C. 44,283 S.E.2d 101 (1981).

39. See id. at 54, 283 S.E.2d at 107. There was also evidence that the claimant was a
cigarette smoker. See id. at 56,283 S.E.2d at 109.

40. See id. at 54,283 S.E.2d at 107.
41. See id. at 50, 283 S.E.2d at 105.

42. See id. at 60,283 S.E.2d at 110.
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and Hansel. One commentator pointed out that the Morrison court
apportioned causation between work- and non-work-related factors
despite the absence of an express apportionment provision in the
statute.43 Another asserted that the Morrison court departed from
precedent, created an illusory distinction between accident-based
claims and occupational disease claims,' and expropriated the
legislature's function by judicially creating law. 45 In his dissenting
opinion in Morrison, Justice Exum argued that neither the facts nor
precedent supported the majority's apportionment rule. 46 He stated
that no apportionment was necessary because Morrison's cotton dust
exposure had "significantly contributed" to her disease and ultimate
disability.47 Justice Exum, concurring in the result in Hansel,
reiterated his "significant contribution" standard and commented on
the difficulties inherent in apportioning the contribution of workrelated and non-work-related causes. 48
Perhaps it was this difficulty in apportioning causation between
work and non-work-related causes of occupational disease that led
the court to abandon the Morrison-Hanselrule in Rutledge v. Tultex
Corp./Kings Yarn.49 By characterizing chronic obstructive lung
disease as an occupational disease, Rutledge "severely limit[ed]" the
pre-Rutledge requirement of apportionment. 0 Justice Exum, now
writing for the majority, 51 evaded the rule espoused in Morrison and
43. See ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION

LAW § 52.06[4][d], at 52-69 (1999).
44. See Stanley Hammer & Kenneth L. Hardis'on, Comment, Workers'
Compensation-You Take (45% of) My Breath Away-Morrison v. Burlington Industries,
304 N.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 458 (1981), 4 CAMPBELL L. REv. 107, 120 (1981) ("An accident
need not be the sole cause of disability if the employment reasonably contributes to the
disability, whereas in occupational disease cases, the occupational disease must be the
exclusive cause of disability.").
45. See Hammer & Hardison, supra note 44, at 125.
46. See Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 19, 282 S.E.2d 458, 470 (1981)
(Exum, J., dissenting).
47. Id at 44,282 S.E.2d at 484 (Exum, J., dissenting).
48. See Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 66 & n.8, 283 S.E.2d 101, 113 & n.8
(1981) (Exum, J., concurring in result) ("We ask too much of the medical profession if we
require it to assess in terms of mathematical percentages the relative contributions of the
various possible causes of such diseases.").
49. 308 N.C. 85,301 S.E.2d 359 (1983); see also Smith, supra note 11, at 573-74 (noting
that the Rutledge court held that apportionment is unnecessary when a worker's disability
is caused solely by chronic obstructive lung disease that has been significantly contributed
to by job conditions).
50. See Smith, supra note 11, at 573-74.
51. Justice Exum had dissented in Morrison, contending that apportionment was
contrary to the significant contribution standard previously adopted by the court. See
Morrison, 304 N.C. at 24-34,282 S.E.2d at 473-79 (Exum, J., dissenting).
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Hanselby stating that the issue of "whether a textile worker's chronic
obstructive lung disease may be an occupational disease" was one of
first impression.52 Justice Exum abandoned the apportionment rule
since he believed it impossible to assign percentages to the various
53
causes of an occupational disease.
In Rutledge, the plaintiff, who had worked in textile mills her
entire life, developed a cough and shortness of breath.' At the time
of her hearing before the deputy commissioner, she suffered from
"chronic obstructive pulmonary disease [with elements] of
pulmonary emphysema and chronic bronchitis" and could only
perform sedentary work. 55 The deputy commissioner determined,
however, that her condition was also partially caused by twenty-nine
years of smoking a pack of cigarettes per day.56 Based on these
findings, the deputy commissioner concluded that the plaintiff's
chronic obstructive lung disease did not result solely from cotton dust
exposure while working for the defendant. 57 The full Commission
adopted the deputy commissioner's decision as its own and denied
compensation. 8
The supreme court rejected the Commission's analysis.59
According to the court, the last injurious exposure rule, which
required merely that the exposure "'proximately augment[] the
disease to any extent, however slight,'" was the proper standard for
occupational disease cases in which there was a pre-existing
condition. 0 For the first time since the 1971 amendment of the North
Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, the court defined
occupational diseases falling under the section 97-53(13) catchall
provision: a disease is "occupational" if it "exposed the worker to a
greater risk of contracting th[e] disease than members of the public
generally, and provided the worker's exposure to [the hazardous
condition or substance] significantly contributed to, or was a
significant causal factor in, the disease's development. ' 61 The court
52. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 100-01, 301 S.E.2d at 369.

53. See id. at 94-95,301 S.E.2d at 365-66.
54. See id.308 N.C. at 87,301 S.E.2d at 361-62.
55. Id at 87, 301 S.E.2d at 362 (alterations in original).

56. See id. at 87-88, 301 S.E.2d at 361-62.
57. See id.at 88,301 S.E.2d at 362.

58. See id.
59. See id. at 90,301 S.E.2d at 363.
60. Id. at 89, 301 S.E.2d at 362 (quoting Haynes v. Feldspar Producing Co., 222 NC.
163,166,22 S.E.2d 275,277 (1942)).
61. Id. at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 369-70. The court recognized that the "significant
contribution" standard put a heavier burden on claimants than in accident cases or in
other states. See id, at 105, 301 S.E.2d at 371. The Virginia Supreme Court, for example,
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that,

in

making

the

"significant

contribution"

determination, the Commission may consider medical testimony, the
extent of the worker's on-the-job exposure to hazardous conditions,

the extent of non-work-related contributing factors, and the way in
which the disease matured in relation to the plaintiff's work history.62
Taking these factors into account, the Rutledge court concluded

that there was sufficient evidence for the Commission to find that the
plaintiff suffered from

a compensable

occupational

disease. 63

Consequently, the court remanded the matter to the Commission for
a new determination of Rutledge's entitlement to compensation
based on the "significant contribution" standard.' 4
The decision was criticized by many who felt that the court had
departed from precedent. 65 Nevertheless, Rutledge became the law
and has never been explicitly overruled. Recent decisions of the
North Carolina Courts of Appeals, however, while not explicitly
abandoning Rutledge, appear to depart from the "significant
contribution" standard and substitute a stricter standard of proof for
causation.
In Jarvis v. Food Lion, Inc.,' the plaintiff sought workers'
compensation for carpal tunnel syndrome that she allegedly
developed while working as a cashier for the defendant grocery
store.67 The deputy commissioner denied the claim, partly because he
determined that the plaintiff failed to prove causation.6 The court
commented that she had failed to demonstrate that her condition was
"'characteristic of and peculiar to her employment and to which the
general public is not equally exposed outside of the employment' "69
requires only that the claimant show that her" 'employment [was] a contributing factor to
the disability.'" Id.at 104, 301 S.E.2d at 371 (quoting Bergmann v. L. & W. Drywall, 278
S.E.2d 801, 803 (Va. 1981)). The court's justification for this principle was that it was
attempting to strike a fair balance between the employer and the employee in the
administration of the Workers' Compensation Act. See id. at 105, 301 S.E.2d at 371. The
"significant contribution" standard was first suggested in Note, Compensating Victims of
OccupationalDisease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916, 932 (1980).
62. See Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 105,301 S.E.2d at 372 (citing Booker v. Duke Med. Ctr.,
297 N.C. 458,476,256 S.E.2d 189,200 (1979)).
63. See id.
at 106, 301 S.E.2d at 372.
64. See id.
at 108, 301 S.E.2d at 373.
65. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
66. 134 N.C. App. 363, 517 S.E.2d 388 (1999), review denied by 351 N.C. 356, 1999
N.C. LEXIS 1326, at *1 (Nov. 4,1999).
67. See id.at 364,517 S.E.2d at 389.
68. See ic
69. Id. (quoting the Commission's Opinion & Award denying the plaintiffs claim);
see also Hansel v. Sherman Textile, 304 N.C. 44, 52, 283 S.E.2d 101, 105-06 (1981)
(describing the burden of proof for a plaintiff seeking compensation for an occupational
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as required by section 97-53(13). The Commission affirmed the
deputy commissioner's decision and accorded no weight to a
diagnosing physician's testimony that the plaintiff's condition was
"work-related and that her job was at least aggravating her pain in
her arms and wrist"'7 because the doctor based his conclusions on the
plaintiff's statements and his personal observations of cashiers in
grocery stores. 7' The doctor's conclusions were problematic because
they were not supported by any direct evidence, such as a physical
examination or observation of the plaintiff herself, but by indirect
observation of similarly situated employees.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the
Commission's decision, holding that, given the Commission's failure
to give weight to the diagnosing physician's testimony, the plaintiff
had failed to establish by the greater weight of the evidence that her
carpal tunnel was an occupational disease.72 The court noted that the
Commission is the exclusive judge of witness credibility and may
refuse to give any weight to a witness's testimony.73 The court also
noted that an appeal from the Industrial Commission is limited to a
consideration of whether the Commission's findings are supported by
any relevant evidence and whether its findings support its
conclusions 74 even if substantial evidence would support a different
decision. 75 The court thus agreed with the Commission that the
diagnosing physician did not have adequate information to make a
determination regarding causation.76
By setting aside the insufficiency of the evidence to prove
causation, the Commission seemed to require sole causation in Jarvis.
The Commission stated that there was not sufficient medical
evidence to prove that the plaintiff's job responsibilities caused her
carpal tunnel syndrome.
The Commission noted "[t]here is
disease).
70. Jarvis,134 N.C. App. at 364,517 S.E.2d at 389.
71. See id at 365-66,517 S.E.2d at 390.
72. See id. at 366,517 S.E.2d at 390.
73. See id. ("The Commission 'is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and
the weight to be given to their testimony, and may reject a witness' testimony entirely if
warranted by disbelief of that witness.' ") (quoting Pittman v. Int'l Paper Co., 132 N.C.
App. 151,156, 510 S.E.2d 705,709 (1999)).
74. See Jarvis, 134 N.C. App. at 367, 517 S.E.2d at 391; Lowe v. BE&K Constr. Co.,
121 N.C. App. 570,573,468 S.E.2d 396,397 (1996).
75. See Jarvis, 134 N.C. App. at 367, 517 S.E.2d at 391; Thompson v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., 119 N.C. App. 411, 414, 458 S.E.2d 746, 748 (1995); Carroll v. Burlington Indus., 81
N.C. App. 384, 387-88, 344 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1986), aff'd per curiam, 319 N.C. 395, 354
S.E.2d 237 (1987).
76. See Jarvis, 134 N.C. App. at 368,517 S.E.2d at 392.
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insufficient evidence of record from which to prove ... that plaintiff's
carpal tunnel syndrome is an occupational disease which was due to
the causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to her
employment with defendant-employer."'77
Even prior to Rutledge, however, the North Carolina Supreme
Court had explicitly rejected the notion of requiring sole causation.
In Booker v . Duke Medical Center,78 the court decided that the
occupational exposure did not have to be the sole originating cause of
a worker's disease for that disease to be compensable.7 9 Even when
other, non-work-related factors have contributed to the disease, the
plaintiff may be compensated if working conditions aggravated her
condition." Therefore, employment does not have to be the sole
cause of the disease as suggested in Jarvis.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals also seemed to deviate
from the significant contribution standard when it decided Hardin v.
Motor Panels,Inc.81 The claimant alleged that she developed carpal
tunnel syndrome while working for the defendant Motor Panels,
Inc.82 The claimant had worked as a clerical assistant for the
defendant for five years when an unfavorable performance review
forced her to resign. 83 She subsequently worked for four different
employers but was forced to quit each job because of increased pain
and numbness in her hands. 84 The Industrial Commission denied
Hardin's claim for workers' compensation because there was
insufficient evidence that her employment with the defendant rather
than with subsequent employers caused or "significantly contributed"
to her carpal tunnel syndrome.8
77. Id. at 366, 517 S.E.2d at 390 (emphasis added).
78. 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979). In Booker, the claimant's decedent was an
employee at the medical center's clinical chemistry laboratory, where he performed tests
on blood, some of which was contaminated with hepatitis. See id. at 461, 256 S.E.2d at 192.
He contracted serum hepatitis in 1971 and died of the disease three years later. See id. at
464,256 S.E.2d at 193. The North Carolina Court of Appeals refused to find that Booker
had an occupational disease because the disease was caused by a single event and not by a
series of events. See Booker, 32 N.C. App. 185, 192, 231 S.E.2d 187, 190 (1977). In
reversing the court of appeals's decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court commented
that an increase in the claimant's risk of contracting a compensable disease was sufficient
causation to allow recovery for occupational disease under the North Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act. See Booker, 297 N.C. at 472,256 S.E.2d at 198.
79. See id. at 473,256 S.E.2d at 199; Smith, supranote 11, at 576.
80. See Booker, 297 N.C. at 472,256 S.E.2d at 199.
81. 524 S.E.2d 368,2000 N.C. App. LEXIS 5 (Jan. 18,2000).
82. See id. at 370,2000 N.C. App. LEXIS 5, at *1.
83. See id. at 370,2000 N.C. App. LEXIS 5, at *1-2.
84. See id. at 370,2000 N.C. App. LEXIS 5, at *2-3.
85. Id. at 370-71,2000 N.C. App. LEXIS 5, at *4.
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On appeal, however, the court of appeals announced that a
stricter standard than the significant contribution standard was
required to find that the plaintiff had an occupational disease. The
court stated that, to be compensated for occupational disease, the
plaintiff had to prove "by the preponderance of the competent,
credible evidence that her disability [was] causally related to her
employment with the defendant."86 As in Jarvis, the court of appeals
limited its review of the Industrial Commission's opinion to two
questions: "(1) whether there is any competent evidence in the record
to support the Commission's findings of fact, and (2) whether those
87
findings of fact support the Commission's conclusions of law."
Under this standard of review, the Industrial Commission's decision
would stand so long as some evidence supported its findings. 88 The
court found competent evidence in the record to support the
Commission's findings and affirmed the Commission's conclusions.
The Jarvis and Hardin decisions illustrate that the North
Carolina Court of Appeals has not followed a consistent standard for
determining when a plaintiff's condition may be classified as an
occupational disease. The element that has produced the most
confusion relates to causation-an issue that was thought to have
been clarified in Rutledge. The Rutledge court had held that a
plaintiff was entitled to worker's compensation if she could show that
her employment with the defendant employer significantly
contributed to her resulting disability. One caveat, however, was that
this employer must have supplied the last injurious exposure the
employee had to the hazards causing the disease.
In Jarvis and Hardin, the court abandons the Rutledge holding
on the issue of causation. In these and other recent cases, the court
of appeals set forth different interpretations of the "significant
exposure" standard that have exacerbated the problems associated
with causation. For example, in Baker v. City of Sanford,8 9 the court
noted that, for the employee's employment to constitute a
"significant contributing" factor, the employee has to prove that
without the employment, the occupational disease "would not have
86. Id at 372, 2000 N.C. App. LEXIS 5, at *11 (citing Phillips v. U.S. Air, Inc., 120
N.C. App. 538,541-42,463 S.E.2d 259,261 (1995)).
87. Id at 371, 2000 N.C. App. LEXIS 5, at *4-5 (citing Locklear v. Steadman
Corp./Sara Lee Knit Prods., 131 N.C. App. 389, 393, 508 S.E.2d 795, 797 (1998)); see also
Hedrick v. PPG Indus., 126 N.C. App. 354, 357, 484 S.E.2d, 853, 856 (1997) (noting that
appellate courts will not disturb the Commission's findings if the findings are supported by
any competent evidence even if contrary evidence exists).
88. See Hardin,524 S.E.2d at 374,2000 N.C. App. LEXIS 5, at *5.
89. 120 N.C. App. 783,463 S.E.2d 559 (1995).
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developed to such an extent that it caused the physical disability
which resulted in claimant's incapacity for work."'9 Three years later
in Locklear v. Stedman Corp./Sara Lee Knit Products,9 the court
interpreted the "significant contribution" standard to mean that the
employment more likely than not caused the occupational diseaseY.
Thus, the plaintiff had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the disease was caused primarily by the employment.
The standard followed by the court of appeals in these recent
cases deviates from the original meaning of "significant contribution"
articulated in Rutledge. In Rutledge, the North Carolina Supreme
Court interpreted section 97-57 of the North Carolina General
Statutes 93 to mean that the plaintiff does not have to show that solely
the conditions of her employment with defendant-employer caused
the disease. As stated previously, the determination of whether a
claimant may be compensated under section 97-57 is a two-step
process. The plaintiff must first prove that she has an occupational
disease. Then, the plaintiff must prove that her "last injurious
exposure" to the disease occurred while she was employed by the
defendant. 94 To satisfy the first requirement, the Rutledge court
determined that the plaintiff had to show that her occupation
exposed her to a greater risk of developing the disease than members
of the general public, and that her employment "significantly
contributed to, or was a significant causal factor in, the disease's
development." 95 The North Carolina Supreme Court noted that this
test prevails even if other non-work-related factors also substantially
contribute to or significantly cause the disease. The court defined
significant as" 'having or likely to have influence or effect: deserving
to be considered: important, weighty, notable.' "96 According to the
court, therefore, factual inquiry is "whether the occupational
exposure was such a significant factor in the disease's development
that without it the disease would not have developed to such an extent
that it caused the physical disability which resulted in claimant's

90. Id.at 788, 463 S.E.2d at 563 (quoting Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn, 308
N.C. 85, 102,301 S.E.2d 359,370 (1983)).
91. 131 N.C.App. 389,508 S.E.2d 795 (1998).
92. See id. at 393-94, 508 S.E.2d at 798.
93. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-57 (1999) ("In any case where compensation is payable
for an occupational disease, the employer in whose employment the employee was last
injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease... shall be liable.").
94. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 89,301 S.E.2d at 362.
95. Id.at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 369-70.
96. Id. at 101-02, 301 S.E.2d at 370 (quoting WEisTER's THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1971)).
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incapacity for work."' Thus, if the plaintiff proves that the disease is
occupational and that the defendant "proximately augmented the
disease [or preexisting condition] to any extent, however slight," then
the employer will be liable for the full extent of disability."
As noted in Rutledge, once the causation hurdle has been
crossed and the claimant has been able to prove the existence of an
occupational disease, the plaintiff then has to prove that her last
injurious exposure occurred while she was employed by the
defendant. 99 The Rutledge court defined the term as an exposure that
exacerbates the disease to any extent, however minimal."' This
includes any exposure to hazards that may cause an occupational
disease, even though the plaintiff's exposure was so minimal that this
exposure alone could not have produced the disease.' The policy
implications behind the requirement that the employment was the
last injurious exposure were also noted in Rutledge. The court
acknowledged that the statutory language takes into account the fact
that occupational diseases sometimes evolve over time after exposure
to hazardous materials at successive jobs.'02 Because of the difficulty
of determining which place of employment caused the most harm or
contributed the most to the resulting disability, only the employer
with the last injurious exposure is liable for any disability that
develops as a result of the occupational disease. 101
The North Carolina Court of Appeals did not reach the issue of
whether the employer's place of business was the last injurious
exposure in Jarvis,because it concluded that the claimant had failed
to prove that she had a compensable occupational diseases according
to section 97-53(13). The court, however, did reach the issue in
Hardin when it applied the last exposure rule in declining to award
compensation to a claimant with carpal tunnel syndrome. °4
97. Id. at 102, 301 S.E.2d at 370 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 89, 301 S.E.2d at 362-63 (quoting Haynes v. Feldspar Producing Co., 222
N.C. 163,168,22 S.E.2d 275,278 (1942)).
99. See Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 89, 301 S.E.2d at 362.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-57
(1999) ("In any case where compensation is payable for an occupational disease, the
employer in whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards
of such disease... shall be liable.").

100. See Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 89,301 S.E.2d at 362.
101. See Caulder v. Waverly Mills, 314 N.C. 70,76,331 S.E.2d 646,649-50 (1985).
102. See Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 89,301 S.E.2d at 362. (noting that under section 97-57 of
the North Carolina General Statutes, the claimant must only show that her last injurious
exposure to the conditions or substances that caused her disease occurred while she was
employed by the defendant).
103. See Jones v. Beaunit Corp., 72 N.C. App. 351,353-54,324 S.E.2d 624,625 (1985).
104. See Hardin v. Motor Panels, Inc., 524 S.E.2d 368, 370-71, 373-74, 2000 N.C. App.
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Although the Commission had established a causal link between the
plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome and her employment, her claim
was denied because the last injurious exposure to the hazards of the
disease did not occur during the course of her employment with the
defendant. After her resignation from her employment with the
defendant, the plaintiff suffered further injury in subsequent
positions. 105 She had a number of other jobs including positions as a
clerk at a Belk's department store, a cashier at Burger King, a home
health aide, and a clerk at a pet store.10 6 In all of these settings, the
7
plaintiff worked with her hands and put pressure on her wrists.'
The plaintiff did not seek treatment until after she had quit her job
with the defendant. 08 She testified that her symptoms had worsened
as a result of the places she worked after her employment with
defendant. 0 9 Therefore, the employer was not liable because the
plaintiff's last injurious exposure to the disease did not occur while
the plaintiff was working for the defendant.
The last injurious exposure rule reflects the General Assembly's
recognition that occupational diseases often develop over time-after
the plaintiff has been exposed to hazardous conditions in successive
places of employment." 0 It further illustrates the difficulty of
apportioning responsibility for an occupational disease among
various employers,"' which can lead to excessive litigation" 2 and
impede the Workers' Compensation Act's goal of providing the
aggrieved worker with a "speedy and quick recovery. "

3

While

casting full accountability on only one of several responsible
employers may seem initially unfair, the net result is justified when
that employer's industry is viewed as a whole: "each employer
consistently exposing employees to the harmful substance
LEXIS 5, at **1-7, *11-17 (Jan. 18, 2000).
105. See id. at 370,2000 N.C. App. LEXIS 5, at *2-4.
106. See id.
107. See i.
108. See id
109. See id.
110. See Anne Ferrell Team, Note, Caulder v. Waverly Mills: Expanding the Definition
of an OccupationalDisease Under the Last InjuriousExposure Rule, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1566,
1573-74 (1986).
111. See Martin, supra note 23, at 211.
112. See id. Other jurisdictions have, in fact, continued to follow the apportionment
rule, requiring a determination of non-work-related factors and work-related factors. See
LARSON & LARSON, supra note 43, § 52.06[4][d], at 52-68 to 52-69. In some cases, courts
allow apportionment between successive employers. See, e.g., id. § 52.06[4][d], at 52-70 &
n.95. For example, in Michigan, successive employers have the burden of proving the
extent of injury caused while the claimant was in their employ. See id.
113. See Martin, supra note 23, at 211; Team, supra note 110, at 1574.
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theoretically will be the last employer at some time and thus shoulder
its share of responsibility for the industry's overall hazardous work
conditions.""' 4
Despite such policy considerations, recent occupational disease
cases, particularly Hardin, demonstrate the inequities of the last
injurious exposure rule." 5 For example, the first employer will often
expose the claimant to the most injury. Both the fault-based tort
system and general notions of justice require that employers
contribute according to their shares of responsibility for the
occupational disease.
In light of the inequitable results that often occur under the last
injurious exposure rule, the North Carolina General Assembly
should adopt a new standard of employer liability for occupational
disease cases." 6 The "most injurious exposure rule" would require
the employer providing the greatest exposure to the hazards leading
to the occupational disease to compensate the complainant to the full
extent of the disability. The employer then would be entitled to
contribution from other employers to the extent that they exposed
the plaintiff to hazardous conditions. Two employers equally at fault
would divide the compensation equally. This proposal would provide
a more equitable result than the current rule because it is more
consistent with the goals of the Workers' Compensation Actproviding quick relief to injured employees" 7 and striking a fair
balance between employees and employers.
Under the most injurious exposure rule, the employee would
first be required to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that her employment with the defendant employer caused her the
most significant and damaging exposure to the conditions leading to
the disease. While this is a significant burden for the plaintiff, once it
has been satisfied, the defendant may seek contribution from other
employers by proving that these employers aggravated or otherwise
contributed to the disease.
It might be argued that the most injurious exposure rule would
be inefficient because, as in the pre-Rutledge apportionment era, the
rule would require satellite litigation among former employers to
determine relative fault,"' depleting resources from which the
114. Team, supranote 110, at 1574.
115. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.

116. See Martin, supra note 23, at 211 (noting that the courts have stated that the
unfairness of the last injurious exposure rule should be addressed by the legislature).
117. Martin, supra note 23, at 194.
118. See Martin, supranote 23, at 211.
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employee could be compensated. However, like the last injurious
exposure rule and unlike the apportionment rule, the most injurious
exposure rule would thwart any potential litigation concerning preexisting, non-work-related factors because these factors would not be
taken into account at all. Once an occupational disease is found,
employers would be encouraged to settle conflicts outside of the
courtroom to avoid being required to compensate the employee to
the full extent of their fault and to avoid the cost of litigation.
The availability of insurance for the employer also makes the
most injurious exposure rule equitable because employers can pass
the costs of insurance on to workers. Employers are in the best
position to prevent injuries and occupational diseases that arise from
hazardous conditions and substances because they can take
precautions to protect employees from exposure to such hazards.
Furthermore, the costs of compensation would be spread throughout
the industry because each employer would presumably be
responsible to some extent for occupational diseases in the industry.
Thus, the most injurious exposure rule provides an equitable result
when the employer's industry is viewed as a whole.
Another valid concern with the current Act involves the
standard of review that appellate courts use in reviewing the
Commission's decisions on appeal. Under the current Act, an
employer or employee may appeal from a final decision of the full
Industrial Commission within thirty days after the decision or after
notice of the decision is received." 9 The appellate court's role in such
an appeal, however, "is limited to a determination of (1) whether the
findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and (2)
whether the conclusions of law are supported by the findings."' 2
Findings of fact by the Commission are conclusive on appeal when
they are supported by the evidence of record.12 ' If any evidence
supports the Commission's findings, then the court is bound by those
GEN. STAT. § 97-86 (1999); JERNIGAN, supra note 9, § 26-1.
120. Guy v. Burlington Indus., 74 N.C. App. 685, 689, 329 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1985)
(quoting Barham v. Food World, 300 N.C. 329, 331, 266 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1980));
JERNIGAN, supra note 9, § 26-4 (quoting Guy); see also Jarvis v. Food Lion, Inc., 134 N.C.
App. 363, 367, 517 S.E.2d 388, 391 (noting that the Commission's decisions are conclusive
on appeal when there is competent evidence to support the Commission's findings and
when those findings justify its legal conclusions), review denied by 351 N.C. 356, 1999 N.C.
LEXIS 1326, at *1 (Nov. 4,1999).
121. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Tultex orp./Kings Yarn, 308 N.C. 85, 90,301 S.E.2d 359,363
(1983) (holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that there was no evidence of
record from which the Industrial Commission could find that the claimant's chronic lung
disease was an occupational disease).

119. See N.C.
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findings, even though other evidence might have supported a

contrary finding."2 Thus, the court defers to the Commission
and
2
does not have the prerogative to weigh the evidence.1
The current standard of review provides neither the worker nor
the employer with an adequate and meaningful substantive appeal
from the full Commission's findings and award. The lack of a
meaningful appeal is significant considering that, for employers
subject to the Workers' Compensation Act, 124 this procedure is the
exclusive remedy for an employee suffering from an occupational
disease. '2 The claimant cannot bring a civil action against the
employer unless the claim against the employer is unrelated to the
employment relationship16 or the case involves an intentional tort.12 7
The lack of a meaningful appeal for an aggrieved party in North
Carolina's current workers' compensation scheme necessitates
replacing the current standard of review with a more meaningful
standard. The author proposes that appellate courts adopt the
substantial evidence of record standard. Substantial evidence has
been defined as "evidence that provides 'a substantial basis of fact
from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred ... more than
a scintilla ...such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' ,,2 The need for such a
122. See N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 97-86 (1999).

123. See Toler v. Black & Decker, 134 N.C. App. 695, 697-700, 518 S.E.2d 547, 549-50
(1999) (citing Morrison v. Burlington Indus., 304 N.C. 1, 6,283 S.E.2d 458,463 (1981)).
124. Section 97-13 of the North Carolina General Statutes excepts employers of the
following from the scope of the Workers' Compensation Act: (1) railroad employees; (2)
fewer than ten full-time farm laborers; (3) casual employees; (4) federal government
employees; (5) domestic servants; (6) prisoners; (7) sellers of agricultural products; and (8)
fewer than three employees in the same business in the state. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9713.
125. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1999); Braxton v. Anco Electric, Inc., 330 N.C.
124, 129, 409 S.E.2d 914, 917 (1991) (affirming the appellate court's decision that an
employee can file a third-party action against a subcontractor even though the injured
employee applied for and received workers' compensation benefits); Gabel, supra note 24,
at 1084; JERNIGAN, supra note 9, § 10-1 (noting that independent contractors and their
employees are not covered under the Act and that physicians may also be liable for
injuries suffered by employees due to negligent treatment).
126. See North Carolina Chiropractic Ass'n v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 N.C. App. 1,
11, 365 S.E.2d 312,315 (1988).
127. See Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 340-41, 407 S.E.2d 222, 228 (1991)
("[W]hen an employer intentionally engages in misconduct knowing it is substantially
certain to cause serious injury or death to employees and an employee is injured or killed
by that misconduct, that employee, or [her] personal representative ... may pursue a civil
action against the employer.").
128. Avondale Indus., Inc. v. United States. Dep't of Labor, 977 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir.
1992) (quoting Diamond M. Drilling Co. v. Marshall, 577 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1978)).
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standard is strongest in cases where the greater weight of the
evidence favors a decision contrary to the Commission's conclusion.
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that the Act
"'should be liberally construed so that the benefits under the Act will
not be denied by narrow, technical or strict interpretation,' "129 the
30
Commission has consistently ruled pro-employer in recent casesY.
While the substantial evidence of record standard is still deferential,
the Commission's findings of fact would have to be supported by
more than a mere scintilla of evidence.
In almost all cases, there will be some evidence, however
miniscule, from which the Commission could base its conclusion.
Consider for example, Toler v. Black & Decker,131 which involved a
person seeking compensation for neck injury, post-traumatic stress
disorder, and depression that she claimed were occupational in
origin. The record revealed overwhelming evidence that the plaintiff
had suffered from a number of unpleasant life experiences that had
more than likely led to her psychological problems. 32 This evidence
greatly outweighed the plaintiff's evidence that her neck injury was
the cause of her depression. The court, however, was compelled to
affirm the Commission's findings of fact and award because there was
competent evidence from which the Commission could have reached
its conclusion. 33 The court of appeals stated that "[d]espite the
abundance of evidence to the contrary, there is competent evidence
of record, however thin, in the form of [a physician's testimony] to
indicate that plaintiff's neck injury had a role in exacerbating her preexisting [post-traumatic stress disorder] and had a role in
exacerbating her pre-existing depression.""
129. Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn, 308 N.C. 85, 105, 301 S.E.2d 359, 371 (1983)
(quoting Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281 N.C. 300,303, 188 S.E.2d 281,283 (1972)).
130. See, e.g., Hardin v. Motor Panels, Inc., 524 S.E.2d 368,374,2000 N.C. App. LEXIS
5, at *17 (Jan. 18, 2000) (affirming the Commission's denial of benefits because the
"plaintiff was last injuriously exposed to carpal tunnel syndrome while working with her
subsequent employers"); Jarvis v. Food Lion, Inc., 134 N.C. App. 363, 368, 517 S.E.2d 388,
391-92 (affirming the Commission's denial of benefits because there was evidence from
which the Commission could find that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that her carpal
tunnel syndrome was an occupational disease), review denied by 351 N.C. 356, 1999 N.C.
LEXIS 1326, at *1 (Nov. 4, 1999). This pro-employer trend in North Carolina is due in
large part to the difficulty of proving causation in occupational disease cases. This trend
follows the national trend in which employers traditionally win two-thirds of all
occupational disease cases. See Frances H. Miller, BiologicalMonitoring: The Employer's

Dilemma, 9 AM. J. L. & MED. 387,409 n.96 (1984).
131. 134 N.C. App. 695,518 S.E.2d 547 (1999).
132. See id. at 700,518 S.E.2d at 550.
133. See id.

134. Id.
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Toler illustrates that, currently, the role of the appellate court is
very minimal. The substantial evidence of record standard would
allow the reviewing court to take a more active role in determining
whether the Commission's findings of fact are supported by the
greater weight of the evidence. In cases in which substantial evidence
of record favors a decision contrary to that reached by the
Commission, the court would be able to vacate or overrule the
Commission's decision. This standard of review would afford the
plaintiff a substantive appeals process because it would be less
deferential to the Commission. A workers' compensation system
that uses substantial evidence of record review by the appellate court
might prevent the inequitable results of cases such as Toler.135
Support for the use of the substantial evidence of record
standard exists at both the federal and state levels. At the federal
level, the substantial evidence test is the general standard used in

reviewing administrative decisions. 36 Congress has also mandated
the use of the substantial evidence standard for review of informal
agency decisions.'37 In addition, the substantial evidence of record
standard of review has been effectively utilized in occupational
disease cases in South Carolina, 38 which has a workers' compensation
statute modeled after the North Carolina Workers' Compensation
Act. 3 9 In McCraw v. Mary Black Hospital,4 ' the Court of Appeals of

135. The substantial evidence of record standard would parallel the standard used in
some federal occupational disease cases. Under the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, ch. 509,44 Stat. 1424 (1929) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 901950 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)), which fixes disability benefits for maritime workers who are
injured on the job or develop occupational disease, the deputy commissioner of the
Compensation Commission first determines whether a worker should be allowed benefits
under the statute. See 33 U.S.C. § 919 (1994). If the claimant does not agree with the
deputy commissioner's decision, she can appeal to the Benefits Review Board. See 33
U.S.C. § 921(b)(3) (1994). The Board must affirm the deputy commissioner's decision
unless the deputy commissioner's factual conclusions were not "supported by substantial
evidence in the record considered as a whole." Id. The Board can send a case to an
administrative law judge for further action or make the decision itself. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 921(b)(4) (1994). If the party is not satisfied with the Board's order, she can appeal to
the region's circuit court of appeals. See 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1994). The court of appeals'
scope of review is also limited to determining whether the deputy commissioner's decision
was supported by substantial evidence of record. See Janusziewicz v. Sun Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co. 677 F.2d 286,290 (3d Cir. 1982).
136. See Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State and Federal): A Primer,18 SEATTLE
UNIV. L. REv. 11, 42 (1994).
137. See iL
138. See, e.g., Tiller v. National Health Care Ctr., 513 S.E.2d 843 (S.C. 1999); Mizell v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 315 S.E.2d 123 (S.C. 1984); McCraw v. Mary Black Hosp., 527
S.E.2d 113 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000); Grayson v. Gulf Oil Co., 357 S.E.2d 479 (S.C. Ct. App.
1987).
139. See Mizell, 315 S.E.2d at 124.
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South Carolina noted that in occupational disease cases, "an
appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of [the
Industrial Commission] as to the weight of the evidence on questions
of fact unless the [Commission's] findings are clearly erroneous in
view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence of record."'141
Although the standard is not quantifiable, in terms of assigning
percentages, South Carolina's standard is more restrictive than North
Carolina's because more evidence is required to support the
Commission's factual findings than merely any evidence of record. 42
The author believes that this standard strikes a healthy balance
between deference to the Commission's factual findings and the need
to afford employees or employers a meaningful appeal.
Opponents of the substantial evidence of record standard might
argue that such a system would require the reviewing court to engage
in weighing the evidence to determine whether substantial evidence
exists to support the Commission's findings. However, the author
does not believe that such balancing would be imperative. In many
cases, substantial evidence likely would support either a denial or
rewarding of benefits. Provided substantial evidence supported the
full Commission's result, the decision would not be disturbed.
Perhaps the potential concern that courts would have to weigh the
evidence would be obliterated if the General Assembly clearly
defined what constitutes substantial evidence.
Opponents might also argue that the substantial evidence of
record standard would weaken the integrity of North Carolina's
workers' compensation system because appellate courts would be less
deferential to the Commission's decisions. The proposed system,
however, would strengthen the integrity and the public's perception
of the current workers' compensation scheme because the facts of
each case would be examined by a higher authority and thus ensure
that there is substantial support for the Commission's decision.
The recent Hardin and Jarvis cases demonstrate a current trend
toward abandoning Rutledge's "significant contribution" standard.
While not explicitly overruling Rutledge, both the Commission and
North Carolina courts have limited the case's precedential value by
requiring a higher standard of proof. 143 This implicit change in
140. 527 S.E. 2d 113 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000).
141. Id. at 116.
142. See id.
143. By denying the claimant compensation in Jarvis, for example, the Commission
stated that there was "insufficient evidence of record from which to prove by its greater
weight that plaintiffs carpal tunnel syndrome is an occupational disease which was due to

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

2104

[Vol. 78

standard threatens to upset the balance between employers and
employees in the application of the Act to occupational disease
claims. Indeed, cases like Jarvis seem to suggest a reversion to the
pre-Rutledge apportionment scheme requiring assessment of workrelated versus non-work-related factors.
Discrepancies in both the Commission's and the appellate
courts' articulations of causation standards in occupational disease
cases mandates that the General Assembly clarify the appropriate
standard. The policy implications of failing to do so are troubling.
The Act was designed to provide employees with swift compensation
and to limit the liability of employers, 14 but reverting to pre-Rutledge
apportionment or a sole causation scheme would undoubtedly
deplete resources in litigation and delay compensation for injured
employees. It is the public which ultimately pays for an inefficient
workers' compensation system through increases in consumer
costs.

145

The most injurious exposure rule would present the most
effective resolution of occupational disease cases by placing liability
for disability from occupational disease on the employer that
provided the most exposure to the conditions that caused the disease
or aggravation of a preexisting condition. Further, the substantial
evidence of record standard would provide a more substantive appeal
for employees and employers displeased with the Industrial
Commission's decision. Upon revisiting Rutledge, it appears that the
"significant contribution" standard may soon be a relic of the past.
VERONICA D. HIGGS

causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to her employment with defendantemployer." Jarvis v. Food Lion, Inc., 134 N.C. App. 363, 366, 517 S.E.2d 388, 390
(emphasis added), review denied by 351 N.C. 356, 1999 N.C. LEXIS 1326, at *1 (Nov. 4,
1999). The Commission made this finding despite the fact that the plaintiff had worked as
a cashier, a position which involved a substantial amount of repetitive hand motion. See

id. at 364-65, 517 S.E.2d at 389. Contrary to Rutledge, the Commission seemed to require
medical testimony that the employment caused the condition.
144. See Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. North Carolina Indus. Comm'n, 336
N.C. 200, 203, 443 S.E.2d 716, 718-19 (1994) (noting that the North Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act was enacted to avoid protracted litigation and to ensure limited
liability); JERNIGAN, supranote 9, § 1-2.

145. See JERNIGAN, supra note 9, § 1-2.

When Digital Contacts Equal Minimum Contacts: How Fourth
Circuit Courts Should Assess Personal Jurisdiction in
TrademarkDisputes over Internet Domain Names
Advances in technology alter the ways people and businesses
operate and often challenge legal doctrines. The doctrine of personal

jurisdiction experienced such a challenge in the early twentieth
century as the United States became a more mobile society and

corporations expanded their operations throughout the country.'
Today, the nation's embrace of cyberspace as a new medium for
communication has again strained the boundaries of personal
jurisdiction doctrine.2 Faced with disputes over the use of Internet
domain names between geographically distant parties, courts must
assess whether they can exercise jurisdiction over a party whose sole
contacts with a forum are electronic in nature.

The traditional,

territorial-based due process analysis for personal jurisdiction,
however, does not adequately address many of the issues that arise in

the context of Internet-related claims. Because no alternative
analysis currently exists, courts must apply the traditional doctrine in
adjudicating these suits. 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
not yet addressed the problem of exercising personal jurisdiction over
Internet domain name disputes. Presently, only a handful of district
courts within the Fourth Circuit have had the opportunity to tackle

1. See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.7, at 108-11 (2d
ed. 1993) ("Initially, a corporation was held to be subject to a court's jurisdiction only in
the state of its incorporation, beyond which it could have no legal existence," but as
corporations began to expand their business outside their particular states of
incorporation, "courts were forced to evolve new jurisdictional theories while still abiding
by the principles [of established personal jurisdiction doctrine]."); Mathew Oetker, Note,
PersonalJurisdiction and the Internet, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 613, 616 (1999) (stating that
while the traditional personal jurisdiction doctrine "was feasible in an era when most
people did not frequently travel between states and conducted business face-to-face, the
advent of new technology later forced the Supreme Court to [amend its traditional
doctrine]").
2. See, e.g., Veronica M. Sanchez, Comment, Taking a Byte Out of Minimum
Contacts: A Reasonable Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Trademark
Disputes, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1671, 1671-72 (1999) ("Because the Internet transcends
geographic boundaries, the application to it of territorially based [personal jurisdiction]
doctrines is exceedingly difficult.").
3. See Howard B. Stravitz, PersonalJurisdictionin Cyberspace: Something More is
Required on the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 925, 925-27 (1998).
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the issue. 4 This situation will likely change as more of these disputes

filter through the court system. This Note examines personal
jurisdiction in Internet domain name and other Internet-related
trademark disputes. First, this Note reviews the different types of
domain name and related trademark disputes and analyzes how
trademark law applies to them.5 Second, the Note examines modem
personal jurisdiction analysis, with an emphasis on constitutional due
process.6 Third, this Note discusses how other federal circuit and
district courts have addressed the issue of the Internet and personal
jurisdiction.7 Finally, the author suggests how the Fourth Circuit
courts should assess personal jurisdiction in domain name and other
Internet-related trademark disputes. 8
America's embrace of the Internet as a new medium of
communication is unprecedented. 9 The Internet provides the
opportunity to shop, invest, conduct business, communicate with
friends, and obtain information on nearly any subject all with the use
of a personal computer. Consequently, the use of the Internet for
business has grown at an astonishingly rapid pace." Many established
companies recognized its advantages and developed an Internet
presence." Moreover, the utility of the Internet has created a new
generation of companies focused
exclusively on maximizing the
2
capacity.'
commercial
Internet's
4. See, e.g., America Online, Inc. v. Huang, Civ. No. 00-290-A, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10232, at *33-34 (E.D. Va. July 13, 2000) (finding jurisdiction in Virginia lacking
over a California-based defendant that contracted to register a domain name-which
allegedly infringed the plaintiffs trademark-with a Virginia-based domain name
registration company); Roche v. Worldwide Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 714, 718-19 (E.D.
Va. 2000) (finding jurisdiction Virginia lacking over a defendant who had done nothing
more than place a passive Web site on the Internet that was accessible to Virginia
residents); Rannoch, Inc. v. Rannoch Corp., 52 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686-87 (E.D. Va. 1999)
(same); Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, 987 F. Supp. 481, 485-87 (W.D.N.C. 1997)
(establishing jurisdiction in North Carolina over a defendant whose principal contacts with
the Stater were over the Internet); Telco Communications Group, Inc. v. An Apple A
Day, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 404, 405-08 (E.D. Va. 1997) (establishing jurisdiction in Virginia
over a defendant based on the its posting of inflammatory press releases on the Internet
about a Virginia company).
5. See infra notes 9-68 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 69-92 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 93-209 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 210-59 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Stravitz, supra note 3, at 925-26 (stating that the Internet reached 50
million users in only four years, while radio and television needed thirty-eight and thirteen
years, respectively, to reach the same audience).
10. See id. at 926.
11. See id.
12. See id.
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The rapid commercialization of the Internet has led to a race for
the acquisition of Internet domain names by companies eager to
establish an Internet identity.13 A domain name is the Internet
equivalent of a compaiiy's address, telephone number, and trademark
all in one. 4 For companies engaged in E-commerce, their domain
name is their corporate identity. Securing a domain name that
consumers may easily identify is crucial to the success of many Ebusinesses. Because of the need to make their Web sites memorable
and easily accessible to consumers, many businesses choose to use
their trademark as their domain name. 6 Thus, Internet users often
assume that a company's trademark is also its domain name. 17 When
a company does not use its trademark or does not have an easily
recognizable domain name, consumers generally resort to Internet8
search engines or advertisements to discover the company's site.'
This indirect route may result in a reduction of the number of visits to

13. See Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1682 (citing Rebecca W. Gole, Note, Playing the
Name Game: A Glimpse at the Future of the Internet Domain Name System, 51 FED.
COMM. LJ. 403,404 (1999)).
14. See Michael B. Landau, Problems Arising Out of the Use of
"www.trademarkcom" The Application of Principles of Trademark Law to Internet
Domain Name Disputes, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 455, 461 (1997); Ira S. Nathenson,
Comment, Showdown at the Domain Name Corral: Property Rights and Personal
JurisdictionOver Squatters, Poachersand Other Parasites,58 U. PnUr. L. REV. 911, 918-19
(1997); Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1683; see also Greg Miller, Internet Addresses Fueling
Rash of TerritorialDisputes, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 1996, at A8 (referring to domain names
as "postal addresses, vanity license plates and billboards, all rolled into one digital
enchilada").
Domain names are composed of a combination of words, followed by a period,
and a two or three-letter suffix indicating the type of organization that owns the Web site.
See Stacy B. Sterling, Comment, New Age Bandits in Cyberspace: Domain Names Held
Hostage on the Internet, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 733, 736 (1997). For commercial
organizations, the three-letter suffix is ".com." See id. Other domain name suffixes
include ".edu" (education organizations), ".gov" (government organizations), ".org"
(organizational), ".net" (network), "nc.us" (individual states), and ".mil" (military). See
Landau, supra,at 462; Sterling, supra, at 736.
15. See Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1683.
16. See Adam Chase, A Primer on Recent Domain Name Disputes, 3 VA. LL. &
TECH.
3,
3
(Spring
1998)
<http://vjolt.student.virginia.edu/graphicsvol3/
homeart3.html>; Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1683; see also Danielle Weinberg Swartz,
Comment, The Limitations of Trademark Law in Addressing Domain Name Disputes, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1491-92 (1998) ("Many businesses choose to use their trademarks as
domain names because consumers are already familiar with those marks and may
favorably associate quality with the trademarks.").
Some examples of company
trademarks used as domain names include "ibm.com," for International Business
Machines (IBM), "nike.com" for Nike, and "sony.com" for Sony.
17. See Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1683.
18. See Swartz, supra note 16, at 1492.
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a company's site and, consequently, less commercial exposure. 9 One
commentator has observed, "[b]ecause there is no effective
alternative method of finding a company's Internet location, having a
domain name that corresponds to a well-known trademark may be a
prerequisite for a company that wants to establish an Internet
presence."20
Often a company attempting to register its trademark as its
domain name discovers that a different company or individual has
already registered the name.21 Until recently, this problem often
arose because Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI), the Alexandria,
Virginia-based company that handled all domain name registrations,
did not research whether a prospective registrant of a particular
domain name actually had the right to use that name.' NSI simply
asked the person if she had such a right, and if the person asserted
that she did, NSI issued the name.2Y A trademark owner could object
to the registration of the name under NSI's domain name dispute
resolution policy by notifying the domain name registrant of its
trademark in the name.24 This policy, however, was of limited use to
aggrieved trademark holders, because it was only available if the
contestant possessed a registered trademark; those who possessed
common law trademarks were left without a remedy.25 Moreover, the
policy was only applicable if the registered trademark and the
contested domain name were exactly the same.26 A trademark owner
could not challenge the registration of an alternate spelling or
common misspelling of the trademarked name or the registration of
the trademarked name in combination with another word.
Therefore, many trademark owners seeking to use their trademarks
as their domain names were forced to bring trademark infringement
19. See, e.g., Sterling, supra note 14, at 735-36 (noting that the fast food chain Carl's
Jr. anticipated as much as a 50% percent reduction in Web site visits because it could not
use the already-taken domain name "carlsjr.com").
20. Gayle Weiswasser, Domain Names, the Internet, and Trademarks: Infringement in
Cyberspace,13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 137,146 (1997).
21. See Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1683.
22. See Chase, supra note 16, at 4-5.
23. See id.
24. See Susan L Crane, Domain Name Disputes: ICANN's New Policy: What it
Covers, E-COMMERCE, Jan. 2000, at 1, availablein LEXIS, Legal Publications Group File.
If NSI received evidence that the trademark owner had a registered trademark in the
name and that the domain name registrant did not also own a trademark in the name, then
it would place the use of the name "on hold" while the parties resolved their dispute. See
id.
25. See id.
26. See id.

27. See id.
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actions against the parties that obtained the desired names from

NSI.28
Recent developments in the domain name registration process
provide more options for aggrieved trademark holders to prevent
third parties from using their trademarks as domain names. First,
NSI is no longer the sole company handling domain name

registrations. 29 Second, a non-profit corporation, The Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), was
established to oversee the Internet's management functions and has
provided uniformity in the area of domain name registration.
ICANN recently established the Uniform Domain Name Disputes
Resolution Policy (UDRP) which all certified domain name
registration companies , such as NSI, must follow when conflicts
arise.31 Under the UDRP, an aggrieved trademark holder must
establish each of the following three elements in an arbitration

proceeding to prevail in .a domain name contest: (1) the domain
name is identical to or confusingly similar to a trademark owned by
the complainant, (2) the domain name registrant has no legitimate
rights in the name, and (3) the domain name was registered in bad
faith.32

If the complainant is successful, the UDRP allows the

arbitrator to order the transfer of the domain name to the aggrieved
trademark holder or the cancellation of the domain name.3
Significantly, the UDRP is not limited to those with federally
28. See Chase, supra note 16, at 5; Swartz, supra note 16, at 1492-93.
29. See Lisa D. Dame, Controversy in Cyberspace; ICANN Adopts WIPO
Recommendations on Domain Names Conflicts, THE INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST, June
1999, at 1. Companies that currently register domain names in addition to NSI include
America Online, register.com, NameSecure.com, and Domain Bank, Inc., among others.
See The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, List of Accredited and
Accreditation-QualifiedRegistrars (visited Sept. 1, 2000) <http://vvw.icann.org/registrars/
accredited-list.html>.
30. See Dame, supra note 29, at 1.
31. See Crane, supra note 24, at 1. ICANN adopted the UDRP in October 1999
which subsequently became law on January 3, 2000. See id. The UDRP governs all .com,
.net, and .org domain names, including those registered through NSI before the policy was
implemented. See Robert D. Gilbert, Practice Tips Significant Changes in Law Offer
Cyberspace Protectionsfor Trademark Owners, E-COMMERCE, Dec. 1999, at 2, available
in LEXIS, Legal Publications Group File.
32. See Gilbert, supra note 31, at 2.
33. See Crane, supra note 24, at 3. In the first case arbitrated under ICANN's dispute
resolution policy, World Wrestling FederationEntertainment,Inc. v. Bosman, WIPO Case
No. D99-0001 (2000) (Donahey, Arb.), the arbitrator ordered the defendant to transfer
the domain name, worldwrestlingfederation.com, to World Wrestling Federation
Entertainment, Inc. (WWF), which held a federally registered trademark in the name
"World Wrestling Federation." See WWF Wins Domain Name Transfer in First ICANN
Arbitration,INTELL. PROP. LrrIG. REP., March 8,2000, at 1.
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registered trademarks or to situations in which the domain name is
identical to the trademark in question.
Although the UDRP provides a more viable and complete
resolution process for domain name disputes than did NSI's previous
policy, many trademark holders might still choose to pursue
trademark infringement claims in federal courts? 4 Aggrieved
trademark holders may bring several different types of Internetrelated trademark suits. The first type of dispute arises when a
person purchases a domain name solely to sell it to a company for
profit and the company owning the trademark to the domain name
sues the holder of the domain name for trademark violations. 35
People who speculatively purchase domain names in such a manner
are commonly referred to as "grabbers" or "cybersquatters. '36 The
practice of speculatively purchasing domain names is so extensive
that only a small number of Internet domain names are actually in use
compared to those that have been registered. Domain names such
as
"mcdonalds.com,"
"coke.com,"
"eddiebauer.com,"
and
"mtv.com," for example, were originally held by individuals who did
38
not own these respective trademarks.
A second kind of dispute arises when a business purchases a
domain name that is similar to a competitor's name or trademark for
the purpose of taking Internet business away from the competitor. 39
Businesses have engaged in this practice in several ways, including
using the competitor's actual trademark in the domain name or using
a "commonly mistyped version of a famous name"40 so that
consumers will inadvertently access its Web site, rather than its
competitor's Web site.4'
34. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of pursuing a remedy
through either the UDRP or the courts, see Gilbert, supranote 31.
35. See Landau, supra note 14, at 485; Nathenson, supra note 14, at 925-26; Swartz,
supranote 16, at 1494-95.
36. Landau, supra note 14, at 485.
37. See Sterling, supra note 14, at 737 (citing Steve G. Steinberg, Addressing the
Internet'sSpace Problem, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26,1996, at D8).
38. See Chase,supra note 16, at 12; Sterling, supranote 14, at 737.
39. See Landau, supra note 14, at 490; Nathenson, supra note 14, at 927.
40. Nathenson, supra note 14, at 927 (noting that in one case, the software company
Zero Micro Software registered the domain name "micros0ft.com" which was later put on
hold following a complaint Microsoft Corporation).
41. See Landau, supra note 14, at 492; Nathenson, supra note 14, at 927. One of the

most-widely publicized cases of squatting involved Stanley Kaplan Education Centers

(Kaplan) and Princeton Review, two rival test preparation companies. See Sterling, supra
note 14, at 738. Princeton Review registered the domain name "kaplan.com" after
noticing that Kaplan had failed to do so. See id. Despite subsequent demands from
Kaplan to turn over the domain name, Princeton Review posted advertisements for its
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A third category of dispute occurs when two companies have the
same or nearly the same name, one of the companies already holds a
domain name in the common name, and the other company wants the
same domain name.42 This type of dispute is more complicated
because both parties possess a valid claim to the name.43
Furthermore, both companies may legally own a trademark in the
same name 44 -trademark law recognizes concurrent use of a name if
the shared use is between multiple parties providing different goods
and/or services or between multiple parties in different geographic
markets.45
A fourth type of Internet trademark dispute arises when a
trademark holder discovers that a different business or individual is
using its trademark within the content of its Web page.46 This type of
conflict is analogous to other traditional trademark infringement
disputes in which the aggrieved trademark holder normally attempts
to terminate the other party's use of the trademark and obtain
statutory damages. These disputes are different from domain name
disputes in that the alleged infringer's use of the trademark does not
prevent the trademark holder from simultaneously using the
trademark.
To understand fully the nature of the different types of Internetrelated trademark disputes, a general understanding of federal
trademark law is necessary. Federal trademark law was codified in
the 1946 Lanham Trademark Act,47 which defines a trademark as
"any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof ...
used by a person ...to identify and distinguish his or her goods ...
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source
of the goods, even if that source is unknown."' The two principal
purposes of the Lanham Act are to protect consumers from confusion
in the marketplace by ensuring that products purchased were those
services on a Web page with the name "kaplan.com." See id. Kaplan sued Princeton
Review and after binding arbitration, Princeton Review agreed to transfer the domain
name to Kaplan. See id. at 739.
42. See Nathenson, supra note 14, at 928.

43. See ihL
44. See supranote 24 and accompanying text.
45. See Landau, supra note 14, at 468-72. For example, United Airlines and United
Van Lines both use "United." See id.
46. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 415-16 (9th Cir. 1997);
Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25,26-27 (2d Cir. 1997).
47. Pub. L. No. 79-489,60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 10511127 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)); see also Sterling, supra note 14 at 748 (presenting the
history of the Lanham Act).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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that consumers actually intended to purchase49 and to secure the
trademark owner's investment in the mark from use by "pirates and
cheats.""
The Lanham Act provides several advantages exclusively for
First, a federally registered
federally registered trademarks.5
trademark is deemed prima facie evidence of an exclusive right to use

the mark.' Second, disputes over such trademarks command federal
jurisdiction,53 which is advantageous because federal judges have
more experience with trademark infringement cases than do most
state court judges.54 Meanwhile, state unfair competition statutes and
trademark statutes afford some protection against infringement, but
these statutes add little protection beyond what is already provided
under federal trademark law. 55
Traditionally, federal infringement claims have fallen into one of
two categories: (1) a claim of infringement based on a likelihood of
confusion or (2) a claim of infringement based on trademark
dilution.5 6 In a likelihood-of-confusion suit, a trademark owner must
prove that the defendant's use of the mark is likely to cause consumer
confusion as to the source of the goods or services.5 7 In a claim for

infringement due to trademark dilution, a trademark holder must
demonstrate that a "defendant's conduct will reduce the
In trademark
distinctiveness or goodwill" of the trademark.
49. See Chase,supra note 16, at 6; Sterling, supranote 14, at 748.
50. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprintedin 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274.
51. See Sterling, supra note 14, at 751-52.
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (stating that federal registration is
"prima facie evidence of the validity [and] the registration of the mark, of the registrant's
ownership of the mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in
commerce on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate"). For
a more thorough discussion of the benefits to federal trademark registration, see Sterling,
supranote 14, at 751-52.
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 1121(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
54. See Sterling, supra note 14, at 751.
55. See Chase, supra note 16, at 6 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998)).
56. See Chase, supra note 16, at 6-8.
57. See id-; Sterling, supra note 14, at 753. Courts give different levels of protection to
different types of marks depending on the category of the mark. See Chase, supra note 16,
at 6. Trademarks fall into one of five different categories of marks: arbitrary, fanciful,
suggestive, descriptive, and generic. See id Arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive marks
generally receive a high level of protection. Marks that fall into the descriptive category,
however, will receive less protection unless the registrant demonstrates that the mark has
a "secondary meaning." Id Marks that fall into the generic category receive no
protection. See id.; see also Landau, supra note 14, at 464 (discussing the likelihood of
confusing claims and the different categories of trademarks).
58. Chase, supra note 16, at 7. "Blurring" and "tarnishment" are the two principle

2000]

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

2113

disputes over Internet domain names, aggrieved trademark holders
pursue both types of claims.59
Because of the novelty of the medium, traditional federal
trademark law has proved inadequate in addressing issues unique to

Internet-related
disputes-in particular, the incidence of
cybersquatting. 6 Consequently, in November of 1999, Congress
amended the Lanham Act with the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act (the "Anticybersquatting Act"),6 which created a new
cause of action for trademark infringement in domain name
registration and thus should facilitate the aggrieved trademark
holder's ability to obtain its trademarked names.62
The Anticybersquatting Act allows trademark holders to bring
suits against anyone who, with a badfaith intent to profit, registers or
uses a domain name that is either "identical or confusingly similar" to
a mark that "is distinctive at the time of registration of the domain
name" 63 or "identical or confusingly similar" to a mark that is "a
famous mark that is famous at the time of registration of the domain
name."' The Act provides an extensive, although not exclusive, list
of factors that a court may consider in determining whether an
alleged infringe acted in bad faith.65 In addition, the Act allows, in
specific circumstances, the owner of a federally registered trademark

ways in which a trademark can be diluted. IL Blurring occurs when the trademark's
selling power is reduced by unauthorized use of the trademark by another on unrelated
goods. See id. Tarnishment occurs when a trademark becomes associated with "lesser
quality goods or with unwholesome or unsavory content." Id.
59. See id. at 6-8. Congress passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-98, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) 985 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)), partly with the intention of addressing domain name
disputes and providing a remedy to trademark holders harmed by cybersquatters. See 141
CONG. REC. 38,561 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) ("[I]t is my hope that this
antidilution statute can help stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses taken by those
who are choosing marks that are associated with the products and reputations of others.").
60. See, e.g., Swartz, supra note 16, at 1488.
61. See Act of Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N (113 Stat.)
1501A-545 to 552 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1125, 1127 (1998 & Supp.
2000)).
62. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d); see also Gilbert, supra note 31, at 1 (stating that the
Anticybersquating Act should aid trademark holders in their efforts to prevent
cybersquatters from infringing their trademarks).
63. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I).
64. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(II).
65. See id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i). These factors include whether the alleged infringer
intended to divert customers from the trademark owner's Web site under the domain
name site, whether the alleged infringer offered to transfer or sell the domain name to the
trademark holder, and whether the alleged infringer registered multiple domain names
that it knew were identical or similar to trademarks of others. See id
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to file an in rem civil action against the domain name for injunctive
relief in "the judicial district in which the domain name registrar,
domain name registry, or other domain name authority that
registered or assigned the domain name is located."' ' Thus, the Act
provides trademark holders with an alternative method for invoking
federal jurisdiction. 67
While the Anticybersquatting Act represents a good step
towards establishing an adequate legal framework for Internetrelated legal disputes, its narrow scope-the Act only applies to bad
faith domain name registration-may limit its effectiveness.
Moreover, the Act's in rem jurisdiction is not useful for a party
seeking more than injunctive relief in a jurisdiction different from
that where the domain name registration company is located.' As a
result, many parties bringing Internet trademark suits must first
establish that the courts have personal jurisdiction over the alleged
trademark infringers.
For a court's determination in a particular case to be binding, it
must have personal jurisdiction over the parties involved in the
action.69 The determination of whether a court has personal
jurisdiction over a party is a two-step process. 70 First, the court must
determine whether jurisdiction is proper under the particular state's
long-arm statute.7' Second, it must analyze whether exercising
jurisdiction over the party would satisfy the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 72 In many states, the long-arm statute
extends to the Constitution's jurisdictional boundaries under the Due
Process Clause. 3 For this reason, and because a due process analysis
66. Id § 1125(d)(2)(A).
67. See, e.g., Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.com, 51 F. Supp. 2d 707, 713 (E.D.
Va. 1999) (holding that prior to the Anticybersquatting Act the Lanham Act did not
permit in rem actions against allegedly infringing marks).
68. As discussed in supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text, NSI, an Alexandria,
Virginia-based company that, until recently, exclusively handled the registration of almost
all domain names. Consequently, the Eastern District of Virginia will likely address many
domain disputes brought under the new in rem provision in the Anticybersquatting Act.
69. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 1, § 3.1, at 94.

70. See Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, LP, 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 909 (D.
Or. 1999); Dale M. Cendali, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, in THIRD ANNUAL
INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 79, 81 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary
Prop. Course Handbook Series No. GO-0051, June 14-15, 1999); William C. Walter &
Deanne M. Mosley, The Application of TraditionalPersonalJurisdictionJurisprudenceto
Cyberspace Disputes,19 MISS. C. L. REv. 213,214-15 (1998).
71. See Walter & Mosley, supra note 70, at 214-15.
72. See id.
73. See Michael L. Russell, Note, Back to the Basics: Resisting Novel and Extreme
Approaches to the Law of PersonalJurisdictionand the Internet, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 157,
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must be performed in all cases, this Note focuses on the due process

component of personal jurisdiction.
Contemporary due process personal jurisdiction doctrine is
premised on one central rule: for a court to have personal jurisdiction
over a defendant, that defendant must "have certain minimum
contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'

"74

Depending on the nature and extent of a non-resident

defendant's contacts with the forum, a court may exercise either
general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction.75 If a defendant's contacts
with the forum are "systematic and continuous,' 76 the court may
exercise general jurisdiction and hear any cause of action involving
the defendant, regardless of whether the specific cause of action arose

out of the defendant's activities within the forum state.77 A court with
specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant may only hear a
directly arises from the defendant's contacts with
cause of action that
78
the forum state.
162(1999).
74. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). In the landmark decision Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1878), the Supreme Court held that physical presence within the forum State was
necessarily for the State to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. See id at
733-34. In InternationalShoe, the Court established this test and expanded the personal
jurisdiction doctrine-departing from its "presence" based approach under Pennoyer-to
accommodate the advent of new technology which mobilized the population and enabled
businesses to operate in multiple forums. See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 1, § 3.10, at 120
(explaining that after the Court realized that the "Pennoyer rule was anachronistic," it
adopted a "more flexible standard for the assertion of personal jurisdiction, based upon a
jurisdictional theory ... better suited to a progressively more mobile society"); Oetker,
supra note 1, at 616 (noting that although Pennoyer was appropriate when intrastate
commerce was the norm, the Court has expanded Pennoyer's holding to reflect the
introduction of new technology).
75. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16
(1984).
76. Id. at 416. The Court has provided little help in determining exactly how much
contact is necessary for general jurisdiction. See Stravitz, supra note 3, at 928. However, if
"a defendant is domiciled in, incorporated or organized under forum state law, or has its
principle place of business in the forum state ... there is little doubt that the
constitutionally required substantially 'systematic and continuous' connection is satisfied."
Helicopteros,466 U.S. at 416 (citations omitted).
77. See id. at 415.

78. See iL at 416. In Helicopteros,the survivors of four American citizens who died in
a helicopter crash in Peru brought suit in Texas against Helicopteros Nacionaleles de
Colombia. See id. at 410-12. The survivors argued that Texas had general jurisdiction
over the company because the company previously engaged in contract negotiations in
Texas, purchased helicopters from Texas, and had pilots trained in Texas. See id. at 411.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that there was no general jurisdiction because the
contacts were not continuous and systematic. See id. at 418.
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The Supreme Court has divided the analysis of whether a court
has specific jurisdiction over a defendant into two separate prongs. 79
The first prong, often called the "minimum contacts" or "purposeful
availment" prong, focuses on the quantity and quality of the
defendant's contacts with the forum state 0 The second prong, often
called the "reasonableness" prong, focuses on the fairness of bringing
the defendant into the forum state's courts.81 Both prongs must be
satisfied to establish specific jurisdiction.' To satisfy the first prong,
the court must find a sufficient number of significant contacts with the
forum state that are related to the particular cause of action. 3
Generally, contacts are deemed significant if a court finds that the
defendant "purposefully avail[ed]" himself to the forum 4 For the
"purposefully availment" requirement to be satisfied, the defendant's
contacts with the forum state must be such "that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there."'
Although determining whether a defendant purposefully availed
himself to suit in a particular jurisdiction is a case-specific, factual
inquiry, some generalizations can be made about what contacts satisfy
the analysis. First, the purposeful availment prong probably is not
satisfied when a defendant does nothing more than place a product
into the stream of commerce. 86 Rather, action by the defendant
specifically directed towards a jurisdiction is necessary. Second, the
purposeful availment prong is likely met when a defendant performs
an intentional act with the knowledge that it will adversely affect an
individual in a particular forum. 87 In this situation, courts use the
79. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,472-78 (1985).
80. See id.
81. See id
82. See id. at 477-78.
83. See id84. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). In Hanson, the Court held that
Florida's jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee of a trust established by a settlor who moved
to Florida after establishing the trust was not proper, because the trustee had not
purposely availed itself of the forum state. See id. The Court stated that there must be
"some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."
Id

85. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). In WorldWide Volkswagen, the Court held that Oklahoma did not have personal jurisdiction over a
New York automobile dealer for a product liability claim arising from an accident that
occurred in Oklahoma. See id- at 299.
86. See Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality
opinion).
87. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1998).
For a discussion of Panavision,see infra notes 149-62 and accompanying text.
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"forum effects test" to find jurisdiction and reason that, because the
defendant knew that the effects of his actions would harm the
plaintiff in a specific jurisdiction, the defendant should have
anticipated being haled into court in that jurisdiction.8
The second prong of the analysis focuses on the fairness of
requiring the non-resident defendant to litigate in the forum State's
courts. To determine whether the second "reasonableness" prong is
satisfied, the court must decide whether allowing jurisdiction over the
non-resident defendant would offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."89 The Supreme Court established the
following five factors that courts should consider when evaluating the
reasonableness of jurisdiction: (1) the burden on the defendant, (2)
the forum state's interest in adjudicating the matter, (3) the plaintiff's
interest in obtaining convenient relief, (4) the interest of the judicial
system in obtaining the most efficient resolution of disputes, and (5)
the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social
policies. 90 Although jurisdiction cannot be established unless both the
purposeful availment and reasonableness prongs are satisfied, the
Supreme Court has stated that when a non-resident defendant makes
purposeful contacts with the forum state, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant is
reasonable. 91
Once a court finds that the requirements of specific or general
jurisdiction are met, its exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is proper. This framework for establishing
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant under the Due
Process Clause has been used by the federal courts since the midtwentieth century. The analysis was adopted because of its flexibility
92
and its ability to recognize the mobility of the modem world.
Recently, however, the utility of the analysis has been challenged by
Internet-related disputes involving types of contacts unforeseen by
88. The "forum effects test" was adopted by the Court in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S.
783, 790 (1984). In Calder, the Court held that the defendants, who were residents of
Florida, could have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in California when they
authored a libelous article about the plaintiff for publication in the NationalEnquirer. See
id, The Court reasoned that, although the defendants had no other contacts with
California, they knew that the plaintiff resided in California and that the plaintiff would
suffer maximum harm in California. See id. Thus, the defendants should have anticipated
being sued in that state. See id.
89. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945).
90. See World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.

91. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,477 (1985).
92. See supra note 74.
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the courts even just a decade ago.
Although the Internet is still in its infancy and many Internetrelated trademark suits are settled outside of court, the body of case
law addressing Internet-based personal jurisdiction is rapidly
expanding. 93 The federal circuit and district courts that have
addressed the issue have struggled to establish a framework for
addressing whether an Internet Web site or transmissions over the
Internet constitute contacts sufficient to render a defendant subject to
a foreign jurisdiction.94 Much of the difficulty stems from the fact that
the traditional personal jurisdiction framework developed at a time
when "jurisdictional lines followed state boundaries, and parties more
clearly understood the scope of their jurisdiction as well as the
location of other parties with whom they were transacting."' 95 In
contrast, cyberspace is a world without boundaries where businesses
and Internet users conduct transactions over the Internet, often
without knowledge of each other's physical location. 96
Applying the traditional, territorial-based minimum contacts
analysis to the Internet, which essentially "defies all territorial
constraints," 97 is understandably difficult.98
Nevertheless, the
traditional personal jurisdiction analysis has been and continues to be
applied by the courts addressing jurisdiction over Internet domain
name disputes. 99
In examining how the courts have addressed this issue, this Note
will first discuss the seminal Internet personal jurisdiction case, Zippo
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.00 This Note will then
consider how the various federal circuit courts have addressed the

93. See, e.g., Cendali, supra note 70, at 87-98 (outlining 49 federal cases that have
addressed the issue of personal jurisdiction and the Internet).
94. See Stravitz, supra note 3, at 926; Leonard Klingbaum, Note, Bensusan Restaurant
Corp. v. King: An ErroneousApplication of PersonalJurisdictionLaw to Internet-Based
Contacts (Using the Reasonableness Test to Ensure FairAssertions of PersonalJurisdiction
Based on Cyberspace Contacts), 19 PACE L. REv. 149,162 (1998).
95. Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1684.
96. See id. at 1685.
97. Andrew E. Costa, Comment, Minimum Contacts in Cyberspace: A Taxonomy of
the Case Law, 35 Hous. L. REV. 453, 456-57 (1998); see also Sanchez, supra note 2, at
1671-72 ("Because the Internet transcends geographic boundaries, the application to it of
territorially based [personal jurisdiction] doctrines is exceedingly difficult.").
98. See Stravitz, supranote 3, at 926; Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1685.
99. See, e.g., Stravitz, supra note 3, at 926 (stating that "[e]ven if flawed and
anachronistic, current [personal jurisdiction] doctrine is being applied by courts to resolve
Internet jurisdictional disputes").
100. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). For a discussion of Zippo, see infra notes 10313 and accompanying text.
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This Note will then

explore how various federal district courts have addressed the issues
and how their treatment is less consistent than that of the federal
circuit courts.' °2
The most influential case to address the issue of personal
jurisdiction over trademark disputes regarding Internet domain
names, Zippo ManufacturingCo. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.,03 involved
a trademark suit over the domain name "zippo.com" between Zippo
Manufacturing Co., a Pennsylvania-based company, and Zippo Dot
Coin, a California-based company? °4 In confronting the issue of
personal jurisdiction, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania summarized the existing law on Internet
jurisdiction and provided a useful framework for analyzing Internet
jurisdiction cases.'
The court stated that there is a spectrum, or a
"sliding scale," of three principal types of Internet jurisdiction
cases.10 6 At one end of the spectrum lies the situation in which a
business or person clearly conducts business over the Internet and has
repeated contacts with the forum state so that exercising jurisdiction
over the defendant is proper.'0 This end of the spectrum is often

referred to as the "doing business" category of the spectrum. 08 At

101. See infra notes 114-71 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 172-209 and accompanying text.
103. 952 F. Supp. at 1119.
104. See id. at 1121. In Zippo, Zippo Manufacturing Co., which produces cigarette
lighters, claimed that Zippo Dot Corn's registration of the domain names "zippo.com,"
"zippo.net," and "zipponews.com" infringed its trademark in the name "Zippo." See id.
Zippo Dot Corn's Web site contained "information about the company, advertisements
and an application for its Internet news service." Id. Its contacts with Pennsylvania were
exclusively over the Internet and consisted of two percent of its subscribers (3,000 out of
140,000 worldwide) residing in Pennsylvania and existing agreements with seven Internet
service providers in Pennsylvania to provide access to Zippo Dot Corn's news service. See
id. The court held that, based on these contacts with Pennsylvania, jurisdiction over Zippo
Dot Corn was proper. See id. at 1128. The court reasoned that because Zippo Dot Corn
sold passwords to 3,000 Pennsylvania residents and entered into agreements with Internet
providers it purposefully availed itself to contact with residents of the forum state and thus
could have anticipated being sued in Pennsylvania. See id. at 1126-27.
105. See Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1686-87.
106. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124; Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1686-87; Anindita
Dutta, Note, Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
289,291-92 (1998).
107. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. The court cited CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,89
F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996), as an example of a case on the "doing business" end of the
spectrum. For a discussion of CompuServe, see infra notes 114-30 and accompanying text.
108. For cases in which courts have found jurisdiction over defendants whose activities
fell into the "doing business" category, see CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,89 F.3d 1257,
1264-65 (6th Cir. 1996); InternationalStar Registry v. Bowman Haight Ventures, Inc., No.
98 C 6823, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7009, at *22-23 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 1999); Thompson v.
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the other end of the spectrum, the defendant has done nothing more
than post information on a Web site that is accessible to users in other
jurisdictions.109 At this end of the spectrum, often referred to as the
"passive Web site" category, jurisdiction is not proper."0 The court
then stated that t&ie middle ground between the two ends "is occupied
by interactive [w]eb sites where a user can exchange information with
the host computer" and that here, "the exercise of jurisdiction is
determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial
nature of the eichange of information that occurs on the [w]eb
site.""' This section of the spectrum is often referred to as the
"interactive" category of the spectrum." 2 Although the court's
description of the three types of cases is fairly broad, it has served as a
useful starting point for other courts to use in analyzing personal
jurisdiction over Internet-related disputes."
Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 743 (W.D. Tex. 1998); Superguide Corp. v. Kegan,
987 F. Supp. 481, 486-87 (W.D.N.C. 1997); Gary Scott Int'l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp.
714,715-16 (D. Mass. 1997).
109. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
110. See id.at 1124. The court cited Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F.Supp.
295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), as an example of a case on this end of the spectrum. For a discussion
of Bensusan, see infra notes 131-41 and accompanying text. On several occasions, courts
have denied personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose activities fell into the "passive
Web site" category. See Mink v. AAAA Dev., L.L.C, 190 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 1999);
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 416-20 (9th Cir. 1997); Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1997); Desktop Techs., Inc. v.
Colorworks Reprod. & Design, Inc., No. CIV. A. 98-5029, 1999 WL 98572, at *8-10 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 25, 1999); Patriot Sys., Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1324 (D. Utah
1998); No Mayo-San Francisco v. Memminger, No. C-98-1392PJH, 1998 WL 544974, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 1998); CFOs 2 Go, Inc. v. CFO 2 GO, Inc., No. C97-4676SI, 1998 WL
320821, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 1998); SF Hotel Co., L.P. v. Energy Invs., Inc., 985 F.
Supp. 1032, 1035-36 (D. Kan. 1997); Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 333 (D.N.J.
1997); Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356, 1356-66 (W.D. Ark. 1997);
IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1258, 1268 (N.D. Ill.
1997), vacated in
part on other grounds, 126 F.3d 537 543 (7th Cir. 1998); Graphic Controls Corp. v. Utah
Med. Prod., No. 96-CV-0459E(F), 1997 WL 276232, at *3--4 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 1997),
aff'd, 149 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 CIV. 3620 (PKL)
(AJP), 1997 WL 97097, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
111. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
112. Numerous courts have addressed cases that fall into the middle, "interactive"
category. The determination of whether personal jurisdiction is proper depends on the
facts of each case. SeeMillennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d
907, 923-24 (D. Or. 1999) (declining to find jurisdiction); GTE New Media Sers. Inc. v.
Ameritech Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 27, 38-39 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding jurisdiction); Scherr v.
Abrahams, No. 97C5453, 1998 WL 299678, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 1998) (declining to
find jurisdiction); Vitullo v. Velocity Powerboats, Inc., No. 97 C 8745, 1998 WL 246152, at
*6 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 27, 1998) (finding jurisdiction); E-Data Corp. v. Micropatent Corp., 989
F. Supp. 173, 176-78 (D. Conn. 1997) (declining to find jurisdiction); Maritz, Inc. v.
Cybergold, Inc. 947 F. Supp. 1328,1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (finding jurisdiction).
113. See, e.g., Millennium, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 915-16 (discussing the Zippo framework
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The federal circuit courts that have addressed the issue of
personal jurisdiction in trademark disputes over Internet domain
names have been relatively consistent with the framework established
by the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in
Zippo. One year earlier, CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson"4 presented
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit with a fact
pattern akin to the "doing business" end of the Zippo spectrum. In
CompuServe, the court overruled a decision by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio and held that the
defendant's Internet contacts with Ohio satisfied the due process
requirements." 5
Patterson, a Texas resident, entered into a
Shareware Registration Agreement (SRA) with CompuServe, an
Ohio-based computer information service company." 6 Under the
agreement Patterson sold software he created on CompuServe's
system to CompuServe subscribers, and in exchange, CompuServe
retained fifteen percent of the sales." 7 The SRA incorporated by8
reference an agreement that Ohio law was to govern all disputes.1
From 1991 to 1994, Patterson electronically transmitted thirty-two
software files to CompuServe which were stored in CompuServe's
system in Ohio." 9 In 1993, when CompuServe began marketing an
application similar to the one that Patterson had created, Patterson
notified CompuServe by e-mail that it was infringing his common law
trademark to the software. 2 After Patterson demanded at least
$100,000 to settle his claims, CompuServe brought a declaratory
judgment action in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio to determine whether it had infringed upon
Patterson contested the Court's personal
Patterson's trademarks.'
jurisdiction over him and the District Court dismissed the suit for lack
of personal jurisdiction."
Upon appeal the Sixth Circuit concluded that Patterson had
and stating that "[m]ost courts follow the reasoning set forth in ... Zippo"). But see
Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1687 (stating that the Zippo court's "categorization is not always
helpful, especially because the [middle ground] scenario and the [passive Web site]
scenario are not as clear as the court makes them out to be").
114. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
115. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1268-69.
116. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, No. C2-94-91, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20352,
*2-3, (S.D. Ohio Aug. 11, 1994).

117.
118.
119.
120.

See id.
See iL at *2.
See idL at *3-5.
See id. at *34.

121. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257,1261 (6th Cir. 1996).
122. See CompuServe, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20352, at *2.
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purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing business in Ohio
and that the district court had specific jurisdiction over Patterson.123
In finding that the purposeful availment prong of the due process
analysis was satisfied, the court emphasized that Patterson had
entered into an agreement with an Ohio company, had repeatedly
sent his software electronically to Ohio, and had signed an agreement
stating that Ohio law would govern the contract.1 24 Further, the court
stressed that Patterson initiated the contacts with CompuServe,
benefited from their agreement, and sent numerous e-mails to
CompuServe regarding his trademark claim.12s
After finding that Patterson's contacts with Ohio were
substantial enough to satisfy the first prong of the due process
analysis, the court held that the cause of action arose out of
Patterson's activities in Ohio.1 26 The court reasoned that because he
only submitted his software to the Ohio-based CompuServe, the
principle place where any trademark infringement would have
occurred is Ohio.' 27 The court then held that the reasonableness
prong of the due process analysis was satisfied and that it was not
unduly burdensome for Patterson to be haled into an Ohio court.'2 It
stated that because Patterson was an entrepreneur who knew that he
was entering into a contract agreement with an Ohio-based company
and because Ohio had a strong interest in the suit, jurisdiction over
Patterson was reasonable. 29 Thus, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
was consistent with the Zippo framework and found specific
jurisdiction in a case where there were continuous and multiple
contacts with the forum state and where
the "defendant clearly
'' 30
Internet.
the
over
business
in]
[engaged
In Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,"' the United States Court
123. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1267.
124. See id-at 1264.
125. See id. at 1265-66 ("The record demonstrates that Patterson not only purposefully
availed himself of CompuServe's Ohio-based services to market his software, but that he
also 'originated and maintained' contacts with Ohio when he believed that CompuServe's
competing product unlawfully infringed on his own software.").
126. See i& at 1267.
127. See iL
128. See iUt
at 1268.
129. See i. The court determined that the State of Ohio had a strong interest in the
suit because it involved an Ohio company, its law of common law trademarks would be
used, and because possibly more than $10 million could have been at stake for
CompuServe because the suit would affect how they operate their shareware business. See
id.
130. Zippo Mfg. Co.v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
131. 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
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of Appeals for the Second Circuit confronted a fact pattern that fits
the opposite end of the Zippo spectrum in which the defendant
operates a "passive Web site" and maintains no other contacts with
the forum state, thus making jurisdiction almost always improper. 132
In Bensusan, the defendant, Richard King, operated a Web site
promoting his small jazz club, "The Blue Note," located in Columbia,
Missouri, which contained the club's logo. 33 The plaintiff, Bensusan
Restaurant Corp., which operated the famous New York City jazz
club, "The Blue Note," and held a federally registered trademark on
the club's name,'1 sued King in the Southern District Court of New
York for trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair
competition. 35 The district court held that neither the New York
long-arm statute nor the Due Process Clause permitted jurisdiction
over King, and the Second Circuit affirmed. 35 The district court
focused on the passive nature of King's Web site137 in noting that King
did nothing to purposefully avail himself of the benefits of New York
law by posting a Web page on the Internet."3 It stated that King's
site was directed towards residents of Missouri and that King did not
encourage New Yorkers to access his site. Moreover, the court
emphasized that King had no other contacts with New York. 39 The
court also explained that "[c]reating a site, like placing a product into
the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide-or even
worldwide-but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed
toward [New York]."' The court distinguished the Sixth Circuit's
holding in CompuServe by stating that, in CompuServe, the defendant
specifically targeted the forum state and had multiple contacts with
the state. 4 ' By affirming the district court's decision, the Second
Circuit implicitly agreed, consistent with the Zippo framework, that
something more than merely placing a passive Web page on the
Internet is necessary to exercise personal jurisdiction in Internet
trademark disputes.
132. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (citing Bensusan as an example of a case where
personal jurisdiction is not proper because the defendant had a "passive Web site that
does little more than make information available to those who are interested in it").
133. See Bensusan, 126 F.3d at 26-27.
134. See id.
135. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295,297-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
136. See Bensusan, 126 F.3d at 29.
137. See Bensusan Restaurant,937 F. Supp. at 299-300.

138. See id at 300-01.
139. See id
140. Id. (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1992)
(plurality opinion)).
141. See id&
at 301.
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The Ninth Circuit adopted a similar position with respect to
passive Web sites in Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc." In Cybersell,
an Arizona corporation, Cybersell, Inc. (Cybersell AZ), which
provided Internet advertising and marketing services, brought a
trademark infringement suit in the District of Arizona against a
Florida corporation, Cybersell, Inc. (Cybersell FL), which provided
consulting services for marketing on the Web.'43 Cybersell AZ, which
had registered the name "Cybersell" as a service mark, alleged that
Cybersell FL's use of the word "Cybersell" and the phrase "Welcome
to Cybersell!" at the top of its Web page constituted trademark
infringement. 144 Cybersell FL moved to dismiss the suit for lack of
personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion, and the
Ninth Circuit affirmed. 45
The Ninth Circuit applied the traditional minimum contacts
analysis, examined other cases-including Bensusan and
CompuServe-in which courts have addressed personal jurisdiction in
cyberspace, and concluded that Cybersell FL had not purposefully
availed itself of the benefits and protections of Arizona.'46 The
court's conclusion rested on the fact that Cybersell FL had not
conducted any commercial activity in Arizona and had posted only a
passive Web site on the Internet. 47 The court further stated that, if it
were to find jurisdiction, then "every complaint arising out of alleged
trademark infringement on the Internet would automatically result in
personal jurisdiction wherever the plaintiff's principal place of
business is located," and that such a result would "not comport with
traditional notions of what qualifies as purposeful activity invoking
the benefits and protections of the forum state."'4 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit, as did the Second Circuit in Bensusan, acted consistently with
the Zippo framework and established that something more than the
mere placement of a Web page on the Internet is necessary to
establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a foreign state.
The following year the Ninth Circuit encountered a similar issue
in PanavisionInternational,LP v. Toeppen,' 49 but appeared to depart
somewhat from Cybersell and the Zippo framework. In Panavision,
142. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
143. See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 415.
144. ld at 415-16.

145. See id. at 420.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See idat 416-20.
See id at 419-20.
Id at 420 (citing Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244,1262 (9th Cir. 1985)).
141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Toeppen,

an

Illinois

resident

and

notorious

"cybersquatter,"' 50 registered the domain name "panavision.com"

with NSI and created a Web site with that domain name which
displayed photographs of Pana, Illinois.' 51 Panavision, a California
company which held a federally registered trademark to the name
"Panavision," sued Toeppen in the United States District Court for

the Central District of California for trademark dilution under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995152 after Toeppen attempted

to sell the domain name to Panavision for $13,000.153

The court

denied Toeppen's motion for dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction and entered summary judgment in favor of Panavision.154

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected Toeppen's argument that

"any contact he had with California was insignificant, emanating

solely from his registration of domain names on the Internet, which
he did in Illinois," and concluded that the purposeful availment prong

of the due process analysis was satisfied under the "forum effects
test." 155 Applying this test, the court reasoned that although Toeppen

had little contact with California, his scheme of registering a
California company's trademark as a domain name for the purpose of
extorting money from the company was akin to an intentional tort.'56
Thus, the court concluded that because Toeppen knew he would
harm Panavision and that Panavision's principle place of business was
in California, he should have anticipated being haled into court in
California when he registered the domain name and established the
57
Web page.

The court then stated that Panavision's claim arose out of
150. The court stated that "Toeppen has registered domain names for various ...
companies including Delta Airlines, Neiman Marcus, Eddie Bauer, Lufthansa, and over
100 other marks. Toeppen has attempted to 'sell' domain names for other trademarks
such as intermatic.com to Intermatic, Inc. for $10,000 and anericanstandard.com to
American Standard, Inc. for $15,000." Id at 1319.
151. See id
152. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). For a discussion of the claim of trademark dilution and the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, see supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
153. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616,619 (C.D. Cal 1996).
154. See id at 623.
155. Id. at 1322. Under the "effects test" first developed in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S.
783 (1984), personal jurisdiction can be established upon: "(1) intentional actions (2)
expressly aimed at the forum state (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered-and
which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered-in the forum state." Panavision,141
F.3d at 1321 (quoting Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir.
1993)). For a discussion of Calder,see supra note 88.
156. See id at 1321-22.
157. See id at 1322.
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Toeppen's California-related activities."'
Finally, the court
concluded that the second, reasonableness prong of the due process
analysis was satisfied and that California's exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Toeppen was not unduly burdensome. 59 The court
reasoned that because California had a strong interest in having the
suit adjudicated in the state and because Toeppen purposefully
subjected himself to a foreseeable suit in California, jurisdiction was
reasonable. 160 In finding specific personal jurisdiction over Toeppen,
the Panavisioncourt undercut the Zippo framework, which provided
that the mere establishment of a passive Web site without any other
contacts is not enough to justify jurisdiction. 61 Nevertheless, the
Ninth Circuit contended that the nature of "cybersquatting" is
sufficiently directed toward the state where the infringed party
resides to justify jurisdiction there and to distinguish it from cases
62
such as Cybersell and Bensusan.
In contrast to the Ninth Circuits' opinion in Panavision,the Fifth
Circuit recently adopted the position that a passive Web site will not
alone support a finding of personal jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants. In Mink v. AAAA Development, L.L.C., 63 David Mink,
a Texas resident, brought a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, against AAAA
Development, a Vermont corporation, and David Middlebrook, a
Vermont resident, alleging infringement of his federal copyright and
patent pending rights. 6 4 After initially having his suit dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction, Mink filed an unsuccessful motion for
reconsideration contending that the court had personal jurisdiction
over AAAA Development because AAAA's Web site was accessible
to Texas residents.' 65
On appeal the Fifth Circuit first held that specific jurisdiction was
improper because none of the alleged contacts were related to the
cause of action.'" The court then considered whether AAAA's
158.
159.
160.
161.

See id.
See id. at 1324.
See id. at 1322-24.
See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.

1997).
162. See Panavision,141 F.3d at 1322. The court stated, "As we said in Cybersell, there
must be 'something more' to demonstrate that the defendant directed his activity toward
the forum state ...Here, that has been shown." Id. (referring to Cybersell, Inc. v.
Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414,418 (9th Cir. 1997)).
163. 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999).

164. See idat 335.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 336. The court stated that Mink was "silent concerning where his
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advertisements on its Web site were substantial enough contacts to
justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over AAAA .167 In doing so,
the court expressly adopted the Zippo framework for the Fifth
Circuit.1" Consequently, the court determined that the Web site was
passive in nature because it only provided information about
AAAA's services, a printable mail-in order form, a telephone
number, a mailing address, and an e-mail address. 169 The defendant
neither conducted business over the Internet nor interacted over the
Thus, the court stated
Internet with any of the forum residents.
that the site fell into the side of the Zippo spectrum where personal
jurisdiction is not appropriate.17' By finding personal jurisdiction over
AAAA lacking, the Fifth Circuit held consistent with the Zippo
framework and, like the Second Circuit Court in Bensusan and the
Ninth Circuit in Cybersell,required more than just the placement of a
Web page on the Internet for a finding of personal jurisdiction.
In contrast to the federal circuit courts' adherence to and
application of the Zippo framework, the federal district courts'
assessments of personal jurisdiction in Internet-related trademark
disputes exhibit greater variances and inconsistencies. For example,
in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.," the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut strayed from the Zippo
spectrum established and exercised personal jurisdiction over
defendants who had rather limited contacts with the forum state.
Inset Systems, a Connecticut-based software development company,
brought a trademark infringement suit in Connecticut against
Instruction Set, Inc., a Massachusetts based computer technology
company, over Instruction Set's registration and use of the domain
name "inset.com."' 173 Inset Systems held a registered trademark in the
name "Inset" and wanted to prevent Instruction Set from using it as

contacts with the defendants occurred," but that it inferred that the contact was not in
Texas because of an affidavit which stated that AAAA had no sales in Texas and had
never had any employees travel to Texas for business purposes. lId at 335.
167. See id at 336.
168. See id (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124

(W.D. Pa. 1997)).
169. See id. at 337.
170. See id. The court stressed the fact that "AAAA's web site does not allow
consumers to order or purchase products and services on-line," and that "potential

customers are instructed by the web site to remit any completed order forms by regular
mail or fax." Id

171. See id
172. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
173. See iL at 162-63.
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their domain name.'74 The court applied a minimum contacts analysis
to the suit and held that specific jurisdiction was proper. 17 The court
ruled that although Instruction Set performed no business or
transactions in Connecticut, its placement of a Web page on the
Internet with an advertisement for its services and a toll-free phone
number was activity directed toward the state of Connecticut and
sufficient to satisfy the purposeful availment requirement. 176 The
court then concluded that Instruction Set's close proximity to
Connecticut and Connecticut's interest in adjudicating the suit
satisfied the reasonableness prong of the due process analysis. 77
Similarly, in Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.,178 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri found jurisdiction
179
over a defendant who operated an essentially passive Web site.
Maritz, a Missouri-based company, provided an e-mail service under
its trademark name "Goldmail" and alleged that advertisements by
Cybergold, a California-based company, about Cybergold's future email service on its Web site, "www.cybergold.com," infringed upon
Maritz's trademark and justified exercising jurisdiction over
Cybergold in Missouri.8 0 In finding jurisdiction over CyberGold, the
court held that CyberGold's contacts with Missouri satisfied the due
process analysis.'
In contesting personal jurisdiction, Cybergold argued that
because it had only posted information about its new e-mail service
on its site, the site was passive.'8 Nevertheless, the court reasoned
that because CyberGold was advertising on its Web page with the
174. See id.
175. See id. at 165.
176. See iL The court further suggested that Instruction Set had availed itself to the
jurisdiction of all of the states. See id. The court's minimum contacts analysis consisted of
essentially four sentences:
Instruction [Set] has directed its advertising activities via the Internet and its tollfree number toward not only the state of Connecticut, but to all states. The
Internet as well as toll-free numbers is designed to communicate with people and
their businesses in every state. Advertisements on the Internet can reach as many
as 10,000 Internet users within Connecticut alone. Further, once posted on the
Internet, unlike television and radio advertising, the advertisement is available
continuously to any Internet user. [Instruction Set] has therefore, purposefully
availed itself of the privilege of doing business within Connecticut.
177. See id
178. 947 F. Supp. 1328,1334 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
179. See id.

180. See id- at 1329-30.
181. See id- at 1331-34.
182. See id- at 1333.

2000]

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

2129

intent of obtaining customers from other jurisdictions and because
approximately 131 Missouri residents had visited CyberGold's site,
the purposeful availment prong was satisfied.183 The reasonableness
prong was satisfied because Missouri had an interest in having the suit
adjudicated in Missouri and because CyberGold did not demonstrate
that litigating in Missouri would be overly burdensome.'1 4 Thus, as
the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut did in
Inset, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri in Maritz found personal jurisdiction over a defendant with
a passive Web site and rather limited contacts with the forum state.
Both decisions are contrary to the spectrum established in Zippo.185
In contrast to Inset and Maritz, in Millennium Enterprises,Inc. v.
8 6 the United States District Court for the
Millennium Music, L.P.,"
District of Oregon found personal jurisdiction lacking in a case with
facts more supportive of jurisdiction. In Millennium, Millennium
Enterprises, Inc., an Oregon-based music store, sued Millennium
Music, L.P., a South Carolina-based music store that sold music
through retail outlets and through a Web site for trademark
inftingement.'8 The plaintiff asserted that personal jurisdiction was
proper because of the defendant's Web site, its sale of compact disks
(CDs) to residents of Oregon, and its purchases of small amounts of
CDs from an Oregon supplier.ls 8 The court quickly dismissed the
plaintiff's arguments that the defendant's sale of CDs to Oregon
residents and the purchase of CDs from an Oregon supplier were
sufficient to warrant jurisdiction. 89 The court then dismissed the
183. See id at 1333-34.

184. See id. at 1334.
185. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text.
186. 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. Or. 1999).
187. See i'L at 908-09.
188. See id. at 909-11.
189. See id. at 911-12. The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim that jurisdiction was
proper because the only Web-based customer the defendant had in Oregon was an
acquaintance of the plaintiff's council, who had been asked by the attorney to purchase a
CD from the defendant, apparently to establish contacts. See id. The court explained that
the defendant "cannot be said to have 'purposely' availed [itself] of the protections of this
forum when it was an act of someone associated with plaintiff, rather than defendant's
Web site advertising, that brought defendant's product into this forum." Id. at 911. It
continued, "[t]he court is dismayed by plaintiff's counsel's lack of candor ... Such
questionable and unprofessional tactics cannot subject defendants to jurisdiction in this
forum." Id. With regard to the purchases from an Oregon supplier, the court dismissed
the plaintiff's argument that these purchases justified personal jurisdiction because the
court stated that the minimal purchases were not related to the suit. It indicated that
plaintiffs "assert no ascertainable loss caused by defendant's purchase of inventory from
[an Oregon supplier]." Id. at 912.
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plaintiffs claim that the defendant's interactive Web site supported
the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 90 Initially, the court stated that
the case fell into the middle of the Zippo spectrum.191 It then stated
that because there was no evidence that the defendant had directed
its activities toward Oregon or transacted business in Oregon and
because the defendant could not have foreseen being sued in Oregon,
there was no purposeful availment.'9 Although the court did not
need to address the reasonableness prong after finding a lack of
purposeful availment, it indicated that special consideration should be
given to Internet cases because small businesses might be discouraged
from operating on the Internet out of fear of being subject to the
jurisdiction of all fifty states. 93 The District Court for the District of
Oregon's decision in Millennium was consistent with the Zippo
framework by not finding jurisdiction where the defendant had an
interactive Web site, but did not direct its activity towards the forum
state.
In InternationalStar Registry v. Bowman-Haight Ventures, Inc.,94
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division addressed a case with a factual scenario that falls
into Zippo's "doing business" category. In InternationalStar Registry,
the plaintiff, International Star Registry of Illinois (ISRI), an Illinois
corporation, sued Bowman-Haught Ventures, Inc. (BHV), a Virginia
corporation, alleging, among other things, trademark infringement
and unfair competition.'95 BHV argued that Illinois lacked personal
190. See id. at 913-23. The court characterized the Inset decision as "inauspicious" and
stated that "the trend has shifted away from finding jurisdiction based solely on the
existence of Web site advertising." Id. at 915.
191. See id. at 920. As the court stated that "[a]rguably, the capability of selling
compact discs through the Web site could constitute 'doing business' over the Internet and
confer personal jurisdiction almost as a matter of course." Id. The court reasoned,
however, that because the defendant's sales of CDs over the Internet had not been
directed to Oregon at all, the defendant's acts amounted to less than "doing business" in
the Zippo spectrum. See id.
192. See id. at 920-23. The court further distanced itself from the Inset and Maritz
courts when it stated:
Not surprisingly, plaintiff relies on Inset and Maritz for the proposition that
jurisdiction over the operator of a Web site is proper if the site is interactive....
However, the court finds lacking in Inset and Maritz the principle that a
defendant must "purposefully direct" its activities at or take "deliberate action"
in or create "substantial connection" with the forum state so as to provide "fair
warning" that such activities may subject defendant to jurisdiction in a distant
forum.
Id. at 922 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,472 (1985)).
193. See Millennium, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 923.
194. No. 98 C 6823, 1999 WL 300285 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 1999).
195. See id. at *1.
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jurisdiction over it despite the fact that BHV had interacted with
Illinois residents over the Internet and had sold twenty-two star
registrations to Illinois residents through its Web9 6site using an
"Electronic Secure Order Form" for credit card sales.
The court found that BHV's activities fell into the "doing
business" category of the Zippo framework.' 7 Although BHV did
not "target or tailor" its business to Illinois, it did benefit
economically from Internet users in Illinois who purchased goods
from BHV over the Internet. 198 Further, the court stated that because
BHV allegedly infringed an Illinois company's trademark while
contracting with Illinois residents, BHV's conduct in Illinois was
related to the controversy in question. 199 Thus, the court concluded

that the purposeful availment prong was satisfied.20 Then, without
actually assessing the reasonableness of requiring the defendant to
litigate in Illinois, the court stated that an exercise of personal
jurisdiction was consistent with the Due Process Clause.2° The
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, thus, held
relatively consistent with the Zippo framework and found jurisdiction
over a defendant who did business over the Internet with residents of
the forum state. Its failure to perform an actual analysis under the
reasonableness prong, however, is suspect.
In Desktop Technologies, Inc. v. Colorworks Reproduction &
Design, Inc.,' the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania acted in accord with Zippo framework when
it refused to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose
Internet activities were essentially passive. Desktop Technologies,
Inc., a Pennsylvania company, brought a trademark infringement suit
against Colorworks Reproduction & Design, Inc., a company based
out of Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. 20 3 Desktop alleged that
Colorworks' use of the domain name "colorworks.com" infringed
Desktop's federally registered trademark in "COLORWORKS" and
allowed Colorworks to compete unfairly with Desktop in the United
States . ' While Desktop contended that Colorwork's Web site
196. See id.
at *1-2.
197. See id. at *6.
198. Id.
at *7.
199. See id.
200. See id. at *8.
201. See id.
202. No. CIV. A. 98-5029,1999 WL 98572 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25,1999).
at *1.
203. See id.
204. See il Colorworks, had a trademark in "ColorWorks," which was registered in
Canada. See id
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supported jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, 20 5 the court agreed with
Colorworks and dismissed Desktop's suit.2 6 Although Colorwork's
Web site was equipped to receive e-mails from customers, it did not
allow customers to place orders online and had nothing more than
information and advertisements about its services. 2° Thus the court
classified the Web site as passive and held that because Colorworks
had no other contacts with Pennsylvania, neither general nor specific
jurisdiction could be exercised over Colorworks.208 Relying on
Panavision and Cybersell to support its holding that specific
jurisdiction was not proper, the court stated that "something more"
than registering another's trademark as a domain name and placing it
on the Internet was necessary for the purposeful availment prong to
be satisfied 09 The District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, thus, ruled consistently with the Zippo framework and
did not find jurisdiction where the defendant's Web site was passive
in nature and the defendant had taken no other action toward the
forum state.
Although a few district courts within the Fourth Circuit have
addressed the issue of personal jurisdiction in Internet trademark
disputes,210 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to address
such a case and the body of law within the Fourth Circuit is
predictably incipient. This Note will now discuss how the courts of
the Fourth Circuit, including the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
should address these disputes. In addressing the issue of personal
jurisdiction in trademark disputes over Internet domain names, the
courts of the Fourth Circuit should take the following measures.
First, the courts should adopt an approach consistent with the
spectrum established in Zippo. Second, they should refrain from
finding personal jurisdiction in cases similar to those in which the
courts did find jurisdiction in Inset, Maritz, and Panavision. Third,
205. See id
206. See id. at *6.

207. See id. at *3-4. The court emphasized the fact that Colorwork's site specifically
directed its customers to fax their orders, and that it stated that it would not begin working
on the order until it was verified by telephone. See id
208. See id at *4-6.
209. See id at *5. Of course, in Panavision,the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found
jurisdiction over a cybersquatter who registered someone else's trademark as a domain
name and posted a Web site on the Internet. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141
F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998). In that case, however, the court emphasized that because
the defendant intentionally harmed the plaintiff and knew the plaintiff was located in
California, there was "something more," and California's exercise of jurisdiction over him
was within the bounds of due process. See id. at 1322.
210. See, e.g., supranote 4.
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they should follow CompuServe, Bensusan, Cybersell, Millennium,

and Desktop and require more than just the placement of a passive
Web page on the Internet for a finding of personal jurisdiction.

Fourth, they should place more emphasis on the reasonableness
prong of the 'due process analysis when considering whether

exercising personal jurisdiction is proper in Internet-related cases.
Taking an extreme approach, such as concluding that jurisdiction
is everywhere or nowhere, does not resolve the issue of personal

jurisdiction over Internet domain name disputes.21' Rather, a middle
ground is necessary, in which a factual determination establishes

whether jurisdiction is proper. For this reason, the spectrum of
Internet cases discussed in Zippo is a useful starting point for a court
assessing whether personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper.1
The courts of the Fourth Circuit should recognize this benefit and
adopt the Zippo framework as a starting point to its jurisdictional
analysis.213
Of course, the framework established in Zippo is only a starting
point. The courts must conduct a factual inquiry and determine in
which of the three categories the defendant's activity falls. Then, in
the likely event that it falls into the middle, or "interactive"

category,21 4 the court must examine "the level of interactivity and
commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the

Web site" and between the parties.21 5 Nevertheless, as did many of
211. See, e.g., Stravitz, supra note 3, at 939 ("[D]isputes over personal jurisdiction
arising from Internet contact cannot be resolved by equally objectionable extremesjurisdiction everywhere or jurisdiction nowhere. Some reasonably predictable middle
position is desirable.").
212. See, e.g., Richard Philip Rollo,Note, The Morass of Internet PersonalJurisdiction.
It is Time for a Paradigm Shift, 51 FLA. L. REV. 667, 692 (1999) ("The largest benefit of
the Zippo test is that it is very flexible."); Russell, supra note 73 at 181 (stating that the
Zippo framework "is well-reasoned and thoughtful").
213. Numerous courts have used the Zippo framework to assess personal jurisdiction in
Internet related disputes. See Mink v. AAAA Devs., L.L.C., 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir.
1999); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997); International
Star Registry v. Bowman-Haight Ventures, Inc., No. 98C 6823, 1999 WL 300285, at *4-6
(N.D. Ill. May 6, 1999); Resnick v. Marfredy, 52 F. Supp. 2d 462, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1999);
Desktop Techs., Inc. v. Colorworks Reprod. & Design, Inc., No. CIV. A. 98 5029, 1999
WL 98572, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1999); Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music,
LP., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907,916 (D. Or. 1999).
214. Future Internet personal jurisdiction cases likely will fall into the interactive
category because as business on the Internet grows, interactive Web sites are likely to be
developed by companies seeking to obtain an Internet presence. See Sanchez, supra note
2, at 1704 ("as the Internet and the Web become more popular, most contacts will fall into
this nebulous middle category and will involve activities occurring only in cyberspace").
215. Zippo Mfg. Co.v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
The court further stated that "our review of the available cases and materials reveals that
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the courts that have addressed this issue, the courts of the Fourth
Circuit should start with the assumptions grounded in the Zippo
analysis-something more than Web site advertising is necessary to
establish jurisdiction and that at a certain point Internet contacts with
residents of the forum state become sufficient to warrant being haled
into court.216
The decisions in Inset and Maritz conflict with the assumption in
the Zippo analysis that something more than a passive Web site is
necessary to satisfy the purposeful availment prong of the due process
analysis. 217 In both cases, the courts found specific personal
jurisdiction over defendants who had limited contacts with the forum
states and who had little to no interaction with residents of the forum
states.2 18 In Inset, the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut found jurisdiction over the defendant although the
defendant had an essentially passive Web site, had not performed any
business transactions in Connecticut, and had no proof that any of the
defendant's advertisements on the Internet were accessed by any
Connecticut residents.2 9 Similarly, in Maritz, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri found jurisdiction
over a defendant who had a primarily passive Web site, had not
performed any business transactions in Missouri (nor anywhere else
for that matter, as the Web site was solely an advertisement for future
services), and whose site had been accessed by only 131 Missouri
residents.P

the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly
proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over
the Internet." IL
The framework established in Zippo has been criticized by some as being too
broad in its approach to be useful. See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1704 (contending
that the Zippo court "never defines the middle category nor does it provide a suggestion
as to how cases falling under the category should be treated" and that the analysis "fails to
recognize that, as the Internet and the web become more popular, most Internet contacts
will fall into this nebulous middle category and will involve activities occurring only in
cyberspace").
216. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
217. See, e.g., Millennium Enters., Inc., v Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907,
922 (D. Or. 1999) (stating that "the court finds lacking in Inset and Maritz the principle
that a defendant must purposefully direct its activities at or take deliberate action in or
create substantial connection with the forum state so as to provide fair warning that such
activities may subject defendant to jurisdiction in a distant forum" (internal quotations
omitted)); Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1706 (stating that the courts in Inset and Maritz
"incorrectly applied the purposeful availment requirement").
218. See supra notes 172-85 and accompanying text (discussing Inset and Maritz).
219. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161,165 (D. Conn. 1996).
220. See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
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The decisions in Inset and Maritz are further problematic
because in those cases, the courts indicated that the mere act of
placing a Web site on the Internet may be enough to subject the
defendant to personal jurisdiction in all fifty states, because it is
foreseeable that one's Web site could be accessed everywhere. l
These courts seem to have adopted a stream-of-commerce theory to
support their finding of jurisdiction. That is, both courts appear to
have suggested that the defendants purposefully availed themselves
to the forum states by placing products (Web sites) into the stream of
commerce (the Internet) with the awareness that the products may
end up in the forum states. By adopting an approach to Internet
jurisdiction analogous to the stream-of-commerce theory, the two
courts used a theory that a plurality of the Supreme Court rejected in
Asahi Metal Industry Company v. Superior Court of California.2 In
Asahi, Justice O'Connor addressed the principal problem of the
stream of commerce theory when she stated that "a defendant's
awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the
product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing
the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward
the forum State. ' m Another problem with the stream-of-commerce
approach is that it essentially robs potential defendants of their ability
"to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as
to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit." 4
The stream of commerce approach, thus, leaves potential defendants
open to suits in states in which they have little or no contacts, and
without the ability to predict where they will be subject to
jurisdiction.5
For all of these reasons, the courts of the Fourth Circuit should
avoid exercising jurisdiction in cases with factual similarity to either
Inset or Maritz. By doing so, the courts will maintain consistency with
the Zippo framework and thus will avoid finding jurisdiction over
221. In Inset, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut suggested
that the defendant "directed its advertising activities via the Internet... toward not only
the state of Connecticut, but to all states." Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165. In Maritz, the
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri was less blunt. It stated that by having
its advertisements on the Internet accessed by Missouri residents, the defendant
purposefully availed itself to privilege of conducting business in Missouri. See Maritz, 947
F. Supp. at 1333. This reasoning leads to the conclusion that the defendant purposefully
availed itself of the benefits to any state whose residents have accessed the defendant's
site.

222.
223.
224.
225.

480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion).
Id.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,297 (1980).
See Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1706.
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defendants who solely place passive Web sites on the Internet.
Further, the courts of the Fourth Circuit will avoid adopting an
approach similar to the stream-of-commerce theory rejected by a
plurality of the Supreme Court in Asahi.
For similar reasons, the courts of the Fourth Circuit should be
cautious in using Panavision as precedent for justifying a finding of
jurisdiction when a defendant has done nothing more than register a
domain name that is also a company's registered trademark. In this
situation, purposeful availment is likely lacking. 6 In Panavision,the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used the "forum effects test" 7 to find
jurisdiction over the defendant, Toeppen, whose sole contact with
California was the registration and use of a California company's
trademark as a domain name.m The court took the "forum effects
test" to its limits and ignored Cybersell, which the court decided
several months earlier.? 9 In Cybersell, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the use of the "forum effects test" in an Internet
trademark dispute, stating that "the 'effects' test [does not] apply with
the same force to [a corporation] as it would to an individual, because
a corporation 'does not suffer harm in a particular geographic
location in the same sense that an individual does.' "230 The unique
nature of Panavision's business possibly justifies the use of the
"effects test" in the specific case." Panavision is a California-based
company involved in the movie and television industry that conducts
almost all of its business in California. Consequently, Toeppen likely
knew that his actions would affect Panavision specifically in
California? 2 Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine another situation in
226. In Panavision,although the court found jurisdiction in a very similar situation, it
stated, "We agree that simply registering someone else's trademark as a domain name and
posting a web site on the Internet is not sufficient to subject a party domiciled in one state
to jurisdiction in another." Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir.
1998).
227. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
228. See Panavision,141 F.3d at 1322.
229. See Scott D. Sanford, Note, Nowhere to Run ...Nowhere to Hide: Trademark
Holders Reign Supreme In Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 1, 33-34 (1999) (stating that in Panavision, "the Ninth Circuit's application of the
Calder effects test, to establish personal jurisdiction, is in direct conflict with its previous
decision in Cybersell").
230. Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 420 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting CoreVent Corp. v. Nobel Indus., 11 F.3d 1482,1486 (9th Cir. 1993)).

231. In using the Calder "effects test," the court stressed the fact that "[Toeppen's]
conduct, as he knew it likely would, had the effect of injuring Panavision in California
where Panavision has its principal place of business and where the movie and television
industry is centered." Panavision,141 F.3d at 1321-22 (emphasis added).

232. See id.

2000]

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

2137

which a court could find that harm against a corporation from
trademark infringement, without other contacts, is sufficient to justify
a finding of personal jurisdiction in the corporation's principal place
of business. For this reason, the courts of the Fourth Circuit should
require more than the act of registering another's trademark as a
domain name and posting a Web site on the Internet for them to find
the purposeful availment prong satisfied, regardless of the intentions
of the infringing party.
Further, one of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' principal
justifications for finding personal jurisdiction in Panavision was the
bad faith intent of Toeppen to profit from his registration of
Panavision's trademark. 3 The court was justifiably unsympathetic to
Toeppen and, although it didn't specifically say so, was more likely to
allow Panavision to adjudicate its suit in its forum of choice and find
that California's exercise of jurisdiction over Toeppen was reasonable
because of Toeppen's bad faith. The court's concern for not
burdening Panavision's ability to find jurisdiction over cybersquatters
would likely have been diminished, however, had the
Anticybersquatting Actf passed by Congress in late 1999 been
As mentioned previously, the
available to Panavision.
Anticybersquatting Act was passed specifically to protect the
trademark holder whose trademark was registered as a domain name
by a person with bad faith intent to profit from the registration.235
The Act allows for trademark owners to obtain in rem jurisdiction
over the domain name in the judicial district of the domain name
registration company where the domain name was registered. 6
Thus, the Anticybersquatting Act provides trademark holders with
jurisdictional alternatives unavailable at the time the Ninth Circuit
addressed Panavision.
The courts of the Fourth Circuit should recognize this difference
and avoid exercising personal jurisdiction over even bad faith
infringers if the exercise would be overly burdensome on the
defendant and perhaps unreasonable under the second prong of the
Under the Anticybersquating Act, the
due process analysis.
trademark holder would still have the option of bringing an in rem
action in the jurisdiction of the domain name registration companyP 7
233. See id at 1322.
234. Act of Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-545 to 552 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d) (1998 & Supp. 2000)).
235. See supranotes 61-68 and accompanying text.
236. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(2)(A).
237. See id § 1125(d)(2)(A).
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Further, two of the largest domain name registration companies,
Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) and America Online, are located
within the Fourth Circuit (both are Virginia-based companies). Thus,
if the domain name in question was registered with either of these
companies, the trademark holder will likely have an option of
bringing an in rem suit within a nearby jurisdiction, if not the
jurisdiction in which it desired to bring the suit in the first place.
After examining precedent that the courts of the Fourth Circuit
should avoid, it is clear that the courts of the Fourth Circuit should
adopt an approach similar to that taken by the courts in Zippo,
CompuServe, Bensusan, Cybersell, Mink, Millennium, and Desktop
and remain cautious in their purposeful availment analysis. When the
defendant's activity falls into Zippo's "doing business" category,"'
the purposeful availment prong is likely satisfied and the courts
should find jurisdiction.2?9 The facts in CompuServe, such as the
defendant repeatedly sending electronic files to CompuServe's
computers in Ohio and signing an agreement to adjudicate all suits in
Ohio,m clearly indicate that the defendant knew he was dealing with
an Ohio corporation and purposefully availed himself of Ohio's
laws.24' Should a court in the Fourth Circuit address a case with
factual similarity to CompuServe the court should likely find
jurisdiction over the defendant.
Nevertheless, the courts should not end their due process
analysis after finding that the contacts fall into "doing business"
category. They still must consider whether exercising jurisdiction
over the defendant satisfies the reasonableness prong.
In
InternationalStar Registry v. Bowman-Haight Ventures, Inc.,242 the

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division,
found personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose contacts fell into
the "doing business" category but failed to consider the
reasonableness of jurisdiction over the defendant. 243 Although the
238. See supra note 107-08 and accompanying text (asserting that a court may exercise
jurisdiction over a party that frequently engages in business interactions with residents of
the forum state).
239. See, e.g., Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907,
916 (D. Or. 1999) (stating that "courts generally have exercised jurisdiction in cases ...
where the defendant 'conducted business' over the Internet").
240. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257,1260-61 (6th Cir. 1996).
241. See id at 1266.

242. No. 98L6823,1999 WL 300285 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 1999).
243. See iL at *7. Rather than actually perform an analysis of whether exercising
jurisdiction over the defendant satisfied the reasonableness prong of the due process
analysis, the court simply stated that "the facts as presented establish that defendant has
sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois such that exercise of personal jurisdiction meets
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court probably would have held that jurisdiction was reasonable after
performing World-Wide Volkswagen's five reasonableness factor
analysis, 244 the court's omission of this analysis was an error. The
courts of the Fourth Circuit should not make the same mistake.2 45
In cases that fall into the "passive" category under the Zippo
246
framework, the purposeful availment prong is usually not satisfied.
Consequently, in these situations, the courts of the Fourth Circuit
should restrain from finding personal jurisdiction. In Bensusan,
Cybersell, and Desktop, the courts correctly held that because the
defendants in each case had only placed Web sites on the Internet
containing trademarks of the companies in the forum states and had
done nothing else to contact the forum states, the defendants had not
purposefully availed themselves of the laws of those states 47 These
holdings are consistent with the traditional personal jurisdiction
notion that something more than just the mere placement of a
product in the stream of commerce is necessary for a finding of
purposeful availment of a particular forum.2' For this reason, when
the courts of the Fourth Circuit encounter cases involving passive
Web sites, they should adopt a similar position.
In trademark disputes with interactive Web sites that fall into the
middle Zippo category, the courts of the Fourth Circuit should
perform a factual analysis to determine if the level of interactivity and
the commercial nature of the Web site is such that the purposeful
availment prong is satisfied. In performing this analysis, the courts of
the Fourth Circuit should follow the example of the District Court for
the District of Oregon in Millennium, and only find jurisdiction if the
defendant actually interacts with residents of the forum state. A
court should not only examine the Web site's interactive capacity, but
also whether residents of the forum state actually interacted with the
traditional standards of fair play and substantial justice. Exercise of personal jurisdiction
[under these facts] does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment ....
" Id.
244. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,292 (1980); see also

supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing the reasonableness prong and the
five factors established by the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen).
245. For a further discussion of how the courts of the Fourth Circuit should use the
reasonableness prong in its due process analysis for personal jurisdiction and the Internet,
see infra notes 253-59 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907,
916 (stating that "[m]ost courts ... decline to assert jurisdiction based solely on Web site

advertising").
247. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 420 (9th Cir. 1997); Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295,301 (S.D. N.Y. 1996).
248. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 (1980).
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site. In Millennium, the court reasoned that although the defendant's
Web site was interactive and users could order products through it,
the defendant did not purposely avail itself of the forum state because
no residents in the forum state had accessed the service. 249 Thus,
despite the Zippo framework allowing jurisdiction in similar
situations involving interactive Web sites, the court reasoned that
jurisdiction was not proper because the defendant did not direct his
actions to the specific forum state1 0 This reasoning is consistent with
the traditional personal jurisdiction notion that exercising personal
jurisdiction over a defendant who purposefully avails himself to suit
in a forum state is justified when the defendant receives "the benefits
and protections of [the forum state's] laws."5 1 The courts of the
Fourth Circuit should take a similar approach and require something
more than just an interactive Web site to establish jurisdiction. They
should require activity by the defendant directed toward the forum
state and actual interaction with organizations or residents of the
forum state for the purposeful availment prong to be satisfied.
If the courts of the Fourth Circuit determine that the purposeful
availment prong is satisfied, they should avoid the mistake made in
InternationalStar Registry and consider whether the reasonableness
prong is satisfied.25 2 After a court determines that the minimum
contacts-purposeful availment prong is satisfied, the typical court
performs a cursory analysis under the reasonableness prong and
usually enters a finding of jurisdiction. 3 The failure to consider fully
249. See Millennium, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 920-23. Of course, as mentioned, see supra note
189, an acquaintance of the plaintiff's attorneys purchased a compact disk through the
Web site. See id. at 911. Nevertheless, the court did not consider this contact in its
analysis since the plaintiff manufactured it. See id
250. See id. at 921. The court stated:
On its face, the site.would appear to suffice for personal jurisdiction under the
middle category in Zippo; the level of potential interactivity, while not
necessarily high, is not insubstantial. Further, the potential exchange of
information can be commercial in nature. However, the court finds that the
middle interactive category of Internet contacts as described in Zippo needs
further refinement to include the fundamental requirement of personal
jurisdiction: "deliberate action" within the forum state in the form of
transactions between the defendant and residents of the forum or conduct of the
defendant purposefully directed at residents of the forum state.
Id (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,788-90 (1984)).
251. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,253 (1958).
252. See supranotes 242-45 and accompanying text.
253. See, e.g., Stravitz, supra note 3, at 940 ("Although most courts deciding Internet
jurisdictional disputes engage in two-branch due process analysis, many of their opinions
seem primarily grounded on conventional views of minimum contacts. The fair play and
substantial justice branch either gets short shift or is added as an afterthought to buttress a
decision already made."); Sanchez, supra note 2, at 1709 ("There is a troubling trend
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whether or not a finding of jurisdiction would comport with
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"

4

is a grave

mistake. In trademark disputes over Internet domain names, courts
should place even more emphasis on the reasonableness prong of the
due process analysis than they do in non-Internet-related suitsP 5
A great advantage of the Internet is that it allows for businesses
to reach a wide audience without incurring significant start-up costs
and time investment 6 As a result, small businesses with little capital
are able to function on the Internet but at the same time probably

cannot afford the costs of litigating matters throughout the country.
Small businesses may be discouraged from obtaining an Internet
presence to expand their business, if doing so would subject them to
jurisdiction in every state. The District Court for the District of
Oregon expressed this concern in Millennium, when it remarked that
"[b]usinesses offering products through the Internet, particularly
small businesses, might forego this efficient and accessible avenue of

commerce if faced with the 'litigious nightmare of being subject to
suit' in every jurisdiction in this country." 7 The courts of the Fourth
Circuit should recognize this reality and not impose unreasonable
standards that might discourage businesses from utilizing the Internet
out of fear of being subjected to costly litigation in foreign
jurisdictionsP 5 Rather, in their reasonableness prong analysis, the
courts should carefully consider the circumstances of each defendant
and whether forcing the defendant to defend itself in a given forum is
reasonable. Even if a Fourth Circuit court finds that a defendant has
purposefully availed itself of the laws of the forum state, the court
should not exercise jurisdiction over the defendant if doing so would
among some courts that have addressed the issue of personal jurisdiction in cyberspace to
disregard the predictability aspect of due process" and to set aside concerns of
inconvenience of the forum for the defendant.).
254. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945).
255. See Stravitz, supra note 3, at 940 (advocating the shifting of emphasis to the
second branch of the due process analysis for Internet-related jurisdictional questions).
256. See Dutta, supra note 106, at 302.
257. Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907, 923 (D.
Or. 1999) (quoting Donnie L. Kidd, Jr., Casting the Net: Another Confusing Analysis of
PersonalJurisdictionand Internet Contacts in Telco Communications v. An Apple a Day,
32 U. RICH. L. REV. 505,541 (1998)).
258. Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that courts should not concern
themselves with the minimum contacts test in Internet jurisdiction cases and instead focus
solely on whether exercising jurisdiction over the defendant would satisfy the
reasonableness prong. See Stravitz, supranote 3, at 940 ("Focusing the crucial due process
analysis on the second branch may not substantially improve predictability. But at least
the inquiry will focus on fair play and substantial justice, which are the objectives that the
Due Process Clause is intended to promote.").
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cause unreasonable harm to the defendant.159

The traditional, territorial-based due process analysis for
personal jurisdiction was developed almost a half-century before the
Internet drastically changed the means by which people and
businesses operate. Consequently, the traditional personal
jurisdiction analysis does not address many of the problems posed by
the issue of how to assess personal jurisdiction over a defendant
whose sole contacts with a forum state are over the Internet. Some
have suggested that a new, unique analysis for assessing personal
jurisdiction over the Internet should be implemented because of the
inadequacy of the traditional analysis2 6 Others have argued that the
traditional framework can adequately address the issue and that the
Internet is no different from other increases in technology in the
twentieth century that led the Supreme Court to its decision in
InternationalShoe 61 Until the Supreme Court addresses this issue or
some other federal action is taken, courts must apply the traditional
due process analysis in domain name disputes and other suits
involving Internet contacts. Because of the unique nature of these
suits, the courts of the Fourth Circuit must be prudent in assessing
personal jurisdiction. They must avoid taking extreme measures in
either direction and only find jurisdiction when the Internet contacts
clearly demonstrate purposeful availment and the exercise of
jurisdiction in the forum state would not unduly burden the particular
defendant.
CHRISTOPHER M. KINDEL

259. As one commentator stated, "It would be unfair to subject a business ... which
existed solely on the Internet, to the same standards as a franchise corporation like
McDonald's, whose Web page is insignificant in comparison to all of its other commercial
activities." Dutta, supranote 106, at 302.
260. See Costa, supra note 97, at 494 ("Because a number of conceptual and practical
problems arise due to the differences between cyberspace and real space, the only
resolution is to carve out a distinct legal paradigm for cyberspace. Cyberspace must be
treated as a place unto itself where entry subjects the entrant to its laws."); Rollo, supra
note 212, at 694 (advocating the adoption of a separate "cyberspace" jurisdiction); Russell,
supra note 73, at 177 ("Some commentators have thrown in the towel. They have
concluded that the law of personal jurisdiction is simply not compatible with new means of
electronic communications.").
261. See Alan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdictionin Cyberspace, 32
INT'L LAW. 1167,1179-91 (1998); Russell, supra note 73, at 176-79.

